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Research on Muslim women in India has increased in recent years, but 
remains sparse. The few existing studies rarely examine the interplay of religion and 
gender on Muslim women, nor do they investigate the historical influences shaping 
Muslim women’s lives.  Using the National Sample Survey (NSS), this dissertation 
seeks to make a unique contribution to the literature by examining Muslim women’s 
educational enrollment and wage employment in the context of three historical forces: 
modernization, religious discrimination and disadvantage, and the rise of Hindu 
fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics.  
 We find that modernization has played an important role in increasing school 
enrollment for children ages 12 to 15.  Modernizing forces have also influenced 
employment in India, modestly increasing wage employment.  While Muslims have 
  
benefited from modernizing forces, they continue to face discrimination and 
disadvantage in the educational system and labor market; therefore they have lower 
levels of school enrollment and slightly lower engagement in wage employment 
compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus.  There is also evidence that the rise of 
Hindu fundamentalism has had a negative impact on Muslim enrollment and wage 
employment over time, however these effects appear greater for Muslim enrollment 
compared to Muslim wage employment.  Evidence suggests that enrollment for 
Muslims above the poverty line may have been more affected by Hindu 
fundamentalism relative to poorer Muslims from 1983 to 1987; however, wealthier 
and poorer Muslims appear similarly affected by Hindu fundamentalism after 1987. 
Contrary to expectations, results suggest that poorer Muslim’s wage employment is 
more affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism relative to wealthier Muslims.  As 
expected, the interplay of religion and gender has affected Muslim women’s 
enrollment and wage employment.  Specifically, they experience lower levels of 
enrollment and wage employment compared to Muslim men and Hindu men and 
women.  Muslim women have been further affected by the rise of Hindu 
fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics in both enrollment and wage 
employment.  However, it appears that these factors have been relatively more 
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Muslim women in India are a disadvantaged group often marginalized in 
scholarly literature and policy interventions.  Over the past few decades, researchers, 
international agencies, and the Indian government have paid particular attention to 
gender issues in India, however, explicitly and implicitly these issues tend to focus 
primarily on Hindu women.  This occurs in large part because Hindus are the majority 
in India.  Researchers focus on Hindu women because it is necessary to bring to light 
the patriarchal obstacles facing the majority of women in India.  In addition, 
individuals in positions to conduct scholarly research or frame policy interventions 
tend to overwhelmingly be Hindu, contributing to the bias towards research on Hindu 
women.  As a result, less is known about the experience of Muslim women in India.   
Recently, there has been an increasing interest in the issues Muslims face, as 
illustrated by the recent publication of The Social, Economic, and Educational Status 
of the Muslim Community of India: a Report1, commissioned by the Indian Prime 
Minister to address the dearth of information regarding Muslims in India.  However, 
literature on Muslims is still in its infancy and often looks at all Muslims, grouping 
Muslim men and women together.  While some scholars, particularly Zoya Hasan and 
Ritu Menon (2005a, 2005b) have made considerable inroads in research on Indian 
Muslim women, few studies contain a comprehensive framework centering on the 
interplay of religion and gender on Muslim women, and virtually none focus on how 
these relationships have been modified by historical forces.  Moreover, little research 
has empirically examined the effect of these forces on Muslim women’s lives.  A 
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primary aim of this dissertation is to contribute to this nascent literature on Indian 
Muslim women, focusing on changes in education and employment over the last two 
decades of the 20th century. 
Over the past thirty years, India has experienced tremendous social, political, 
and economic change.  Many of these changes have been salient to Muslim women’s 
lives.  This dissertation argues that three factors have influenced their experience: 
modernizing forces, religious discrimination and disadvantage, and the intricate 
relationship between the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and the Muslim community’s 
response to this threat.   
Modernization is a process, which involves economic growth, urbanization, 
and industrialization.  For developing countries, it also entails the diffusion of 
Western ideas and systems.  Modernization causes immense transformations in 
societies such as changes in education, employment, gender roles, and ideologies 
(Inglehart and Baker 2000).  While these changes are not always positive, particularly 
for women (Boserup 1970), this dissertation argues that modernization has expanded 
education and employment opportunities for Hindu and Muslim men and women.    
However, for Muslim men and women, modernizing forces are often 
moderated by historical disadvantage and religious discrimination.  Historically, 
occupational and educational mobility in India has been limited.  Influenced by an 
occupationally based caste system, individuals have been generally expected to 
remain in the same social and economic position as their parents and ancestors.  
While this is changing for some disadvantaged groups, particularly scheduled castes 
                                                                                                                                           
1 Otherwise known as the Sachar Committee Report. 
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and scheduled tribes2 who benefit from affirmative action programs in public 
employment and education, Muslims are generally not afforded this assistance despite 
the disadvantages they face.  The disadvantage Muslims have experienced in the past 
and continue to experience is in part a product of religious discrimination.  Muslims 
face considerable discrimination in both employment (Hasan 2005, Khandker 1992) 
and education (Jeffery et. al. 2005).  Evidence also suggests that discrimination 
against Muslims is increasing (Basu 1997, Jeffery and Jeffery 2005).  This 
dissertation argues that Muslim men and women have lower levels of wage 
employment and education because of past and current disadvantage and 
discrimination. Moreover, this disadvantage may have intensified in recent decades 
due to increased communal tensions. 
India has been experiencing a deepening religious divide and a rise in Hindu 
fundamentalism resulting in an increasingly defensive response from the Muslim 
community.  This may have a unique influence on Indian Muslim women.  When 
minority groups are threatened or attempt to gain previously denied social, political, 
and economic resources, they often try to create unity among group members.  
Various literatures argue that there are often negative implications for women within 
these communities, particularly among groups defining their identity in religious 
terms.  However, literature discussing these issues primarily emerges from the field of 
cultural studies and tends to lack an empirical basis.  The impact of these forces on 
women’s day to day experiences in such areas as education and employment 
                                                 
2 In 1950, the Indian Constitution gave special status to lower castes and tribes.  Lower castes have 
been historically marginalized in the Indian caste system, working menial jobs with little chance for 
upward mobility, facing considerable discrimination.  Tribes are indigenous ethnic minorities, 
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consequently have received little attention.  This dissertation makes a unique 
contribution to the literature by empirically analyzing changes in gender disparities in 
education and employment among Muslims, and by comparing them to similar 
changes among Hindus, in an era during which the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and 
the Muslim community’s response to it has dominated the lives of Muslim men and 
women.  
While modernization, religious discrimination and disadvantage, and the 
complex relationship between the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and the Muslim 
community’s response are three potentially important features influencing Muslim 
women’s lives, no study has examined these factors simultaneously.  Using the 
National Sample Survey (NSS), this dissertation seeks to broaden our understanding 
of Indian Muslim women’s education and wage employment in the context of these 
three important factors.   
The first chapter of this dissertation addresses post-colonial Hindu-Muslim 
communal tensions and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism; Muslim disadvantage and 
discrimination; and patriarchal constraints Hindu and Muslim women experience.  
The second chapter discusses modernization’s influence on education, and 
employment; Muslim disadvantage and discrimination in employment and education; 
and the potential impact of the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and the Muslim 
community’s response on Muslim women.  The third chapter describes my conceptual 
framework and hypotheses.  Chapter four describes the dependent, independent and 
control variables; and research design and methods. The fifth and sixth chapters 
                                                                                                                                           
generally living in remote hilly forest areas.  The term schedule is used because the constitution listed 
castes and tribes eligible for this special status in schedules.   
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present the enrollment and wage employment analysis results respectively.  Finally, 





Chapter 1: Communal Tensions and the Rise of Hindu 
Fundamentalism, Religion, and Patriarchy in India 
 
Tensions between Hindus, the majority group in India making up 80.5 percent 
of the population, and Muslims, the largest minority group comprising 13.4 percent of 
the population (Census of India 2001)3, have escalated over the past several decades.  
This recent outbreak of religious tensions has adverse consequences for all Muslims, 
but may uniquely affect Muslim women.  Muslim women experience the 
disadvantage and discrimination that affect all Muslims and experience patriarchal 
practices that all women face in India.  In addition, Muslim women’s experience is 
influenced by the intersection between their affiliation with a religious community 
and their gender.  This chapter provides a context for the Muslim experience in India, 
focusing on both the Muslim community as a whole and Indian Muslim women.  The 
first section discusses the intricate relationship between Hindus and Muslims 
highlighting post-colonial communal tensions and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism 
in India.  The second section addresses the disadvantage and discrimination that 
Muslims face in India.  Finally, the third section describes the patriarchal customs and 
constraints experienced by Hindu and Muslim women.     
Post-Colonial Communal Tensions and the Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism 
Relations between Hindus and Muslims in India have changed over the years 
depending on, among other factors, historical circumstances. There are many 
instances in Indian history where Hindus and Muslims have lived peacefully with one 
another and other horrific occurrences where events have culminated in communal 
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violence. Similar to many inter-group conflicts throughout the world, religious 
identities have been exploited to create divisions between Hindus and Muslims in 
India.  A common idea propagated by the British colonial power, both Hindu and 
Muslim communalists and a belief absorbed among the wider population is that 
Hindu Muslim tensions are primordial and continuous (Thapar 2005).  However, in 
reality, the construction of Hindu-Muslim religious identities have depended on space 
and time and are often related to the political interests of various groups. This section 
discusses the variegated and complex relationship between Hindus and Muslims in 
India, highlighting post-colonial Hindu and Muslim communal tensions and the rise 
of Hindu fundamentalism. 
  While Hindu and Muslim relations were at times contentious during British 
colonial rule, communal tensions reached an apex during the Partition of India in 
1947, when East and West Pakistan4 were carved out of the Indian subcontinent.  As 
riots between Hindus and Muslims engulfed India, particularly the northwestern part 
of the country, hundreds of thousands, and by some estimates, millions of people 
were massacred (Collins and Lapierre 1975, Wolpert 1993).   In the 20 years 
following the partition, most Hindus left East and West Pakistan and migrated to 
India, however, for Muslims, migration out of India proved relatively more difficult. 
While many Muslims, particularly the middle class, migrated from India to Pakistan, 
a substantial proportion of Muslims remained in India. After the separation of 
Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, modern India became the home to the largest 
                                                                                                                                           
3 Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and others make up about 6 percent of the Indian population. 
4 Upon independence from Pakistan in 1971, East Pakistan became Bangladesh. 
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block of Muslims in South Asia. However, the partition served to create serious 
divisions between Indian Muslims and their Hindu brethren.   
After the Partition, although sectarian violence was subdued, tensions 
continued to simmer.  There was an upsurge in riots from 1964 to 1971.  Hindu 
nationalism rose during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, where Hindu mistrust of 
Muslims is evident in the rhetoric claiming that Muslims are Pakistani spies who give 
signals to Pakistani aircraft (Banerjee 1990).  Religious tensions and violence 
subsided from 1971 to the late 1970s, only to rise again with increasing Hindu 
fundamentalism (Banerjee 1990).  
 While political Hinduism existed in the 1950s and 1960s, it was relatively 
more prevalent among Hindu upper castes compared to other castes.5  Increasingly, 
campaigns against Muslims and political maneuvers in the 1970s slowly led to the 
spread of Hindu fundamentalism, bringing more moderate Hindus into the 
fundamentalist fold, sowing the seeds for Hindu fundamentalism to intensify in the 
1980s and 1990s.   During the 1970s, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the 
association of national volunteers, and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), two Hindu 
political parties under the wider coalition of Sangh Parivar, meaning Family of 
Associations, resumed the spread of negative stereotypes and propaganda about 
Muslims.  Fueled by the supposed mosque restorations funded by petro-dollars6, 
campaigns to build Hindu temples were initiated.  Propaganda also proliferated about 
the Muslim population overtaking the Hindu population because of higher Muslim 
fertility (Banerjee 1990).   
                                                 
5 Many upper caste Hindus had strong secular leanings, however those engaged in political Hinduism 
in the 1950s and 1960s tended to belong to upper castes. 
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 However, the RSS and a newly founded Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) did not have complete legitimacy among the majority of Hindus 
until they became symbols of anti-authoritarianism (Banerjee 1990).  In the 1970s, 
Indira Gandhi was convicted of election fraud and was forced to resign, however, 
instead of resigning, she suspended the constitution and called a national emergency 
that lasted for 18 months (Keay 2000).  In addition to inhumane slum removal and 
birth control campaigns, numerous people were jailed and the press was censored.  It 
is in this context that the BJP and RSS became the antithesis of Indira Gandhi’s 
authoritarian measures.  They made gains politically in the 1977 elections by joining 
the ruling coalition, Janata party (Banerjee 1990).  When Indira Gandhi returned to 
power in 1980, she did so by capitulating to the ever growing powerful Hindu 
component, often by supporting the Hindu police and political parties involved in 
Hindu-Muslim riots, denouncing minorities for not assimilating to India (Banerjee 
1990), and stating that foreign interference from Pakistan is to blame for Hindu-
Muslim riots (Brass 2003).   
The reach of Hindu fundamentalist parties continued to expand.  New front 
political organizations were created for lower castes who felt uncomfortable with the 
upper caste dominated RSS and for those Hindus who did not want to be identified as 
members of RSS (Banerjee 1990).  Furthermore, the RSS tried to capture scheduled 
caste7 allegiance by trying to cause conflict between scheduled castes and poor 
minorities.  To rally support for a fundamentalist agenda, the VHP and other 
                                                                                                                                           
6 Money from oil rich Islamic countries in the Middle East. 
7 In 1950, the Indian Constitution gave special status to lower castes.  Lower castes have been 
historically marginalized in the Indian caste system, working menial jobs with little chance for upward 
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organizations used the issue of conversions from Hinduism to Islam to demonstrate 
that Hinduism was under attack.  These parties used the scheduled caste conversions 
in Meenakshipuram, Tamil Nadu in January of 1981 to bolster their argument that 
Hinduism is threatened by Islamic Fundamentalism and the power of petro-dollars 
(Banerjee 1990).  Not only were counter-conversions arranged, but campaigns, which 
were particularly effective for mobilizing the middle and lower-middle classes, were 
organized around the idea that “I am not ashamed to be a Hindu” (Banerjee 1990).  
All of these activities led to the spread of Hindu fundamentalism from mid-sized 
towns to small and large cities (Banerjee 1990). 
Tensions between Hindus and Sikhs, a minority religious group in India 
comprising 2 percent of the population, following the assassination of Indira Gandhi 
by one of her Sikh bodyguards catapulted Hindu fundamentalist and nationalist 
rhetoric at the forefront of politics (Banerjee 1990).  Sikh political parties and the 
Congress party battled for power, particularly in the state of Punjab, where the 
majority of Sikhs reside.  In June 1984, to route out Sikh militants, Indira Gandhi 
initiated Operation Bluestar, a raid on an important temple that was a base for alleged 
Sikh militants.  This fueled the fire of Hindu and Sikh communalism culminating in 
the assassination of Indira Gandhi by one of her Sikh bodyguards in November of 
1984.  Riots ensued or rather Hindus attacked Sikhs en masse, killing, maiming, and 
burning down shops and homes of Sikhs. 
This turn of events had a crucial impact on Indian politics.  In the 1984 and 
1985 elections, the mass media was influenced to promote a Hindu agenda, not by the 
                                                                                                                                           
mobility, facing considerable discrimination.  The term schedule is used because the constitution listed 
castes eligible for this special status in schedules. 
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usual suspects of Hindu fundamentalist parties, but by the Congress party (Banerjee 
1990). Simultaneously, Hindu fundamentalist groups launched multiple campaigns to 
promote Hinduism.  Among the campaigns were calls for destroying the Babari 
Masjid, a mosque built in 1528, claimed to stand on the birthplace of a Hindu God, 
Ram.  These parties also called for a uniform civil code to apply to all religious 
groups, targeting Muslim Personal Law, codes that dictate rules for Muslims.  The 
Hindu rhetoric used by the normally moderate Congress party and campaigns led by 
Hindu fundamentalist and nationalist groups deepened Hindu and Muslim tensions.    
In 1989, campaigns to build a temple in place of the Babari Masjid involved 
collecting bricks and money for the temple (Shah 1998).  In 1992, the VHP called for 
a holy war against Muslims to rally support for the destruction of the Babari Masjid.  
Some of the following slogans and advertisements were used in newspapers and 
rallies: “Everyone will be shown their place, Those who are sleeping in Delhi, Their 
Sleep will be disturbed, We have to live in Hindustan with respect, we will pay for the 
price for maintaining dignity” and “There is a dictate to murder Hindus, see, once 
again Mughal rule has come to Delhi (Shah 1998).”  The campaigns and rhetoric were 
successful, the Babari Masjid was destroyed on December 6, 1992 by Hindus, while 
Hindu police and government officials did nothing.  Riots once again engulfed India 
resulting in Hindu and Muslim neighbors murdering one another.   
The campaigns to destroy the Babari Masjid and its eventual destruction 
coincided with the BJP’s rise to power in the 1990s.  While the Hindu nationalist and 
fundamentalist agendas had considerable influence over the activities and beliefs of 
many Hindus, resulting in worsening Hindu Muslim tensions, the early 1990s was the 
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first time an overtly Hindu nationalist party gained considerable political power.  The 
BJP gained many seats in western and northern India, particularly the states of Uttar 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Rajastan from 1990 to 1995 
(Chiriyankandath 1998).  In 1996, they won enough seats to hold together a coalition 
government for only 13 days. Another coalition government was formed by the BJP 
in 1998, only lasting one year. Their power was finally solidified in 1999, where they 
led a coalition government until 2004. 
Thus, India has experienced a rapid spread of Hindu fundamentalism and 
nationalism from the 1980s to the present.  Hindu nationalism has become more 
pervasive, eventually leading to the rise of the BJP to political power in the 1990s.  
Contrary to Hindu nationalist propaganda, it was not Hindus that were under attack, 
but Muslims.  Evidence suggests that the rise of Hindu fundamentalism politically 
and socially, the proliferation of negative stereotypes about Muslims, riots which are 
often initiated by Hindus (Brass 2003, Mann 1992), state and police complicity and 
often participation in anti-Muslim riots (Brass 2003), attacks on Muslim Personal 
Law, and local ‘everyday’ communal interactions between Hindus and Muslims 
(Jeffery and Jeffery 2005) have resulted in a more cohesive Muslim community 
identity (Mann 1992).   Mann (1992) finds that Muslim solidarity does not only occur 
at the local level.  When anti-Muslim riots occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
Muslims in the city of Aligarh went to aid those Muslims left homeless by the 
violence (Mann 1992).  Mann (1992) also finds that Hindu attacks on Muslim 
Personal Law and the destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque further reinforced 
Muslim community solidarity.         
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While communal tensions and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism is well 
documented, there has been limited empirical examinations of their impact on the day 
to day lives of Muslims, particularly on their employment and educational 
opportunities.  Furthermore, there has been scant empirical analysis of how these 
communal tensions affect Muslim women’s education and employment.  This 
dissertation seeks to expand our understanding of the rise of Hindu fundamentalism 
on the Muslim experience, with a particular focus on Muslim women. 
Muslim Disadvantage and Discrimination in India 
 Although Muslims experience advantages in infant and child survival, child 
sex ratios8, life expectancy, and maternal mortality (Government of India 2006), 
Muslims continue to experience disadvantage in many socioeconomic arenas, despite 
the considerable gains they have made.  Several factors contribute to the current 
disadvantage that Muslims experience in India.  First, Muslims have faced substantial 
discrimination at the hands of the Hindu majority since the Partition of India.  
Additionally, most of the Muslims who left for Pakistan during the Partition were 
from the middle and upper classes, leaving many poorer Muslims behind.  
Furthermore, to escape the rigidities of the Hindu caste system and discrimination 
from higher castes, there have been low caste conversions to Islam.9  The poorer 
Muslims who stayed in India after the Partition and low caste converts to Islam have 
not had the resources for educational, occupational, or income mobility, thus 
                                                 
8 Muslims experience higher child sex ratios compared to other groups, suggesting that Muslims 
discriminate less against girls than other groups.   
9 With the hope of attaining greater equality and escape discrimination and disadvantage within the 
Hindu caste system, many individuals belonging to lower castes, particularly Dalits or untouchables, 
those of the lowest castes, converted to other religions in India such as Islam, Sikhism, Christianity, 
and Buddhism.   
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contributing to the disadvantage we observe among Muslims in India.  This section 
highlights some of the disadvantage and discrimination that Muslims face in Indian 
society. 
One area where Muslims experience disadvantage is literacy.  The literacy rate 
for Muslims was 59.1 in 2001, compared to 65.1 for Hindus (Census of India 2001).  
Muslims also face considerable disadvantage in school enrollment (Kulkarni 2002, 
Rastogi 2003, Shariff 1995) and educational achievement (Desai and Kulkarni 2005, 
Kulkarni 2002, Unni 2001a). This is particularly surprising since a greater proportion 
of Muslims live in urban areas, which have a better educational infrastructure than 
rural areas: 35.7 percent of Muslims live in urban areas compared to 27.8 percent of 
the general population (Government of India 2006).  Kulkarni (2002) finds that these 
disparities in education are partially due to past discrimination in education, income, 
and residence, however, he also finds that there is an independent effect of religion 
despite controls for family endowments suggesting that current discrimination plays a 
role as well.  The provision of government schools also contributes to lower levels of 
enrollment and educational achievement.  Districts with higher proportions of 
Muslims also have fewer educational inputs compared to districts with higher 
proportions of non-scheduled caste Hindus (Betancourt and Gleason 2000).  
Moreover, government schools in or near villages with higher portions of Muslims 
have fewer resources compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus (Jeffery and Jeffery 
2005).   Muslims also face discrimination in government and non-Muslim private 
schools from predominantly Hindu teachers (Jeffery and Jeffery 1998).  Teacher’s 
lower expectations of Muslim children and lack of attention could negatively affect 
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Muslim children’s school performance and achievement. In addition, discrimination 
from teachers and texts extolling the virtues of Hinduism (Sikand 2005) may result in 
Muslim parents withdrawing their children from schools.  
Muslim disadvantage is also illustrated by various socioeconomic factors, 
such as poverty (Bhagat and Praharaj 2005, Unni 2001a), landownership (Kulkarni 
2002, Shariff 1995), and earnings (Khandker 1992, Unni 2001a).  Muslims 
experience higher levels of poverty compared to the Indian population as a whole.  
About 23 percent of India’s total population is poor compared to 31 percent of 
Muslims (Government of India 2006).  In urban areas (see Table 1), Muslims 
experience the highest poverty rate (38.4) compared to scheduled castes and tribes 
(36.4), other backward castes10 (25.1), upper caste Hindus (8.3) and other minorities 
(12.2) (Government of India 2006).  Muslims in rural areas are slightly better off, 
experiencing the second highest poverty rate (26.9 percent).  Scheduled castes and 
tribes have the highest poverty rate (34.8), while other backward castes (19.5), upper 
caste Hindus (9.0), and other minorities (14.3) experience considerably lower poverty 
rates (Government of India 2006).   
In rural areas, landownership is an important basis for material well-being.  
There are more landless Muslims compared to Hindus.  Among rural dwellers, 35 
percent of Muslims are landless compared to 28 percent of Hindus (Shariff 1995).  
When Muslims do own land, they own less than Hindus.  For example, while 20 
                                                 
10 Other backward castes have faced exclusion and discrimination in India, resulting in low 
socioeconomic status.  The majority of other backward castes are from the shudra caste, the lowest 
category out of the four varna caste system, higher only to Dalits, who have such low status that they 
are not included in the four varna system. 
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percent of Hindus in rural areas own five or more acres of land, the corresponding 
figure is only 10 percent for Muslims (Shariff 1995). 
    There are also earnings and income gaps between Hindus and Muslims.  
There is some evidence that Muslims earn less than Hindus, and have less income 
mobility (Khandker 1992).  Educational advances among Muslims do not appear to 
aid in increasing their earnings, pointing to wage discrimination.  Unni (2001a) finds 
that among salaried and self-employed workers, Muslims do not receive any 
significant returns to their education, while other disadvantaged groups such as 
scheduled castes and tribes do experience educational returns in both salaried 
employment and to a lesser extent self-employment.    
  Muslims also experience disadvantage in employment compared to Hindus.  
The work participation rate, defined as the percentage of workers to the total 
population, is 31.3 percent for Muslims compared to 40.4 for Hindus.  Furthermore, 
Muslims are underrepresented in both public and private sectors (Hasan 2005) and are 
largely confined to non-farm self-employment (Das 2002).  Muslims are also less 
likely to be employed in the protected sector, and are therefore in more vulnerable 
employment positions (Khandker 1992). It is important to note that wage employment 
itself does not confer economic advantages and historically, Muslim participation in 
self-employment has protected them somewhat from the dire poverty faced by 
landless agricultural laborers, but their exclusion from regular employment reduces 
their avenues for upward economic mobility, particularly in the current era where 
rewards to white collar work have been rising. 
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Discrimination against Muslims is also evident in fertility rhetoric.  Sadhavi 
Saraswati, a well-known Hindu nationalist party member, can be heard on a widely 
distributed tape proclaiming, “For every five children the Hindu’s have, the Muslims 
have 50. And who feeds these 50 children?  Hindus do! After Muslims divorce, the 
waqf boards support the children with taxes we pay…Within 25 years you will be 
living like a poor minority in this country (Basu 1997).”  Another Hindu nationalist 
referring to Muslims cried, “The state tells us Hindus to have only two or three 
children.  After a while they will say ‘do not have even one’.  But what about those 
who have six wives, 30-35 children, and breed like mosquitoes and flies (Basu 
1997)?”  This rhetoric also stereotypes Muslim men as being oversexed (Jeffery and 
Jeffery 2005) and Muslim women as being over fertile (Sarkar 2002).  These 
pronouncements are what Jeffery and Jeffery (2005) call saffron demography, where 
myths about Muslims are propagated.  These myths are becoming ‘common wisdom’ 
to Hindus in India, proliferating beyond Hindu fundamentalist circles (Basu 1997, 
Jeffery and Jeffery 2005).   
 Violence against Muslims and the state and police complicity in this violence 
also demonstrates the discrimination Muslims face.  While Hindu fundamentalist 
rhetoric often paints Muslim men as aggressive and hot-blooded during communal 
tensions, in reality the majority of riots consist of attacks on Muslims and are 
provoked by Hindus (Brass 2003, Jeffery and Jeffery 2005).  Government officials 
and the police are often indirectly or directly involved in these riots.  Government 
officials and police are indirectly involved when they do nothing to stop the riots or 
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protect Muslims.  They are directly involved when they give orders for the violence 
or participate in the riots. 
     The disadvantages facing Muslims in India may be worsening with the rise 
of Hindu fundamentalism.  This may occur for two reasons.  First, as negative 
stereotypes about Muslims spread and communal tensions intensify, Muslim’s may 
face greater discrimination in areas such as education, and employment.  Second, 
Muslims may withdraw from these arenas where they must interact with Hindus 
because of safety concerns, fear of harassment, and distrust of the state apparatus, 
which has failed to protect them in riots and in worst cases perpetrated the violence.  
This dissertation seeks to illuminate our understanding of the Muslim experience in 
education and employment, in the face of increasing communal tensions and 
discrimination.  
Patriarchy: Hindu and Muslim Women in India  
In India, as in many societies, patriarchal ideologies and practices place a 
lower value on females compared to males, resulting in, among other things, lower 
access to education, health care, and employment.  Furthermore, patriarchal beliefs 
play an integral role in excess female child mortality and the increasing utilization of 
sex selective abortions.  This section discusses the complicated and often oppressive 
patriarchal beliefs and practices in India that shape Hindu and Muslim women’s lives. 
 Social, economic, and cultural customs diminish women’s economic worth.  
In India, sons make important economic contributions to their parents’ household.  If 
living in an extended family, sons typically reside in the same home as their parents 
with their wives.  In this situation, a son contributes his wages to the household, or 
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makes economic contributions by working on the farm or in a household business.  In 
contrast, a daughter moves in with her husband’s family.  If a woman works for 
wages, these wages are given to her husband’s household, not her natal family, 
lowering women’s economic worth to her natal family.  
 Another factor related to the economic worth of women in India is their 
exclusion from wage labor.  Although Indian women make substantial contributions 
to the Indian economy by working on family farms and in family businesses, they are 
often excluded from wage labor and direct control of income earning enterprises, 
making it difficult to make valued financial contributions to their natal family or 
husband’s household.  According to the 1991 Indian Census, only 23 percent of 
women reported being employed (Desai 1994).  When women are employed, they 
make lower wages then men (Banerjee 1985, Khandker 1992).  Constraints on their 
labor force participation and lower wages if employed make it difficult for women to 
make economic contributions to their natal family or husband’s family, reducing their 
economic value, despite other important productive contributions they make to the 
household.  
Old age support practices also lower the economic worth of females and raise 
the value of males.  The majority of Indians do not have access to formal avenues of 
old age support.  Most people are not employed in jobs that give old age pensions and 
the government does not provide social security.  Therefore, the majority of Indians 
must rely on other forms of financial support in their old age. Parents often rely on 
their sons to provide for them in old age, thus bolstering the economic worth of sons 
and devaluing daughters. 
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The economic worth of women in India affects all women, while certain 
cultural practices affect mainly Hindu women.  Dowry, a custom where the bride’s 
family gives gifts and money to the groom’s family, also contributes to a woman’s 
economic worth affecting primarily Hindu women.  Historically, dowry often 
consisted of a woman’s family preparing and giving goods, such as bedding and rugs, 
to the groom’s family (Sharma cited in Desai 1994).  However, dowry has become 
more oriented towards monetary transactions and expensive consumer items, such as 
refrigerators, televisions, and cars.  Instead of producing relatively inexpensive items 
such as bedding, households must save considerable amounts of money to provide an 
adequate dowry for their daughters’ marriage.  This is an economic drain on a family, 
lowering the value of having daughters.  Despite laws outlawing dowry, this practice 
has become more commonplace and has even spread to communities, particularly in 
the South, that traditionally paid a bride price whereby the groom’s family gives the 
bride’s family money at that time of marriage (Rahman and Rao 2004).  The 
prevalence of dowry in Muslim communities in India is not well documented.  Some 
small-scale studies suggest that Muslim communities practice dowry (Fazalbhoy 
2005), while others suggest that dowry is not practiced in the community (Lateef 
1990).  It is likely that there is considerable regional variation among Muslim 
communities.  Specifically, Muslim communities in areas where dowry is widespread 
may be more likely to practice it. 
The value of Hindu women is further diminished by religious prescriptions at 
the time of death.  Sons are valuable because they, not daughters, can perform 
religious rites for their parents upon death.  For Hindu women, particularly in the 
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north, kinship patterns also determine a woman’s worth in India. Communities that 
practice village exogamy, require that marriage partners be unrelated and come from 
different villages. Under this system, girls move away from their natal families and 
village to live with their husband’s family in another village.  This practice deprives 
women of support from their natal kin and social networks leaving them at the mercy 
of the husband’s family.  Additionally, women from these communities are not able to 
provide support to their natal families by virtue of distance.  In contrast, the practice 
of village endogamy, observed primarily in the south of India, entails marriage 
partners often marrying cross cousins or girls marrying their maternal uncles (Bittles 
1994).  Furthermore, endogamy is characterized by marriage within the village, 
whereby daughters remain in close proximity to their natal family, enjoying support 
from their kin and existing social networks.  This proximity also allows daughters to 
provide support to their family.  Therefore, the worth of women in communities that 
practice village endogamy is greater than the worth of women belonging to 
communities practicing village exogamy.   
Relative to Hindu communities, particularly in northern India, which often 
practice village exogamy, Muslim women reside closer to their natal homes and are 
more often married into a household they have known for years (Bloom et. al. 2001).  
Moreover, it is common for maternal cousins to marry in these communities (Bloom 
et. al. 2001).  Similar to other communities that practice village endogamy, this 
feature of Muslim communities may enhance a Muslims woman’s worth.        
Muslim women’s worth should also be bolstered by the rights conferred to 
them by Islam; however, in practice these rights are not always observed.  A practice 
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that is more similar to a bride price rather than dowry, mahr, in theory, should be a 
potentially liberating force for Muslim women in India. According to Islamic law, a 
man must give a woman mahr, money or goods promised at the time of their marriage 
(Vatuk 2005) and women have the right to stipulate the amount (Engineer 1996).  
Mahr can be given at the time of the wedding, but it is more common in India for it to 
be ‘deferred’ to an agreed upon date (Vatuk 2005).  In the event of divorce or death of 
her husband, the woman is to receive the mahr she was promised (Vatuk 2005).  
While Islamic law dictates that women should receive mahr, this does not necessarily 
occur in practice among Muslims in India.  It is common for women to give up their 
mahr (Vatuk 2005).  Moreover, if a couple divorces and the husband chooses not to 
give his wife her mahr, she has few options.  Legally, she could file a suit, but this is 
not common (Vatuk 2005). 
Widow remarriage is another area where Muslim women are granted rights 
under Islam, however, Hindu customs of widow remarriage have influenced Muslims 
and therefore Muslim women’s rights under Islam have been curtailed.  Widow 
remarriage is encouraged under Islamic law where widows have many social and 
religious rights and are technically supposed to have higher status in society (Husain 
1976).  Following the example of Prophet Mohammad, marrying a widow and raising 
her children as his own confers high status on a man. In contrast, among Hindus, 
widow remarriage has been seen as a sign of lower status (Husain 1976). However, 
Husain (1976) observes that Hindu custom has had a clear effect on the Muslim 
community in India, where in reality widows are stigmatized and do not enjoy the 
status or rights conferred upon them by Islamic law. 
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Inheritance of land and wealth is an area where Islamic law conferred greater 
rights to Muslim women compared to Hindu women until the Hindu Code Bill of 
1956 was passed (Lateef 1990). According to Islamic law, Muslim women have the 
right to inherit property and wealth to secure their well-being, however they receive 
less than men.  Prior to the passage of the Hindu Code Bill of 1956, for Hindu 
women, cultural practices dictated that any property or wealth a woman had or 
obtained became that of her husband’s family.  Therefore, parents willed their 
property to their sons to diminish land and wealth fragmentation, thereby, increasing 
the value of having sons, while reducing the value of women. While Hindu women 
now have inheritance rights under the law, the cultural practices that were observed 
before the Hindu Code Bill persist today.  Moreover, the rights that Islamic law gives 
Muslim women are generally not observed.  Rather, there is evidence that Muslims in 
India have assimilated to the inheritance practices of Hindus (Rathbone 1934 in 
Lateef 1990).  Therefore, while Hindu women have legal rights and Muslim women 
have religious rights to inheritance, in practice both Hindu and Muslim women are 
denied their rights.   
 Purdah or female seclusion, a practice where women’s sexuality is controlled, 
is another patriarchal constraint affecting both Hindu and Muslim women. Beginning 
at puberty, purdah imposes restrictions on women’s mobility, involves full or partial 
veiling, and delineates ways in which men and women interact (Desai 1994, Jeffery 
1979).  Generally, women from poorer households do not strictly adhere to purdah 
because their lower socioeconomic status requires them to seek employment.  Since 
they must work, they are not able to follow rules about mobility and interaction with 
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men.  In contrast, purdah is commonly practiced among wealthier households where 
women do not have to work (Desai 1994). This practice reduces women’s control 
over social and material resources by curtailing women’s interactions with men 
within and outside the household and restricting women’s movement outside the 
household.  
While Hindu women have ample legal rights and Muslim women have many 
religious rights under Islam, in practice both Hindu and Muslim women experience 
patriarchal controls and discrimination in India.  However, Muslim women may be 
more disadvantaged compared to their Hindu counterparts because of the intersection 
of their gender and religion.  This disadvantage which Muslim women experience 
emanates from the discrimination and disadvantage that all Muslims face in Indian 
society as well as patriarchy that all Indian women experience.  Furthermore, Muslim 
women may experience increasing disadvantage as the Muslim community tries to 
preserve its identity in the face of rising Hindu fundamentalism.  
Conclusion 
 The first section of this chapter highlighted post-colonial communal tensions 
and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism.  The communal tensions in the 1980s and 
1990s, while not new, have taken on a different flavor.  The spread of Hindu 
fundamentalism and its eventual rise to political prominence during this period has 
severely threatened the Muslim community.  As section II has shown, Muslims 
already face considerable disadvantage and discrimination in India.  With the rise of 
Hindu fundamentalism, they may experience even more discrimination from Hindus 
and may withdraw from certain public arenas for fear of safety and harassment, 
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thereby worsening their disadvantage.  Muslim women may be uniquely affected by 
the increase of Hindu fundamentalism.  Muslim women already face substantial 
disadvantage through the interplay of religious membership and gender, however, the 
rise of Hindu fundamentalism and the Muslim community’s sharp response to this 
threat may exacerbate the disadvantage they experience.  
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Chapter 2: Modernization, Religious Disadvantage and 
Discrimination, and the Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism and 
Muslim Identity Politics 
 
 Over the past 30 years in India, Muslim women’s education and wage 
employment have been affected by a variety of influences including modernization 
and globalization; religious discrimination and disadvantage; and the complex 
relationship between increasing Hindu fundamentalism and the Muslim community’s 
response to this threat.  While critics of modernization theories have identified many 
negative aspects of integration into the global economy, modernization is seen as 
being synonymous with education, particularly Western education, and the 
incorporation into a cash economy. Thus, when looked at in terms of education and 
wage employment, modernization favorably influences the lives of all communities, 
Hindus and Muslims, men and women.  However, religious discrimination and 
disadvantage may diminish the influence of modernization for Muslims.  Moreover, 
the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and the Muslim community’s response may 
uniquely shape the lives of Muslim women.  This chapter discusses the influence 
these three factors have on various groups in India.  The first section addresses 
modernization issues pertaining to all Indians and then only females.  The second 
section focuses on the religious discrimination and disadvantage experienced by 
Muslim men and women.  Finally, the third section addresses how Muslim women 




Modernization and Secular Changes 
 Modernization theory, once a dominant theory in the sociological and 
development literature, contends that modernization, a process that involves 
industrialization, economic growth, economic development, and urbanization, are not 
unique processes to Western countries and that developing countries can emulate this 
progress in the course of development.  In recent years, this theory has been widely 
criticized in the development literature and many of its central tenets have been called 
into question.  However, one aspect of this theory has remained; modernization 
causes profound transformations in society such as changes in education, 
employment, gender roles, and ideologies (Inglehart and Baker 2000). 
Historically, modernization has had an important influence on education.  
When Western countries began to industrialize in the late 1800s and early 1900s, a 
more educated workforce was required to perform relatively more complex jobs, thus 
mandatory education was instituted (Weiner 1991, Notestein 1953). Similarly, as 
developing countries undergo development, their governments invest in education 
and promote policies that increase educational levels.  Increasingly, educational 
provisions are now recognized as one of the central functions of government and a 
major part of nation building projects (Meyer et. al. 1992).  
Through colonization, imperialism, and globalization, western countries have 
always had a profound influence on developing nations.  These historical and 
contemporary processes have resulted in the diffusion of western ideas and systems, 
playing a vital role in increasing education in developing nations. Specifically, the 
diffusion of western ideas and systems regarding the development of the nation state 
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and the role of education in that development has had a crucial effect on education 
throughout the world (Meyer et. al. 1992).  In particular, mass education increased 
dramatically after World War II as the western model of the nation-state and the 
centrality of mass education expanded and intensified (Meyer et. al. 1992). 
In developing nations, the net enrollment ratio for primary school, which is 
the number of children enrolled in primary school in the relevant age group as a 
percentage of all children in that age group, increased from 48 percent to 77 percent 
from 1960 to 1991 (United Nations 1996).  The net enrollment ratio has also 
increased for secondary school, from 35 percent to 47 percent for this same period 
(United Nations 1996).  There are exceptions, specifically some countries in Sub 
Saharan Africa have experienced a decline in primary school enrollment in the 
context of economic decline, however, overall, the trend has been upward.  Looking 
more specifically at India, it experienced economic growth from 1951 to 2001 and 
made important gains in education.  In particular, from 1951 to 2001 the gross 
enrollment ratios, the total enrollment of the school age population divided by the 
relevant age group, increased from 43 to 96 for primary school (I-V) and 13 to 60 for 
upper primary school (VI-VIII) (Ministry of Education 2006). 
Urban-rural differences in education also demonstrate the role of the modern 
market and developmental forces in increasing education levels.  Urban areas 
represent greater levels of modernization and development and experience higher 
levels of educational attainment compared to rural areas.  Using literacy rates as a 
proxy for advances in education, urban-rural differences in literacy rates illustrate that 
development has an influence on education.  In India, the literacy rate for the urban 
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population was 73 in 1991 compared to 45 in rural areas (Ministry of Education 
2006).  Furthermore, as economic growth progressed, these rates increased over a ten-
year span for both urban and rural areas.  Specifically, in 2001, the literacy rate for 
the urban population increased to 80 and the literacy rate in rural areas increased to 
59 (Ministry of Education 2006).   
While many modernizing forces increase enrollment and educational 
attainment, other modernizing forces may have adverse consequences.  Specifically, 
structural adjustment and liberalization policies, adopted by many developing 
countries to avoid a debt crisis, have potentially negative influences on education. 
Some liberalization programs have increased the cost of schooling by instituting fees, 
reduced government spending on education, and resulted in recession, increasing the 
financial strain on many households.  Households may have difficulties investing in 
education if educational costs and financial strain increase.  While India adopted 
liberalization policies in the 1980s, and although these policies intensified in the 
1990s, the government did not institute fees for government schools for children 6 to 
14 and did not cut its investments in the educational system.  Furthermore, India 
experienced economic growth rather than recession. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
liberalization policies have considerably hampered education in India.     
 In theory, a major part of the modernization process is economic growth, 
which has a crucial impact on employment.  Economic growth is the expansion of the 
economy, where more goods and services are produced, resulting in more income per 
person. When economic growth occurs, employment increases as more people are 
needed to produce valued goods and services.  Moreover, economic growth changes 
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the types of jobs that workers hold (World Bank 1995).  In countries with low levels 
of development, most of the working age population is engaged in agricultural work, 
particularly agricultural self-employment.  As a country experiences economic 
growth, more opportunities are created in wage employment in services and industry 
(World Bank 1995).   
 Modernization may not necessarily have this effect on employment in many 
developing countries because they have been plagued by structural adjustment 
policies.  Evidence from numerous countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, and 
Africa demonstrate that liberalization policies have slowed job creation, increased 
informal employment particularly as public sector employment decreased, and 
increased unemployment and underemployment (Baden 1993).  In the 1980s, India 
embarked on a series of economic reforms.  In the early 1990s, facing an exchange 
rate crisis, the Indian government was forced to adopt more drastic liberalization 
policies.  Many argue that these reforms were instrumental in generating economic 
growth in the 1980s, and particularly in the 1990s (Delong 2001).  The growth of the 
Indian economy accelerated in the 1980s and continued to grow at a rapid pace, 
making it one of the fastest growing economies in the 1990s (Delong 2001).  From 
1950 to 1980, India experienced a steady annual growth rate of 3.7 percent (Delong 
2001).  From 1980 to 1990, the annual rate of growth jumped to 5.9 percent and 
continued to increase in the 1990s to 6.2 percent.   
Contrary to expectations, the rapid growth experienced by India from 1980 to 
2000 did not accelerate employment growth, instead, the rate of employment growth 
declined.  There appears to be two noticeable trends in employment during this period 
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of liberalization and economic growth.  First, India experienced a casualization or 
informalization of the labor force during this period, as the growth of organized or 
formal employment declined and growth of informal employment increased (Sinha 
and Adam 2004).  Second, there has been a decline in self-employment. It appears 
that the decline in self-employment was absorbed by casual wage work, contributing 
to the casualization of the labor force. The percentage of workers engaged in self-
employment decreased from the early 1980s to 2000 from 57 to 53 percent, while 
casual wage employment increased from 29 to 33 percent (Desai and Das 2004). 
The influence of liberalization policies and economic growth on regular salary 
employment trends is less clear.  Duraisamy (2000) finds a slight decrease in regular 
salary employment from the 1980s to 2000, which has been in part attributed to 
public sector employment decline (Desai and Das 2004).  Other estimates suggest that 
regular salaried employment increased during this same period (Sundaram 2004).  
However, Anant (2004) finds that regular salaried workers remained at 14 percent 
from 1983 to 1999.  Therefore, it is unclear what impact liberalization policies have 
had on regular salaried employment.  
Contrary to the experiences of many countries in Latin America, the 
Caribbean and Africa, India did experience considerable economic growth while 
adopting structural adjustment and liberalization policies.  Despite this considerable 
economic growth, India shares the experience of slow job growth and the 
casualization of the labor force with these countries.  
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Modernization and Female Education and Employment 
 Thus far, we have discussed the broad influences of modernization on 
education and employment.  Now we will turn to the effects of modernization on 
female education and employment.  Development has an important influence on 
women’s education. The level of economic development, measured by Gross National 
Product (GNP), and its relationship to the gender gap in school enrollment illustrates 
the importance of development on girls’ education.  Hill and King (1993) find that 
low-income countries have the largest gender gap in primary school enrollments, 
lower-middle-income countries have a relatively smaller gender enrollment gap, and 
upper-middle-income countries have the smallest gender gap.  Furthermore, the 
gender gap in enrollment decreases as regions develop over time.  In Eastern Asia, a 
region which has experienced considerable economic growth over the past few 
decades, the gender gap in enrollment for individuals aged 6 to 23 was 16 percentage 
points in 1960 and decreased to 5 percentage points in 1990 (Wils and Goujon 1998).  
Southern Asia and Arab states have experienced more moderate declines in the gender 
gap in enrollment.  In Southern Asia and for Arab states, the gap decreased 3 
percentage points from 1960 to 1990 for individuals aged 6-23 (Wils and Goujon 
1998).  These numbers conceal some of the progress that occurred for women in these 
regions.  For example, in Arab States and Southern Asia, only 14.7 and 14.2 percent 
of girls aged 6-23 were enrolled in school in 1960, however, in 1990 enrollments 
increased to 45.3 and 34.5 percent (Wils and Goujon 1998).  While considerable 
progress still needs to occur, modernizing influences have had a positive influence on 
girls’ education and to a lesser extent on the gender gap in education. 
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 Unfortunately in countries where economic growth stagnated, the benefits to 
girls were far more limited as was the case for countries that adopted structural 
adjustment policies uncritically. If structural adjustment policies increase financial 
strain on households, households may choose to invest in boys’ education where the 
returns to investment are higher.  As mentioned above, structural adjustment policies 
in India have likely not had a huge impact on education, therefore it is unlikely that 
girls have been adversely affected by structural adjustment and liberalization policies.  
 In India, girls’ enrollment has been increasing and the gender gap in 
enrollment has been narrowing.  In 1983, 37 percent of girls ages 6 to 18 were 
enrolled in school.  This figure increased to 61 percent in 1999-2000 (National 
Sample Survey Organization 1983-1999-2000).  As a result of girls’ increasing school 
enrollment, the gender gap in school enrollment has decreased.  In 1983, the 
difference between the percentage of boys and girls enrollment for ages 6 to 18 was 
21 percentage points.  By 1999-2000, the difference decreased to 12 percentage 
points.   
While the gender gap in education has been decreasing, there are several 
factors that moderate modernizing influences.  In particular, in the face of scarce 
resources, households choose to invest in boys’ rather than girls’ education. This 
occurs for several reasons.  First, boys have considerably more economic 
opportunities and greater returns to education relative to girls (Dreze and Saran 1995, 
The Probe Team 1999).  Furthermore, boys are expected to provide financial and old 
age support to their parents (Dreze and Saran 1995, The Probe Team 1999), therefore 
households have a direct stake in their sons’ education and employment opportunities.  
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Even if daughters are expected to work in the future, their husband’s family would 
benefit from their employment, not their natal family, therefore their natal family has 
little economic incentive to invest in their education.  This is particularly true for 
areas that practice village exogamy, a practice where daughters marry someone 
outside their village, thus restricting the contact and support of their natal families. 
 Restrictions on girls’ movement at the age of menarche also negatively affect 
girls’ enrollment.  To ensure the purity of their daughters, households often put 
restrictions on girls’ movement when they start menstruating.  Therefore, it is 
common for girls to drop out of school around the ages of 12 or 13 (Rastogi 2003).  
The shortage of primary and middle schools, particularly girls only schools, 
exacerbate this problem.  While the supply of both primary and middle schools has 
been expanding since the early 1990s, access to middle schools is still relatively 
limited (Nayer 2002, The Probe Team 1999).  Many villages may have a primary 
school, however, children may have to travel to another village for middle school.  
Parents are often reluctant to have their daughters travel the further distance (Nayer 
2002, The Probe Team 1999).  Both concerns over girls’ safety (Nayer 2002) and the 
observance of purdah play a role in this reluctance. 
   Marriage markets also affect girls’ enrollment.  It is believed, particularly 
among disadvantaged castes, that higher levels of education encumber girls’ marriage 
prospects and increases their dowry since they must marry men of similar education 
(The Probe Team 1999).  Higher castes feel that marriage prospects improve for 
educated girls, as long as their education does not surpass the men in their community 
(The Probe Team 1999).  In addition, the gender division of labor in the household 
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requires women to perform most of the domestic chores, diminishing educational 
attainment for girls.  Older girls are often required to take care of younger siblings in 
the household and help other women with domestic chores, leaving them little time to 
attend school. 
 While these cultural factors dampen girls’ enrollment, it appears that 
modernization has had an important impact.  This is evident by increasing girls’ 
enrollment and the decreasing gender gap in enrollment, despite cultural factors that 
negatively influence girls’ enrollment. 
 Modernization and development also play a role in female employment.  
According to the World Bank (1995), development and female employment are 
expected to have a U shaped relationship.  When work is organized around the family, 
which corresponds to lower levels of development, women’s participation in work is 
high, particularly in agricultural activities.  As economic growth and urbanization 
occur, women’s work participation generally decreases as women stay at home while 
men seek formal non-agricultural employment.  This is partially related to the higher 
wages that men receive compared to women (Goldin 1995).  As development 
progresses and employment opportunities expand, women’s formal nonagricultural 
employment increases.  Goldin (1995) argues that increases in girls’ secondary 
schooling and the expansion of white-collar jobs facilitate the movement of female 
labor force participation up the U shaped curve.   
 Modernizing forces also alter ideologies about gender roles and break down 
barriers to women’s employment.  Modernizing forces, through development, 
diffusion of ideas, and active fertility campaigns, have reduced fertility in many 
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developing countries, potentially reducing the span of women’s reproductive 
responsibilities, which often hinders women’s labor force participation.  However, 
modernizing forces such as structural adjustment policies may adversely affect 
women’s employment, decreasing women’s participation if employment opportunities 
worsen (Baden 1993).     
Modernization and mechanization of agriculture in India further illustrates 
potential negative consequences for women’s employment.  From 1950 to 1991 
women’s economic activity decreased.  In 1950, 30.45 percent of women were 
involved in economic activities, whereas in 1991 only 22.70 percent of women were 
economically active (Datta 2002).  Datta (2002) attributes this decline in women’s 
economic activity to mechanization and modernization of agriculture.  Specifically, 
traditional modes of agricultural production were replaced by factories and mills, 
which adversely affected women’s employment.  However, it is not clear how 
modernizing forces will affect the structure of women’s employment, specifically 
women’s wage employment and self-employment. 
 In India, it is evident that women’s share of non-agricultural employment, 
defined as being engaged in industry, trade or services, has been increasing (Unni 
2001b).  From 1971 to 1994, the share increased from 12 to 21 (Unni 2001b).  
However, it appears that women’s labor force participation remained stagnant and 
even decreased slightly from 1980 to 1995 (Das and Desai 2003).  These 
contradictory findings may be related to increased participation by women in non-
agricultural work and compensating declines in agricultural work, suggesting a need 
to focus on non-familial work to determine the changes in wage work for women.  
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 Several factors diminish female employment in India.  Purdah can negatively 
influence female labor force participation.  Women practicing purdah have limited 
interactions with non-related men and have restrictions on where they can go.  
Generally, lower caste households cannot afford to practice purdah because scarce 
resources in the household require women to work.  Therefore, this practice tends to 
be observed by upper castes.  However, the trend of Sanscritization, a process where 
lower castes emulate higher castes to attain higher status, may increase the prevalence 
of purdah among lower castes (Srinivas 1966).  
 The gender division of labor also affects female employment.  As in many 
other countries, women are primarily responsible for domestic chores.  Furthermore, 
many do not have modern conveniences to shorten the time to complete these duties.  
Therefore, preparing meals, taking care of children, collecting fuel wood or water in 
rural areas, are all time consuming and arduous tasks, which may hinder female 
employment.  Discrimination in the labor market further dampens female labor force 
participation.  In many jobs, males are making hiring decisions and the prevalent 
view is that males are superior workers, decreasing women’s employment 
opportunities (Banerjee 1985). 
Modernization and development influence female employment in 
countervailing ways.  Rising female educational attainment generally increases 
female labor force participation (Sethuraman 1998 cited in Unni 2001b).  However, 
Das and Desai (2003) find that primary and post-primary education decreases 
women’s employment opportunities in India.  They argue that this is partly due to the 
lack of employment opportunities for educated women in India.  Despite these 
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constraints, female labor force participation in non-agricultural work does appear to 
be increasing, particularly in informal employment. Unni (2001b) argues that 
modernization is increasing in informal employment and the feminization of the 
workforce in this type of employment (Unni 2001b).  Modernizing forces have also 
influenced legislation aimed to incorporate greater numbers of women into the labor 
force. The government passed a law in 2005 allowing women to work night shifts, 
shifts from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.  Teleworking is also being promoted to include women 
in the labor force.  Technological advances are also important modernizing influences 
that affect women’s work.  Technology, particularly in urban areas, reduces the time 
women must devote to domestic chores.  This is also true in rural areas.  For example, 
the installation of a village pump may reduce the time it takes women to fetch water, 
potentially freeing up time for other productive activities.  However, advances in 
technology also have adverse effects on women’s employment.  For example, when 
rice mills and husking machines replaced women’s manual rice husking in India, 
males dominated the new technological advances, decreasing women’s employment 
in this arena (Mukherjee 1999). 
In summary, modernizing forces are expected to increase overall enrollment 
and girls’ enrollment in India.  Modernizing forces will also likely increase wage 
work as casual wage work increases.  However, it is unclear how modernization will 
influence female employment in India, an issue to be further explored in this 
dissertation.  We will now turn to factors that influence Muslim’s educational and 
employment experiences in India. 
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Muslim Education and Employment: Disadvantage, Discrimination, and 
Segmentation 
Despite modernization’s positive influences, Muslims face continual 
disadvantage and discrimination in education and employment in India. Although 
enrollment has risen for both Hindus and Muslims, educational differences between 
the two groups have persisted over time and even increased for secondary school and 
college (Desai and Kulkarni 2005).  This is particularly discouraging considering that 
other disadvantaged groups, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, have experienced 
gains in education, resulting in a decline in the educational gap between these groups 
and upper caste Hindus (Desai and Kulkarni 2005).   
One site where discrimination against Muslims manifests itself is in the 
allocation of publicly provided education.  In their study of the Bijnor district in Uttar 
Pradesh, Patricia and Roger Jeffery (1998) and Jeffery et. al. (2005) find that few 
Muslim villages and Muslim dominant wards within large multi-caste villages have 
government primary schools.  The Muslim villages and wards with government 
primary schools are of lower quality and have fewer resources.  Specifically, these 
schools serve larger populations, yet they are smaller, have less teachers, and 
experience higher rates of teacher absenteeism.  This qualitative analysis is 
substantiated by a national study using district data conducted by Betancourt and 
Gleason (2000).  They find that there are less publicly provided educational inputs in 
districts that have higher proportions of Muslims.  This occurs despite high Muslim 
demand for secular schooling, particularly among the middle and upper classes 
(Engineer 2001, Mann 1994).  
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Government and private school partiality towards Hindus also affect Muslim 
educational attainment.  Jeffery et. al. (2005) find that Muslims perceive government 
schools to be communal.  They believe that government schools have mainly Hindu 
teachers with a bias towards other Hindus.  Specifically, Hindu students are more 
likely to receive private tutoring and receive higher grades. Furthermore, government 
school textbooks exalt Hinduism, while negatively portraying Muslims (Sikand 
2005).  These prejudices against Muslims in government and secular private schools 
are likely to affect the decisions that Muslim households make about educating their 
children in these institutions.    
 Discrimination in the labor market also has adverse consequences for Muslim 
educational attainment.  Since Muslims face considerable discrimination in the labor 
market, limiting their opportunities in both the public and private sectors, they often 
do not see the value of educating their children beyond a particular level (Mann 1994, 
Sikand 2005).   
 Many authors argue that poverty and madrasa education, religious schools 
focusing on Islamic scholarly teachings, negatively influence educational attainment 
among Muslims.  However, these claims are problematic.  First, although many 
wealthy Muslims did leave for Pakistan during Partition, leaving poorer Muslims 
behind in India, and some Muslims are low caste converts, Muslims have higher 
levels of urbanization compared to the rest of the population (Government of India 
2006) and are therefore better off than many rural dwellers. Second, even though 
there is a growing Muslim middle class and Muslims have high levels of 
urbanization, relative to Hindus, Muslims do not have distinct class/caste differences 
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in education (Jeffery and Jeffery 1998).  This suggests that poverty is not the driving 
factor for low Muslim educational attainment, however it is likely that socioeconomic 
status does play some role. 
Other questionable claims are that most Muslim parents prefer to send their 
children to madrasas, most Muslim children are enrolled in madrasas, and as a result 
Muslims have difficulties transferring to upper level secular schools.  In fact many 
Muslim parents prefer to send their children to secular schools (Sikand 2005, Mann 
1994) and they in fact do.  Most Muslim children go to secular schools rather than 
madrasas, even as madrasa facilities and enrollments expand (Sikand 2005).  
Specifically, only 3 percent of school age Muslim children attend madrasas and of the 
children that are enrolled in schools, only 4 percent are enrolled in madrasas 
(Government of India 2006).  
 Research indicates that Muslims also face considerable disadvantage and 
discrimination in the labor market.  Das’s (2002) study, using nationally 
representative data, suggests that Muslims are discriminated against in regular 
salaried employment and therefore are concentrated in non-farm self employment as 
owners of small businesses.  In his case study of Bombay, Khandker (1992) finds that 
the labor market is segmented according to gender, caste, and religion.  He argues that 
adjusting for human capital factors such as skill level and training will not breakdown 
the discriminatory institutional barriers facing these disadvantaged groups.  In 
particular, Muslims are more likely to hold less secure jobs.  Muslims are more likely 
to be in the unprotected wage market and have fewer occupational and income 
mobility opportunities.  
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 Muslim disadvantage is also apparent in government employment (Hasan 
2005, Singh 1980).  Even though Muslims make up around 14 percent of the 
population, they only make up 2.83 percent of elite Indian Administrative Service 
(IAS) employment (Hasan 2005).  While one would expect their share of IAS 
employment to increase as educational levels increase, Muslim share of IAS 
employment actually decreased from 2.98 percent in 1980 to 2.83 percent in 2000 
(Hasan 2005).   
While there are few affirmative action programs for Muslims, three states 
have modest programs for poor Muslims, Kerala, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu (Hasan 
2005). Even though these affirmative action programs for poor Muslims in these three 
states have been small in scale, they are purported to have made important strides 
towards greater proportional representation of Muslims in public employment (Hasan 
2005).  The effectiveness of these programs illustrates the discrimination that 
Muslims face in government employment and offers solutions for combating this 
discrimination. 
While Muslims have faced discrimination in education and the labor market, 
there is little empirical data regarding whether religious differences in education and 
wage employment have increased or worsened in the face of communal tensions.  
Hindu-Muslim communal tensions have a long history in India, since the early 1980s 
these tensions, with encouragement from state governments, have erupted into 
renewed violence.  On one hand, these tensions could worsen the discrimination that 
Muslims face in education and the labor market.  On the other hand, the tensions 
could cause Muslims to choose not to assimilate or integrate with a hostile dominant 
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group, resulting in the withdrawal from secular schooling and wage employment.  In 
the case of education, Muslims already feel that government schools are biased 
towards Hindus.  In light of communal tensions, Muslims may feel that it is important 
to send their children to madrasas, so their children can escape the discrimination they 
face in school and preserve their heritage.  The increase in communal tensions poses a 
similar problem for wage employment.  Hindus dominate wage employment and may 
become more discriminatory in their hiring practices.  Muslims already feel that they 
are discriminated against in government jobs.  This perception may be heightened 
during communal tensions and Muslims may not pursue particular forms of wage 
employment. 
In addition, communal tensions may affect upper and lower class Muslims 
differently.  Evidence suggests that economic competition and increasing Muslim 
prosperity contribute to communal tensions and the often resultant riots (Ahmad in 
Sengupta 2006, Hasan 1982, Lateef 1990).  For example, communal groups politicize 
the threat of Muslim prosperity to Hindu dominance in many western Uttar Pradesh 
cities, culminating into riots (Hasan 1982) that some suggest were, “aimed at the 
economic base of the community (Lateef 1990).” Since they pose a greater threat to 
Hindus, upper class Muslims may be more targeted during communal tensions and 
riots, therefore they may be more affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism 
compared to lower class Muslims. 
Thus far, we have focused on the experience of all Muslims; now we turn to 
the experience of Muslim women.  As discussed above there are many factors, which 
hinder girls’ educational attainment.  Gender differences in economic opportunities, 
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gender differences in financial and old age support, the practice of purdah, marriage 
markets, and the gender division of labor affect educational attainment for all girls.  
However, because Muslim girls belong to a minority group, additional factors may 
influence their educational attainment.  First, marriage markets may negatively affect 
Muslim girls more than Hindu girls.  Households generally take into consideration 
community norms for boys’ education when making decisions about their daughters’ 
education.  Girls are expected to have lower educational levels than boys because of 
concerns of finding a spouse and affording dowry (The Probe Team 1999).  
Therefore, the lower educational attainment of Muslim men has a ceiling effect on the 
educational attainment of Muslim women (Hasan and Menon 2005a).   
Muslim women are further disadvantaged by the same factors that affect all 
Muslims, namely discrimination in access to schools and within government and non-
Muslim private schools.  Therefore, Muslim women face disadvantage through the 
interplay of gender and religion.  This results in lower levels of educational 
attainment compared to Hindu men and women and Muslim men. 
Muslim women are disadvantaged by gender and religion in wage 
employment as well.  As mentioned earlier, employment for all women in India is 
influenced by the practice of purdah, the gender division of labor in the household, 
and segmented labor markets. Muslim women face these constraints that all women 
face and face constraints that Muslim men face.  Similar to Muslim men, Muslim 
women generally are employed in the unprotected wage market and have less chances 
for occupational and income mobility (Khandker 1992).   
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Therefore, the low employment levels of Muslim women can be attributed to 
the intersection of gender and religion.  On one hand, similar to other women in India, 
Muslim women are affected by patriarchal controls such as purdah, the gender 
division of labor in the household, and markets segmented based on gender.  On the 
other hand, they also face discrimination and disadvantage in the labor market based 
on their minority group status.     
In summary, Muslims face considerable disadvantage in both education and 
employment.  There are fewer government schools placed in Muslim dominated areas 
and when they are accessible to Muslims, they are of lower quality.  Furthermore, 
Muslim children face prejudice in government and non-Muslim private schools 
through interactions with mainly Hindu teachers and textbooks that extol Hinduism 
and deprecate Islam.  Muslims also face disadvantage in the labor market.  This is 
evident by their confinement to non-farm self-employment (Das 2002) and vulnerable 
jobs with limited occupational and income mobility (Khandar 1992).  Muslim women 
are likely to be negatively affected by the interplay of gender and religion.  
Specifically, cultural factors that dampen educational attainment and wage 
employment for all Indian women, affect Muslim women.  Furthermore, Muslim 
women’s education and wage employment are negatively affected by their minority 
religious status.  Additionally, communal tensions in India have worsened overtime, 
which may result in more prejudice against Muslims in education and wage 
employment.  Evidence also suggests that upper class Muslims may be relatively 
more affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism compared to lower class Muslims.  
In this dissertation, we will examine Muslim enrollment and wage employment to see 
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how their experiences may have changed over the years, in the context of both 
modernization and heightened communal tensions. 
Rising Tide of Fundamentalism and Identity Politics 
  Muslim women’s education and wage employment must also be viewed in the 
context of increasing religious tensions in India. As discussed in Chapter 1, the divide 
between Hindus and Muslims has widened considerably in the past 30 years. Hindu 
fundamentalism and propaganda regarding the “backwardness” of Muslim culture has 
had a complex impact on the Muslim community in India. 
 Various literatures argue that women’s agency, empowerment, rights, 
education, and employment are vulnerable in the context of religious politicization 
(Hawley 1994, Jeffery and Basu 1998, Moghadam 1994).  While these literatures use 
different terminology such as identity politics, politicized religion, and religious 
fundamentalism, all argue that women belonging to these communities are adversely 
affected.  I have chosen to use the terminology “religious identity politics” to refer to 
the context in India, despite the numerous critiques of the term identity politics by 
Marxists and post-structuralists (Heyes 2002). 
Identity politics is a movement or discourse, which focuses on defining 
identities, namely religious, nationalist, ethnic (Moghadam 1994), feminist, racial, 
and sexual identities (Heyes 2002).  Many identity politics movements attempt to 
gain social, political, and economic resources that have been denied to a particular 
group. Feminist movements, the United States Civil Rights Movement, and Gay and 
Lesbian movements are examples of identity politics movements (Heyes 2002).  
Religious identity politics movements may also try to gain resources that have been 
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previously denied to them, however these movements may also form if the groups’ 
culture is threatened by other religious groups, modernization, or Westernization. 
Religious identity politics movements and discourses include: the New Right in the 
United States (Klatch 1994), the pro-life movement in the United States (Papanek 
1994), Iran under Khomeni (Papanek 1994), Gush Emunim in Israel (Tress 1994), 
Orthodox Jewish women in The United States (Kaufman 1994) and Pakistan under 
Zia ul Haq (Rouse 1998).  In most circumstances, these discourses and movements 
have negative implications for individuals who are less powerful in the group 
(Papenek 1994). In particular, women are negatively affected in many religious 
identity politics discourses and movements (Moghadam 1994).  
Religious identity politics literature suggests that women may be negatively 
affected by identity politics in two ways.  First, to buttress the needs of the entire 
subordinate group, women’s needs are often neglected.  Specifically, women in 
subordinate groups often experience oppression by the dominant group and by 
patriarchal ideologies; however, the recognition of the intersection of their oppression 
is often sacrificed to serve the needs of the entire subordinate community.  Second, 
women often become symbols for the community.  Too often, this entails appeals for 
a return to traditional gender roles, where women represent motherhood and 
protectors of culture, resulting in demands for women to return to the home and 
domestic sphere. 
One way in which religious identity politics can be potentially harmful to 
women is in the arena of women’s rights.  The abortion debate in the United States 
and the reinsertion of Sharia law in several countries are examples of religious 
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identity politics negatively affecting women’s rights.  Adherents to the pro-life 
movement in the United States often long for an idyllic past where female sexuality is 
more controlled, men have more control in the family and society, and the family is 
stable (Papanek 1994).  The pro-life movement, in seeking to overturn Roe v. Wade, 
attempts to restrict women’s right to choose to have an abortion and their control over 
their bodies.  The re-establishment of conservative interpretations of Islamic law is 
another example of how women’s rights may potentially be harmed in the name of 
religious identity politics.  In several countries, the reintroduction and conservative 
interpretations of Islamic law can potentially harm women in the areas of marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance (Hale 1994), even though the Quran itself has modern views 
about marriage, divorce, inheritance, child custody, and maintenance (Engineer 
1996).  For example, conservative interpretations of Islamic law allow a husband to 
readily divorce his wife, but make it difficult for a woman to divorce her husband.  
Furthermore, while Islamic law does grant Muslim women rights to inheritance and 
wealth, women’s access to inheritance is more restricted compared to many secular 
laws.  Specifically, while Muslim women are granted the right to receive inheritance 
and wealth, they receive less than males in the household.     
In India, Muslim women’s rights have been affected by the interplay of Hindu 
Fundamentalism and the resultant Muslim identity politics.  The Shah Bano case 
represents Muslim women’s rights and empowerment being sacrificed in the face of 
threatened Muslim identity.  Shah Bano, a Muslim woman, was divorced from her 
husband in 1975.  Her husband paid her maintenance of 200 rupees until 1978.  In 
1986, under article 125 of the India Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires 
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husbands to pay 500 rupees a month, Shah Bano sued her husband.  The court, using 
language that was inflammatory towards Muslims, ruled that her husband had to pay 
25 rupees a month, increasing this amount to 180 rupees when Shah Bano petitioned 
the court (Awn 1994).  Muslim groups were outraged because the court was 
interfering with the religious law of the Muslim community and threatening their 
identity (Awn 1994).  Hindu fundamentalists further threatened Muslim identity by 
using this issue to paint Muslims and Islam as barbaric and harmful to women’s 
status, ironically arguing that they would never treat Hindu women in this way.  
Women’s groups legitimately concerned with the way in which Muslim Personal laws 
adversely affected Muslim women, found themselves on the same side as Hindu 
Fundamentalists (Chhachhi 1991) and were thus forced to let go of their demands. 
The women’s movement’s withdrawal from this issue and Muslim resistance to the 
threat to their identity resulted in the passage of the Muslim Women Protection of 
Rights on Divorce Bill of 1986, which contrary to its name, restricts Muslim women’s 
rights in terms of marriage, divorce, and child support relative to what is currently 
sanctioned by law for other women in India. 
Religious identity politics movements also have controlled women’s dress and 
sexuality.  For example, in Iran, during the revolution, it was made compulsory for 
women to wear a veil and it was forbidden for women to wear make-up (Tavakoli-
Traghi 1994).  There is evidence of religious identity political movements of Sikhs, 
Vishva Hindu Parishad, the Tailban, and Pakistani government restricting women’s 
movements and dress (Hawly and Proudfoot 1994).  
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The religious identity politics literature suggests that women’s education and 
employment are affected by identity politics movements, however there is little 
empirical research on these potential linkages. Even conceptually, these linkages have 
not been fully developed.  Religious identity politics may have different implications 
for women’s education and wage employment.  In religious identity politics 
movements, education is valued in as far as it enhances the role of mother and wife 
(Moghadam 1994).  This argument for the education for women is not unique to 
religious identity politics movements, for example, both Hindu and Muslim 
households partially view girls’ education in the context of how it improves their 
domestic role. This focus may enhance primary and middle school education but may 
reduce higher levels of educational attainment, meaning that one needs domestic 
skills which do not require high levels of education (Jeffery and Jeffery 1998).  
Modernizing forces aid in changing these views about educating girls.  If identity 
politics movements seek to maintain these calls for educating girls only so they can 
be better wives and mothers, modernizing forces may not penetrate the reinforcement 
of these ideologies. 
 In addition, in India, Muslim households may be reluctant to send girls to 
government and non-Muslim private schools, since females are given the 
responsibility of being vessels of religion and teaching their children how to be good 
Muslims.  Government and non-Muslim private schools inhibit their ability to do this, 
therefore Muslim households may feel compelled to send their daughters to madrasas 
for religious instruction for a few years.  Once children are sent to madrasas, it may 
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become difficult to transition into government and non-Islamic middle and secondary 
schools.  Therefore, Muslim women’s education may be curtailed. 
 Employment carries little redeeming value ascribed to education. Through 
exalting women’s domestic roles and their responsibilities to be a good wife and 
mother, religious identity politics movements often circumscribe women’s ability to 
work, under the assumption that if a woman works, then time is taken away from her 
children and husband, thus the woman cannot fulfil her duties to be a good mother 
and wife and also work (Bouatta and Cherifati-Merabtine 1994).  In such diverse 
identity political movements as Khomeni’s Iran, Hitler’s Germany, and Sudan, there 
were explicit calls for women not to work.  In Iran, the state encouraged women not 
to work through such policies as mandatory retirement, harassment, and incentives 
for men whose wives do not work (Gerami 1994).  Despite these sanctions against 
women working, it seems to have mostly affected educated upper class women, rather 
than lower class women (Moghadam 1988).  Similarly, in Sudan, identity politics 
movements called on women not to work unless they did not have children or if their 
family was in need of income (Hale 1994).     
In India, Muslim women’s wage work may be susceptible to these influences. 
Furthermore, if the Muslim community perceives itself as being subject to hostile 
Hindu influences, withdrawal from intensive contact with these groups, particularly 
for women, may be one of the responses. Wage work frequently involves working in 
factories, offices and shops under supervisors who are most likely Hindu. Fears of 
harassment may lead to withdrawal from these work environments.  In addition, 
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stereotypical images of Muslim women as being backward, unreliable and unable to 
communicate may lead to employer discrimination and inability to secure work.  
While the religious identity politics literature argues that women’s rights, 
status and empowerment are vulnerable to religious identity politics, it is unclear if 
religious identity politics movements actually depress women’s education and 
employment.  This dissertation makes a unique contribution to the literature by 
examining empirical trends in Muslim women’s school enrollment and wage 
employment in the context of intensifying Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim 
identity politics. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has highlighted factors shaping Indian Muslim women’s lives.  
Modernizing forces may positively affect enrollment and wage employment for all 
Indians.  Religious disadvantage and discrimination negatively influences enrollment 
and wage employment for both Muslim men and women.  In addition, there is 
evidence that discrimination against Muslims has been increasing as a result of the 
rise of Hindu fundamentalism, which would further depress enrollment and wage 
employment for Muslims.  Additionally, there is evidence that upper class Muslims 
may be particularly affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism.  Muslim women’s 
lives may be further shaped by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity 
politics.  This dissertation makes an important contribution to the literature on 
Muslim women, by empirically testing these relationships. 
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
 
Over the past thirty years, India has experienced profound economic, political, 
and social changes, greatly influencing Muslim women’s lives.  The preceding 
chapters highlight three primary trends, modernization, religious disadvantage and 
discrimination, and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics.  
Despite the confluence of these trends and their potential impact on Muslim women, 
they have never been simultaneously empirically examined.  Utilizing the National 
Sample Survey (NSS), this dissertation empirically tests these trends, focusing on 
measurable outcomes, enrollment and wage employment.  This chapter discusses the 
conceptual framework and hypotheses.  
Conceptual Framework 
Enrollment 
As Figure 1 illustrates, I hypothesize that modernization, discrimination and 
disadvantage, and Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics have 
influenced school enrollment from 1983 to 1999 primary through parental value and 
demand for education. 
Modernizing forces have increased the supply of schools, increased the 
economic benefits of schooling and changed ideologies about the non-economic 
benefits of schooling.  Educational expenditure (Ministry of Education 2006) and the 
provision of educational facilities have increased considerably (Govinda 2002), 
granting greater access to education for larger portions of the population.  Increased 
supply of schools lowers many of the household level costs associated with 
education. For example, children’s enrollment is hindered when they must travel long 
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distances to school, often on difficult terrain (The Probe Team 1999).  If a child must 
walk a long distance to attend school, there may be safety concerns and there are 
opportunity costs associated with the time the child is away from home.  Time 
traveling to and from school may come at the expense of children’s household chores.  
Safety concerns and domestic responsibilities particularly affect girls schooling.  
Social distance poses another hindrance to schooling for disadvantaged groups (The 
Probe Team 1999).  Many schools are located in higher caste sections of villages.  
Disadvantaged groups may not feel comfortable traveling to those schools because of 
safety and harassment concerns.  To the extent that more schools are built in areas 
where disadvantaged groups reside, parental demand for education among 
disadvantaged groups may increase.  In particular, parental demand for Muslims may 
increase as schools become more accessible. 
Modernizing processes also increase the economic benefits of schooling 
affecting parental value and demand for education.  Development changes the 
structure of the economy and the types of jobs that are available, requiring a more 
skilled workforce.  Additionally, these forces change the returns to education in terms 
of attaining better jobs and higher earnings.  Caldwell et. al. (1985) and The Probe 
Team (1999) find that households increasingly view education as a venue to obtain 
better paying jobs.  Specifically, Caldwell et. al. (1985)  find that parents in rural 
India want to increase their children’s chances of obtaining non-farm, urban, or 
government employment.  Developmental processes have also changed the rural 
economy, increasing parental demand for schooling (Caldwell et. al. 1985). 
Decreasing farm sizes, changes in rural technologies, and changes in employment 
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relationships have resulted in less reliance on children’s labor. This reduction in the 
need for children’s labor has played an important role in increasing school enrollment 
(Caldwell et. al. 1985).  Modernization also changes ideologies about the non-
economic benefits of schooling. Households increasingly view education as important 
for literacy, numeracy, enlightenment, and a better ability to interact with the social 
world (Caldwell et. al. 1985, The Probe Team 1999).   
Discrimination and disadvantage also influence parental demand for 
schooling.  Low cultural and economic worth of women in Indian society influences 
girls schooling.  Households faced with scarce resources will choose to invest in 
boys’ education over girls’ education because of the greater returns to boy’s 
education.  Furthermore, cultural practices such as purdah, restrictions on girls’ 
movement at menarchy, also hinder girls’ school enrollment.  These societal and 
community values about girls’ cultural and economic worth are enacted through 
parental demand for girls’ education, depressing their education. 
Muslims also face discrimination and disadvantage which influences parental 
demand for schooling.  The school climate may adversely affect Muslim school 
enrollment.  Textbooks and curriculums that have a pro-upper caste Hindu and anti-
Muslim biases, and hostilities from teachers and students may deter Muslim 
children’s enrollment.  Specifically, Muslim parents may not want to send their 
children to schools where the school climate is hostile.  As Hindu fundamentalism 
increases, the school climate is likely to become more negative towards Muslims, 
having further depressive effects on their enrollment.  Moreover, if Muslim children 
must travel in Hindu dominated areas to attend schools, Muslim parental concern for 
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their children’s safety may influence their children’s enrollment.  Historical 
discrimination and disadvantage may also adversely influence Muslim school 
enrollment.  Past discrimination and disadvantage have negatively affected Muslim 
households’ educational attainment and economic opportunities, reducing the 
socioeconomic resources they have to send their children to school.  Present 
discrimination in the labor market also influences Muslim parental demand for 
schooling.  Muslim parents may not see the value in investing heavily in education if 
the returns to education in the labor market are lower for Muslims.  Discrimination 
and disadvantage in terms of the allocation of schools also negatively influences 
Muslim children’s enrollment.  Areas with high concentrations of Muslims have less 
schools (Jeffery and Jeffery 1998, Jeffery et. al. 2005).  Parents’ reluctance to send 
their children to schools that are at a great distance, may hinder Muslim children’s 
school enrollment. 
Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics may have a unique 
influence on Muslim girls.  To the extent that Muslim women and girls have become 
symbols for the Muslim community, in the face of rising Hindu fundamentalism, then 
parental demand for girls education will likely decrease.  More specifically, if the 
Muslim community, as a reaction to Hindu fundamentalism, adopts more 
conservative ideologies about gender roles, then parental demand for girls’ education 
will decrease.  The further delineation of gender roles, where women attend to 
domestic duties while men engage in market work, devalue the importance of 
education for girls, resulting in household’s choosing not to invest heavily in girls 
education.  Moreover, in religious identity politics movements, women are seen as 
 
 57
vessels for religion and must impart their religious knowledge to their children.  This 
may result in Muslim parents sending their girls to madrasas to receive religious 
instruction.  Madrasa schools often do not provide education at higher levels of 
schooling and transitions to madrasas to government and non-Islamic private schools 
can be difficult, potentially curtailing Muslim girls’ education when madrasa 
education is no longer available.  Furthermore, in the face of rising Hindu 
fundamentalism, parents may fear for the safety of their daughters while traveling to 
school, potentially restricting their education. 
Thus far we have discussed how external forces have likely influenced 
parental demand for enrollment.  There are also important factors within the 
household that affect children’s school enrollment.  The economic resources of the 
household determines who is able to go to school and for how long.  Families that 
have scarce economic resources will likely have a lower demand for education, 
having to spend their resources on more basic needs.  Furthermore, they may have a 
greater demand for children’s help in the household.  Additionally, scarce economic 
resources hinder girls’ education more than boys, since households would choose to 
send boys to school because of the greater returns to their education and because boys 
will provide for their parents in old age.  Girls’ education is further hindered by 
responsibilities in the household, such as care of younger children.  
Wage Employment 
 Figure 2 illustrates the factors that have influenced the wage employment 
patterns of Hindu and Muslim men and women.  Modernizing forces change the 
structure of employment, decreasing self-employment and increasing opportunities in 
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wage employment.  These forces also increase education and earnings and, in theory, 
should change patriarchal ideologies.  As often coveted wage employment, 
educational, and earnings opportunities become more available, households will 
increasingly attempt to gain access to these opportunities. To the extent that 
modernization changes patriarchal ideologies, cultural practices that inhibit women’s 
work, such as purdah, may be relaxed. These changes are likely to occur at both the 
community and household level.  At the household level, households may be attracted 
to the earning potential of women, and relax cultural practices that limit women’s 
wage work.  In theory, modernization is also supposed to break down the importance 
of ascriptive characteristics such as gender and race in the labor market, since it 
becomes too costly for firms to discriminate.  Therefore, modernizing forces should 
decrease the effects of discrimination that women and Muslims face in the market 
place. 
 While development may reduce the discrimination that women and Muslims 
face in the labor market, discrimination in the labor market persists.  Women face 
discrimination in the labor market and are also encumbered by cultural practices that 
inhibit their labor force participation.  Labor force discrimination has a direct impact 
on their access to jobs, while other cultural constraints operate through household 
decision-making about women’s work.  The delineation of strict gender roles, where 
men are involved in market work and women tend to reproductive and domestic 
responsibilities are broader ideologies of society which operate through labor force 
opportunities and household decision-making about women’s work.  Moreover, 
cultural practices such as purdah also operate via household decision-making.  Many 
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upper caste households observe purdah, this practice is becoming more prevalent as 
other households emulate higher caste households and attempt to gain status through 
the observance of purdah.  However, households who have scarce resources are often 
not in a financial position to practice purdah. 
 Muslims also face discrimination in the work place having a direct negative 
influence on their wage employment.  Employers, who tend to be Hindu, since 
Hindus are the majority in India, may discriminate against Muslims resulting in not 
hiring Muslims or relegating them to low paying jobs.  Where Muslims do have jobs, 
working primarily with Hindus, their work environment could be hostile and these 
hostilities may worsen with the rise of Hindu fundamentalism, possibly resulting in 
Muslims withdrawing from such work places.  Moreover, the rise of Hindu 
fundamentalism and resultant riots in many areas, have led many Muslims to leave 
their homes to live in Muslim dominant areas (Government of India 2006).  Muslim 
dominant areas tend to have less resources (Government of India 2006) and may 
result in Muslims living further away from lucrative job opportunities, curtailing their 
wage employment. 
 Muslim women may be further affected by Hindu fundamentalism and 
Muslim identity politics.  If the Muslim community adopts more conservative 
ideologies about gender roles, then households may decide to withdraw women from 
wage employment.  Religious identity politics movements often call for a further 
delineation of gender roles.  The increased demarcation of gender roles reinforces the 
importance of women’s reproductive and domestic duties and denounces their 
participation in market work.  Market work conflicts with women being good wives 
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and mothers because it takes time away from their husbands and children (Bouatta 
and Cherifati-Merabtine 1994).   Muslim women’s market work may be further 
depressed if Muslim households decide to curtail women’s contact with Hindus over 
concerns for Muslim women’s welfare in an increasingly hostile environment.   
 There are also factors within the household that influence wage employment.  
Economic resources within the household may determine whether women engage in 
market work.  Women from poorer households may have no choice but to engage in 
market work.  Children in the household, particularly young children are likely to 
decrease women’s engagement in market work, since women are responsible for child 
care duties. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1  
Modernizing forces will increase overall school enrollment and wage employment 
over time. 
Economic growth and the diffusion of western ideas have been increasing 
school enrollment in developing countries.  As the economy grows, a more educated 
workforce is needed to perform complex tasks (Notestien 1953), resulting in 
government educational investment and promotion.  Furthermore, colonial and post-
colonial relationships with Western countries have led developing nations to emulate 
the western model of the nation-state and place importance on mass education (Meyer 
et. al 1992).  Thereby, increasing the commitment that developing nations have to 
education.   
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In India, since Independence, there have been many factors that have 
increased school enrollments.  In order to enhance the development process, the 
Indian government has made important commitments to raise school enrollment 
levels, particularly by increasing access to schools.  In addition, the changing 
economic structure in India resulting in economic benefits to those who are more 
educated has influenced household decision-making about school enrollment.  Parents 
are increasingly sending their children to school to raise their chances of obtaining 
better employment opportunities (Caldwell et. al. 1985).  Moreover, parents are 
increasingly aware of the social benefits of schooling, such as enlightenment and a 
better ability to interact with the social environment (Caldwell et. al 1985, The Probe 
Team 1999).  However, literature suggests that structural adjustment and 
liberalization policies may reduce school enrollments due to lower expenditures on 
education, the institution of fees, and recession.  While India did undergo structural 
adjustment and liberalization policies, the Indian government did not reduce 
expenditures or institute fees, nor did India experience a recession.  Therefore, we 
expect total educational enrollment to increase over time.     
Modernization also influences employment patterns.  During early periods of 
development, the family is the center of production (Notestein 1953).  As 
development progresses, outside forms of production develop, pulling household 
members out of family production into jobs such as factory work (Notestien 1953).  
As economic growth occurs, more people are needed to produce goods and services, 
increasing service, manufacturing, and industrial wage employment opportunities 
outside the household (Anderson and Leiserson 1980).  However, these arguments 
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largely rely on the experience of developed nations and do not account for, among 
other factors, the impact structural adjustment and liberalization policies have on 
developing nations.  As a result of structural adjustment and liberalization policies, 
many developing countries experienced a slow down in job growth, casualization of 
the labor force, and increased unemployment and underemployment. 
From 1950 to 1980, India experienced slow and steady economic growth, with 
a per capita economic growth rate of 1.7 (Rodrik and Subramanian 2005).  The 1980s 
ushered in a new era of economic growth.  From 1980 to 2000 the per capita 
economic growth rate increased to 3.8 percent (Rodrik and Subramanian 2005).  
Contrary to expectations, but similar to the experience of many other developing 
nations that underwent structural adjustment programs, the economic growth that 
India experienced did not accelerate growth in employment, rather the employment 
growth rate declined from the 1980s to 2000.  However, this economic growth has 
resulted in the reduction of self-employment, which partially reflects employment in 
household enterprises.  The percentage of workers engaged in self-employment 
decreased from 59 percent in 1977-78 to 53 in 1999-2000 (Anant 2004). While 
economic development decreased self-employment, wage work increased.  Those 
engaged in wage work are either regular salaried employees or casual wage laborers.  
While the overall percentage of workers engaged in wage work increased during this 
period, it is unclear whether regular salaried wage employment increased.  Anant 
(2004) finds that from 1977-78 to 1999-2000 regular salaried employment remained 
stagnant, with roughly 14 percent of workers engaged in regular salaried employment 
in both periods.  However, other estimates indicate that regular salaried employment 
 
 63
increased (Sundaram 2004), while others (Duraisamy 2000) suggest a slight decrease 
in regular salaried employment from the 1980s to 2000.  There is more agreement 
regarding the trend in casual wage employment, with many arguing that India is 
experiencing a casualization of the labor force.  The percentage of workers engaged 
in causal wage employment has increased from 27 percent in 1977-78 to 33 percent in 
1999-2000.  It appears that much of the decrease in self-employment is associated 
with the increase in casual wage work.  In other words, it appears that those engaged 
in self-employment are increasingly moving in to casual wage employment.  Despite 
the ambiguity surrounding the trends for regular salary employment, we expect that 
as India experienced accelerated economic growth during the 1980s through 2000, 
total wage work, encompassing both regular salaried employment and casual wage 
labor will increase, largely driven by increases in casual wage employment.   
Hypothesis 2 
Modernizing forces will narrow the gender gap in enrollment in education.  It is 
unclear how modernizing forces will influence the gender gap in wage employment, 
at least in the short run.  
 As development proceeds, gender gaps in enrollment decrease. Examining the 
relationship between development and gender inequality in education, Hill and King 
(1993) find that low-income countries tend to have the largest gender gaps in school 
enrollments, while developed nations have the smallest gaps.  The experiences of 
urban and rural areas also demonstrate that development narrows gender differences 
in enrollment.  Urban areas are more developed than rural areas and experience lower 
gender differentials in education. In addition, as governments actively promote 
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schooling and provide greater access to schools, girls benefit.  Wils and Goujon’s 
(1998) study of six world regions from 1960 to 1990 suggests that as enrollment 
increases, the gender difference in enrollment decreases as girls’ enrollment catches 
up to boys’ enrollment.  
 In India, education of women was dismal prior to Independence from Britain 
(Basu 1999, Dreze and Sen 1995).  The Indian government, recognizing that girls’ 
education was considerably lower than boy’s education, wrote a provision in the 
constitution urging states to make special efforts to encourage girls’ education (Basu 
1999).  Over the years, educational commissions and the women’s movement called 
for more substantial efforts to increase girls’ enrollment, resulting in special programs 
and campaigns to enhance girls enrollment and literacy (Basu 1999). 
 Through these efforts and the government’s commitment to expand 
educational facilities, girls’ access to education has increased.  Since girls’ enrollment 
is sensitive to proximity to schools, this has played a major role in increasing their 
enrollment.  Parents’ reluctance to send girls to schools outside their village or far 
distances reduces girls’ enrollment (Nayer 2002, The Probe Team 1999).  
Government expansion of educational facilities removes this barrier to girls’ 
education.  Work by Rastogi et. al. (2004) substantiates this claim.  They find that 
gender inequality in education is reduced in districts with higher levels of school 
quality, proxied by the number of teachers in a district.    
 However, supply of schools is not enough.  A major hindrance to girls’ 
schooling is household demand. As discussed in Chapter 2, girls’ low economic and 
cultural worth in India diminishes their school enrollment.  Despite these barriers, 
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demand for girls’ schooling has been increasing since Independence.  One factor that 
has increased the demand for girls’ schooling is the importance of education in 
marriage markets.  Households increasingly want to educate their daughters to 
enhance their marriage prospects (Caldwell et. al. 1985, The Probe Team 1999).  
Households also believe that some education for girls is important to improve their 
domestic abilities, accounting skills, and letter writing skills (The Probe Team 1999).  
Increasingly, households are also indicating that they would like to educate their 
daughters to increase their employment opportunities (Caldwell et. al. 1985, The 
Probe Team 1999).  Caldwell et. al. (1985) argue that this was not the case 15 years 
before their study.   
Another potential hindrance to girls’ schooling is structural adjustment 
policies, however we do not expect that girls’ education in India has been affected by 
these policies.  The Indian government has invested considerably in education, has 
not instituted any fees, and India has experienced significant economic growth.  
Therefore, households do not feel additional financial constraints that would likely 
hinder girls’ enrollment.    
 Increased school expansion, efforts of women’s groups and educational 
commissions, campaigns directed at girls schooling and literacy, and the increasing 
demand of girls schooling has had an important impact on girls schooling.  As a 
result, girls’ enrollment in India has increased at a faster rate compared to boys (Basu 
1999, Nayer 2002).  Therefore, we expect that modernizing forces have reduced the 
gender gap in school enrollment over time.    
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 Women’s labor force participation is expected to follow a U shaped curve.  At 
low levels of development, women’s work participation is high as both men and 
women are engaged in economic activities based around the home.  As development 
proceeds, wage work outside the home pulls men into market work, while women 
continue to work at home.  As development further progresses, particularly when 
there is a sufficient level of secondary schooling and white collar jobs (Goldin 1995), 
women’s market work increases, and female labor force participation moves up the 
curve of the U.  However, it is unclear what threshold of development will 
significantly propel women's labor force participation.  Structural adjustment policies 
may facilitate the increase of women’s market work, if household incomes decrease 
requiring women to work outside the home.  However, if the labor force does not 
expand, then women’s market work may be curtailed.   
The effect of modernizing influences on Indian women’s wage employment is 
not clear because there are various potentially countervailing trends.  There is 
evidence that women’s wage employment has been increasing over time.  In 
particular, the percentage of women as agricultural wage laborers has increased since 
1961 (Mukherjee 1999).  Unni and Rani (2000) also find that women’s share of non-
agriculture employment is increasing, suggesting that women are increasingly 
entering wage employment.  However, there is also evidence that overall female labor 
force participation rates have remained stagnant and even decreased from 1980 to 
1995 (Das and Desai 2003).  The pattern behind this stagnation and even labor force 
decline for Indian women is unclear. Therefore, it is unclear how modernization will 




Discrimination and disadvantage adversely affect Muslim enrollment and wage 
employment. 
 Discrimination and disadvantage that Muslims face in India influence both 
their school enrollment and wage employment.  There are several factors, which lead 
to lower school enrollment among Muslims.  First, there are fewer publicly provided 
schools in wards, villages and districts that have higher proportion of Muslims 
(Jeffery and Jeffery 1998, Jeffery et. al. 2005). Second, there is Hindu bias in 
government and non-Islamic private schools.  Teacher bias towards Hindus and 
government texts which extol Hinduism, while deprecating Islam negatively 
influences Muslim school enrollment.  Absence of Urdu schools may further affect 
enrollment, particularly in southern states where Muslims often use Urdu at home 
which is very different from Kannada, Malyalam, Tamil and Telugu taught in schools. 
Discrimination in the labor market also depresses Muslim school enrollment.  
Muslims are discriminated against in both the public and private sectors.  This reality 
often discourages Muslim households from investing scarce resources in education, 
when they will not be rewarded for these human capital investments (Mann 1994, 
Sikand 2005).  Therefore, we expect Muslim enrollment to be lower than Hindu 
enrollment. 
 Muslims also face discrimination and disadvantage in the labor market.  
Muslims face considerable discrimination in both the public and private sectors 
(Hasan 2005).  Muslims are largely confined to non-agricultural self-employment 
(Das 2002), hold more vulnerable jobs, and have less occupational and income 
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mobility compared to Hindus (Khandker 1992).  Therefore, we expect Muslim wage 
employment to be lower than Hindu wage employment. 
Hypothesis 4 
As Hindu fundamentalism intensifies, discrimination against Muslims 
increases, reducing growth in enrollment and wage employment for Muslims, thereby 
increasing the enrollment and wage employment gap between Hindus and Muslims, 
particularly in states where Hindu fundamentalist currents are strong. 
 As Chapter 1 documents, Hindu fundamentalism has been increasing since the 
early 1980s, intensifying throughout the 1990s, resulting in the proliferation of 
negative Muslim stereotypes and prejudice against Muslims.  Increased prejudice 
against Muslims may further depress Muslims enrollment and wage employment.  
The propagation of negative stereotypes of Muslims, may further lower Hindu 
teachers’ expectations of Muslim children affecting Muslim children’s performance 
and progress in school.  Children may find this environment frustrating and 
unmotivating and as a result drop out.  Parents often stop investing in their child’s 
education when they are not making adequate progress (Caldwell et. al. 1985).  
Households do not have enough resources to keep a child in school who is not 
performing well because of the opportunity cost of lost labor and costs of schooling 
such as textbooks, uniforms, and other fees (Caldwell et. al. 1985).  Another potential 
factor depressing Muslim school enrollments is that Muslim households may view 
increased prejudice against Muslims in government and non-Muslim private schools 
as detrimental to children’s wellbeing.  In addition, in the face of rising Hindu 
fundamentalism Muslim households may find it important to have their children 
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retain part of their religious heritage by sending them to madrasas.  If Muslim 
households increasingly choose to send their children to madrasas in the face of rising 
Hindu fundamentalism, it becomes more difficult for children enrolled in these 
schools to attend government secondary schools after madrasa education is no longer 
available.  Therefore, as Hindu fundamentalism increases, Muslim enrollment may 
decrease.  
 Increased prejudice and discrimination towards Muslims will likely also 
influence their wage employment.  Since Muslims are predominantly in non-farm 
small scale self-employment, hiring decisions for wage employment are in the 
purview of Hindus. Even if Muslims were in wage work, they are only 13 percent of 
the population so most will work for Hindu employers.  As negative portrayals of and 
prejudice against Muslims intensify, it will be even more difficult for them to find 
jobs in wage employment.  Therefore, wage employment is likely to decrease for all 
Muslims in the face of increasing prejudice from Hindus. 
Hypothesis 5 
 Upper class Muslims may be relatively more affected by the rise of Hindu 
fundamentalism compared to poorer Muslims.  If this is true, then we would expect 
the enrollment and wage employment gaps between upper class Muslims and Hindus 
to be larger than the gap between poorer Muslims and Hindus, particularly in states 
where Hindu fundamentalism is strong. 
 There is evidence that communal groups have utilized the increasing 
economic prosperity of Muslims in particular areas to incite communal tensions and 
riots (Hasan 1982, Lateef 1990).  As a result, upper class Muslims may be more 
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targeted during these tensions and riots and may also face more discrimination from 
Hindus.  Thus, potentially increasing the enrollment and wage employment gaps 
between upper class Muslims and Hindus more than for poorer Muslims and Hindus.  
 
Hypothesis 6 
Similar to the relationship between Hindu females and males, Muslim females will 
have lower levels of enrollment and wage employment compared to Muslim males 
because of gender discrimination in schooling and the labor market. 
 Muslim females will experience similar disadvantages that Hindu females 
face in school enrollment.  In the face of scarce resources, households choose to 
invest in boys’ education because they have more economic opportunities.  
Furthermore, males provide future financial and old age support to their parents, 
making investment in their education more crucial.  In addition, the practice of 
purdah, marriage markets, and the gender division of labor result in lower educational 
levels for Muslim females compared to Muslim males.  Moreover, Muslim females, 
like Muslim males, face discrimination in government and non-Islamic private 
schools.  Therefore, due to the interplay of gender and religion, Muslim female 
enrollment will be lower than Muslim male enrollment. 
 Similar to Hindu women, Muslim women’s wage employment is depressed by 
the practice of purdah, the gender division of labor, and segmented labor markets.  
Moreover, Muslim women face discrimination in the wage labor market because of 
their religious affiliation.  Therefore, the intersection between gender and religion 




The rise in Hindu Fundamentalism and religious identity politics will increase the 
Muslim gender gap in enrollment and wage employment over time, particularly in 
states where Hindu fundamentalism is strong. Furthermore, these factors will have a 
greater influence on Muslim women’s employment compared to their enrollment in 
education. 
 Although Muslim women share gender discrimination with their Hindu 
sisters, they are further affected by the way in which religion has been politicized in 
India. Muslim women’s lives have been strongly affected by political currents in the 
1980s and 1990s. The rising tide of Hindu fundamentalism and the resultant identity 
politics among Muslim communities are likely to have an increasingly negative 
impact on Muslim women’s education and wage employment.  
Religious identity politics movements call for women to return to the 
domestic sphere and for the reinforcement of the gender division of labor.  Enrollment 
in education, particularly at levels such as middle school and above, and participation 
in wage employment are in opposition to the gender division of labor. While both 
employment and enrollment contradict the appeals for women to return to the 
domestic sphere, education is still somewhat appealing for identity movements, since 
education seemly makes women good mothers. Therefore, if identity politics plays a 
role in Muslim women’s lives, we do expect the gender gap in Muslim enrollment to 
increase over time, but only moderately. In contrast, we expect the effect of identity 
politics to be much greater on employment since wage employment is not tied to 
motherhood or the domestic sphere. 
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Chapter 4 Data: Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables; 
and Research Design and Methods 
 
This chapter discusses the data; describes the dependent, independent and 
control variables; and explains the research design and methods. 
Data 
We employ the National Sample Surveys (NSS), allowing us to examine 
enrollment and wage employment patterns over time.  The NSS all-India household 
surveys have been conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization (NNSO) 
annually since 1950, collecting important cross-sectional employment and 
consumption data.  Starting in 1972, every five years, surveys with larger samples 
have been collected called the quinquennial surveys.  This paper utilizes the larger 
sample sizes of the quinquennial surveys, using four NSS rounds, 38, 43, 50, and 55, 
which were collected in 1983, 1987-1988, 1993-1994, and 1999-2000 respectively.  
The quinquennial surveys use a multi-stage stratified sample design, conducting in-
person interviews from a sample of randomly selected households to collect data on 
approximately 100,000 to 120,000 households or around 500,000 individuals per 
round.  For rounds 38, 43, 50, and 55, there were 120,921, 129,194, 115,409, and 
120,309 households were interviewed respectively.  Data was collected on 623,494, 
667,848, 564,740, and 596,688 individuals for rounds 38, 43, 50, and 55 respectively.  
An adult respondent answers questions about the household and individuals within 
the household.       
We will now turn to a discussion of the dependent variables and sample for 
the enrollment and wage employment analyses.  Tables 2 and 3 display the means and 
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standard deviations for independent and control variables for the enrollment and 
employment analyses respectively.         
Dependent Variables and Sample 
 The primary aim of this dissertation is to understand Muslim women’s school 
enrollment and wage employment in light of several countervailing influences such as 
modernization, religious disadvantage, and the rising tide of Hindu fundamentalism 
and Muslim identity politics.  These factors are crucial to understanding Muslim 
women’s experience in India for a variety of reasons.  First, both of these components 
allow us to gauge the well-being of Muslim women in India and how it has changed 
over time in the face of increasing Hindu fundamentalism.  Second, the use of these 
two factors allows us to make a unique contribution to the identity politics literature.  
While many researchers argue that women’s status in the form of education and 
employment is threatened by identity politics movements, it is has not been examined 
empirically. Both of these factors also taps into a slightly different aspect of Muslim 
women’s lives and this difference has interesting theoretical implications. Therefore, I 
utilize two dependent variables for this analysis: school enrollment and wage 
employment. 
Education 
India’s educational system consists of preprimary, primary, middle, secondary, 
and higher education.  Preprimary schools are similar to kindergarten in the United 
States.  Primary school is for children ages 6 to 11 and consists of grades 1 through 5.  
Children 12 to 14 attend middle schools, grades 6 to 8.  Children ages 15 to 18 attend 
high school and junior college, grades 9 through 12.  Higher education consists of 
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technical schools, colleges, and universities.  There is also non-formal education for 
children ages 6 to 14, who are not able to attend regular schools.  While school ages 
are designated for each level of education, in practice ages vary because children are 
sent to school at different ages and can be held back.  Also, there are some differences 
in transition points between primary and middle and middle and high school across 
states and whether grades 11 and 12 are located in high schools or in separate junior 
colleges.  By focusing on ages 12-15, this dissertation will focus on middle school 
and the first year of secondary school, although some students who have started 
school late or have been held back may be in primary school. 
The dependent variable for education is enrollment of children 12 to 15 coded 
1 if the respondent is enrolled and 0 if the respondent is not enrolled.  The individuals 
in the age group 12 to 15 could potentially be enrolled in primary, middle, or 
secondary schooling, however they will mainly be enrolled in middle and the first 
year of secondary school.  While primary schooling is becoming increasingly 
accessible to most groups, and inequalities are diminishing at this level, considerable 
gaps between various groups in upper primary and secondary schooling still persist.  I 
expect the greatest differences between religious groups and males and females to be 
in middle and secondary school enrollment, by looking at the age group 12 to 15 we 
will be able to examine these differences.  We have chosen the upper limit of 15 to 
minimize the effects of selectivity issues of early age at first marriage on the gender 
gap in enrollment.  Once girls are married and move in with their husbands, their 
education is often curtailed, augmenting the gender differences in education.  If we 
include these girls in our analysis then any household level control variables are 
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measuring characteristics of their husband’s family, not the characteristics of their 
natal family, which heavily influences their educational attainment.  The average age 
at first marriage is rising in India, however it continues to be an issue.  Sixty-five 
percent of women aged 25 to 49 were married by the age of 18 (ORC Macro 2000).  
In several states, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Andhra 
Pradesh about 80 percent of women aged 25 to 49 were married by the age of 18 
(ORC Macro 2000).  Moreover, for the cohort of women aged 20 to 24 in the 1998-
1999 National Family and Health Survey, 50 percent were married before the age of 
18, among those married before 18, 24 percent were married before 15.  The median 
age of marriage and median age of first cohabitation are similar for this age group, 18 
and 18.3 respectively, suggesting that many of these women who married at young 
ages moved in with their husbands at that time (ORC Macro 2000).11    
The total sample for the analysis of enrollment is 218,306 individuals ages 12 
to 15.  Due to missing values on various variables, 2,336 observations were dropped 
from the analysis.  Therefore, the sample size is 215,970.  Excluding the dropped 
observations, there are 56,948, 58,741, 47,565, and 52,716 individuals ages 12 to 15 
in NSS rounds 38 (1983), 43 (1987-1988), 50 (1993-1994), and 55 (1999-2000) 
respectively.   
Table 4 shows total enrollment, enrollment by gender, and enrollment by 
gender and religion by round.  Fifty-eight percent of all children ages 12 to 15 are 
enrolled in school for all rounds.  As expected enrollment increases over time, 47 
                                                 
11 There are cultural practices, for example gauna in North India, where there is a lag between when a 
couple marries and when they cohabit, particularly for couples who marry at young ages. 
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percent of children aged 12-15 were enrolled in school in 1983, this figure increased 
to 67 percent by 1999.   
There is considerable variation in enrollment across states (see Table 5).  For 
all rounds combined Andhra Pradesh has the lowest level of enrollment, where 45 
percent of children aged 12 to 15 for all rounds were enrolled in school.  In contrast, 
Mizoram has the highest levels of school enrollment, where 91 percent of children 12 
to 15 were enrolled from 1983 to 1999.  
Whether a child resides in an urban or rural setting influences their chances of 
enrollment.  Figure 3 shows urban and rural enrollment by gender.  Urban enrollment 
is considerably higher compared to rural enrollment.  Seventy-three percent of urban 
children aged 12 to 15 were enrolled in school for all rounds combined, while only 54 
children residing in rural areas were enrolled. Similarly, enrollment for boys and girls 
in urban areas is higher compared to rural areas.  Seventy-eight percent of urban boys 
were enrolled in school from 1983 to 1999, compared to 64 percent of rural boys.  
Similarly, 69 percent of urban girls were enrolled in school for all rounds combined, 
while only 42 percent of their counterparts were enrolled in rural areas. 
Age is an important factor in determining school enrollment.  Figure 4 shows 
enrollment by age and gender for all rounds combined. Sixty-four percent of children 
aged 12 are enrolled in school. Similarly, for children aged 13, 64 percent are 
enrolled.  However, as children age, their enrollment declines, 58 percent of children 
aged 14 are enrolled in school, this figure declines to 47 percent for children aged 15.  
Both boys and girls experience this decline.  Seventy-one percent of boys aged 12 are 
enrolled in school for all rounds combined, compared to 55 percent of boys aged 15.  
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Similarly, 53 percent of girls aged 12 are enrolled in school, declining to 36 percent 
for girls aged 15. 
Over time, enrollment by gender and religion has increased over time, 
however differentials between groups persist (see Table 4).  Both males and females 
have experienced increases in school enrollment over time. Male enrollment 
increased from 59 percent in 1983 to 73 in 1999.  Female enrollment grew at a faster 
rate than male enrollment, although female enrollment remains lower. Thirty-four 
percent of females aged 12-15 were enrolled in 1983, increasing to 60 percent by 
1999.  Hindu and Muslim girls and boys all experienced increases in school 
enrollment over time, however persistent differences remain.  Hindu males 
enrollment increased from 65 percent to 79 percent from 1983 to 1999, increasing 14 
percentage points.  Muslim males made similar gains, although their enrollment 
remains lower than Hindu males.  Muslim male enrollment increased from 49 percent 
to 63 percent from 1983 to 1999, a 14 percentage point gain.  Hindu females 
experienced the greatest gains in school enrollment, even surpassing Muslim male 
enrollment. Hindu females experienced a 29 percentage point gain in enrollment, 
increasing from 39 percent in 1983 to 68 percent in 1999.  Muslim females also made 
important gains, although their enrollment remains the lowest compared to all other 
groups.  Muslim girls’ enrollment increased 25 percentage points from 29 percent to 
54 percent from 1983 to 1999.  Multivariate analysis will be used to test whether 
patterns of school enrollment have been influenced by modernizing forces, 
discrimination and disadvantage, and Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity 




We utilized the ‘usual status’ variable in the NSS to create our wage 
employment variable.  The reference period for the ‘usual status’ variable is 365 days 
prior to the survey.  The ‘usual status’ variable measures the major activity which 
individuals were engaged in over the past year: self-employment as own account 
workers; helpers in a household enterprise; regular salaried or wage employees; 
casual wage work; did not work but are seeking and available for work; attending 
educational institutions; engaged in domestic work; landlords, pensioners, and 
remittance recipients; not able to work due to disability, beggars and prostitutes, and 
others.  Some of these activities are self-evident, such as attending an educational 
institution, while other activities require some explanation.  Self-employed own 
account workers run their own enterprises.  Helpers in a household enterprise work 
full or part time, assisting in but not running a household enterprise, receiving no 
regular salary or wages.  Regular salaried and wage workers work full or part-time in 
others’ farm and non-farm enterprises, receiving a salary or wages on a regular basis 
(National Sample Survey Organization 1983-2000).  Similar to regular salary or wage 
workers, casual wage workers work in others’ farm and non-farm enterprises, 
however, they receive a daily or periodic wage.               
For employment, the dependent variable is a three category variable coded 1 if 
the respondent is employed in regular salaried work or casual wage labor, 2 if the 
respondent is self-employed and 3 if the respondent is unemployed, or out of the 
labor force.  The sample is restricted to individuals ages 25 to 55. The upper bound of 
55 is used because retirement is expected at this age and is mandatory for many 
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individuals working in formal organizations or the government.  The sample does not 
include individuals attending an educational institution or not working because of 
disability.   
We utilize a variable measuring wage employment because it represents 
integration into the labor market.  This type of employment is where Hindus and 
Muslims must interact.  Therefore, this type of employment allows us to better 
examine the discrimination Muslims face in employment.  Furthermore, it is this type 
of employment where Muslim identity politics may affect Muslim women. 
Unemployment is categorized with out of the labor force because in the context of 
India, unemployment is very low (Visaria and Minhas 1991).  When faced with 
extreme poverty it is common for individuals to find some work (Desai and Das 
2004), thus, fine distinctions between unemployed and out of labor force are not 
meaningful in this context.  Therefore, it is important to focus on the better quality 
jobs rather than on whether an individual is employed or unemployed (Desai and Das 
2004). While wage employment by itself does not imply better quality jobs, it does 
indicate market integration and access to cash income. 
The total sample for the wage employment analysis is 840,912 individuals 
ages 25 to 55.  There were 2,103 missing observations on a few independent 
variables, therefore these observations were dropped. After dropping missing 
observations, the sample size is 838,809 individuals aged 25 to 55.  The samples for 
round 38 (1983), 43 (1987-1988), 50 (1993-1994), and 55 (1999-2000) respectively 
are 201,054, 223,646, 198,389, and 215,720.  
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Table 6 shows unweighted frequencies and weighted percentages of wage 
employment, self-employment, and unemployment/out of the labor force by gender 
and religion for each year.  Thirty-four percent of men and women aged 25 to 55 are 
engaged in wage employment for all rounds.  Similarly, 34 percent are engaged in 
self-employment.  Largely driven by women not being in the labor force, 32 percent 
of the sample is unemployed or out of the labor force.  Wage employment has 
increased modestly from 1983 to 1999, increasing from 33 percent to 35 percent.   
There is considerable variation in wage employment by state.  Table 7 shows 
the unweighted frequencies and weighted percentages for individuals 25 to 55 
engaged in wage employment.  Manipur has the lowest levels of wage employment, 
where 17 percent of individuals 25 to 55 are engaged in wage employment.  
Chandigarh has the highest level of wage employment, 52 percent of individuals 25 to 
55 are engaged in wage employment. 
Wage employment varies by urban and rural setting and gender.  Figure 5 
shows that individuals living in urban areas are more likely to be employed in wage 
employment, 37 percent of individuals aged 25 to 55 are engaged in wage 
employment in urban areas, compared to 32 percent in rural areas.  Men are more 
likely to be engaged in wage work in urban areas compared to men in rural areas, 
however, interestingly the opposite holds true for women.  Fifty-nine percent of urban 
men aged 25 to 55 are engaged in wage employment, compared to 44 percent of rural 
men.  Only 14 percent of urban women aged 25 to 55 are engaged in wage 
employment, compared to 21 percent of rural women.   
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Figure 6 shows wage employment by age and gender.  Individuals in younger 
age groups are more likely to be engaged in wage work.  For the age group 25 to 34, 
34 percent are engaged in wage employment, compared to 36 percent for the age 
group 35-44, and 31 percent for the age group 45 to 55.  Men in the age groups 25 to 
34 and 35 to 44 experience similar levels of engagement in wage employment, 49 
percent of those aged 25 to 34 are engaged in wage work, compared to 50 percent in 
the age group 35 to 44.  Men in the age group 45 to 55 have lower levels of wage 
employment, 44 percent of males in this age group are engaged in wage employment.  
Women in the age group 25 to 34 and the age group 45 to 55 are slightly less engaged 
in wage employment compared to women aged 34 to 44.  Nineteen percent of women 
aged 25 to 34 are employed in wage work compared to 21 percent of women aged 35 
to 44 and 17 percent of women aged 45 to 55.  Wage employment may be lower for 
women in the age group 25 to 34 as they attend to reproductive and child-care 
responsibilities.  While women in the older age category are likely affected by low 
labor force participation throughout their lives. 
Patterns of wage employment vary by gender and religion over time (see 
Table 6)  Male engagement in wage employment increased slightly more than female 
engagement in wage employment.  Male wage employment increased from 46 
percent to 49 from 1983 to 1999, a 3 percentage point increase, while females 
experienced a 1 percentage point increase from 19 percent to 20 percent.  Hindu 
males are slightly less likely to be engaged in wage employment compared to Muslim 
males, however, Hindu males experienced a slightly higher increase in wage 
employment.  Hindu male wage employment increased from 41 to 43 from 1983 to 
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1999, while Muslim male wage employment increased from 43 to 44.  Hindu female 
wage employment also increased moderately from 15 percent to 16 percent from 
1983 to 1999.  In contrast to the experience of all other groups, Muslim women 
experienced a decline in wage employment from 10 percent in 1983 to 8 percent in 
1999, suggesting that Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics may be 
influencing their wage employment.  While descriptive statistics indicate that Muslim 
women may be adversely affected by Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity 
politics, it is necessary to utilize multivariate analysis to evaluate the influence 
historical factors have had on wage employment over time.  
Independent and Control Variables 
 




 The historical period captures the influence of modernization on education 
and employment for all individuals in the sample.  As indicated in the Data section, 
this dissertation utilizes four rounds of NSS data.  The historical period variable is 
measured based on these four rounds.  Historical period is coded as a series of 
dummy variables for each period, 1983 (round 38) is the omitted category.      
Male 
 The advantage that males enjoy in both education and employment are 
captured by the variable male.  It is coded 1 if the respondent is male and 0 if the 




The interaction between the variables Male and Historical Period measures 
female’s education and employment experience over time.   
 Muslim - Religion and Social Background 
 The disadvantage and discrimination Muslims face in education and 
employment in India is captured by the variable Muslim.  There are also dummy 
variables, serving as controls, included in this analysis to measure groups from other 
social backgrounds, even though comparisons between non-scheduled caste Hindus 
and Muslims is the main focus of this dissertation.  The variable Scheduled Caste 
captures lower caste Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhs.  The variable Scheduled Tribes 
captures any respondent that is from a scheduled tribe regardless of religion.  Hindus 
that are not in the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe category are the omitted 
category. 
Muslim*Historical Period 
The interaction between the variables Muslim and Historical Period measures 
the potential intensification of disadvantage and discrimination Muslims experience 
in the context of rising Hindu fundamentalism. 
Male*Muslim 
The interaction between the variables Male and Muslim measures the 




The three-way interaction between the variable Male, Muslim, and Historical 
Period measures the potential impact of the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and 
Muslim identity politics on Muslim women in enrollment and wage employment. 
Control Variables 
Age 
For enrollment, age is a continuous variable representing 12 to 15 years olds.  
For wage employment, age is a continuous variable measuring 25 to 55 year olds. 
Age Squared 
Age squared is included in the analysis because age may have a curvilinear 
relationship with enrollment and wage employment. 
Marital Status 
The variable will only be used as a control in the analysis for wage 
employment.  Younger women who are not married may be more likely to work.  
Similarly, divorced and widowed women may have to help support themselves and 
their families, pushing them into the workforce.  Two dummy variables measure 
marital status. Never married is the first variable.  The second variable captures 
whether a woman has been divorced of widowed.  The omitted category is currently 
married.    
Household Size 
The size of the household may influence whether a child goes to school or not.  
On one hand, a larger household size may have scarce resources and this may inhibit 
a child going to school.  On the other hand, larger households may have more 
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resources to pool together to send children to school.  Household size may also 
influence employment.  If a household is burdened by many members, then more 
individuals from that household may have to work.  Household size is a continuous 
variable. 
Urban 
Whether a locality is urban or rural influences wage employment and 
enrollment opportunities.  Therefore we control for Urban, which is coded 1 if the 
location is urban and 0 if it is rural. 
Number of Children in the Household 
This variable is used as a control for the wage employment analysis. Since 
women are primarily responsible for childcare, the number of children in the 
household may influence women’s employment.   
Completed Education 
The variable completed education will only be used in the wage employment 
analysis.  One’s education has an important effect on employment opportunities.  
Completed education is measured by two dummy variables, ‘Primary’ measures 
whether the respondent completed primary or middle school, and ‘Secondary’ 
measures whether the respondent completed secondary and above.  The omitted 
category is Below Primary which captures individuals who did not complete primary 
school or who are illiterate. 
Consumption Index 
The consumption index will only be used in the enrollment analysis.  
Consumption is a proxy for the wealth of the household.  Children from wealthy 
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families are more likely to be enrolled in school compared to poor families.  The 
consumption index will not be used in the wage employment analysis because 
consumption is endogenous to wage employment. 
State 
States have different levels of development and economic growth, affecting 
both enrollment and wage employment opportunities.  Also, state governments play 
an important role in education.  Therefore, we control for state by a series of dummy 
variables.  The omitted category will vary depending on the analysis.  As will be 
discussed below, the models will be run on all states combined, states that have strong 
Hindu fundamentalist leanings, and non-fundamentalist states.  For all states 
combined and fundamentalist states, Uttar Pradesh has the largest population and 
therefore will be the omitted category.  For non-fundamentalist states Bihar has the 
largest population and is therefore the omitted category.  As will be discussed in more 
detail below, models are also run for individuals above the poverty line and below the 
poverty line for all states combined, fundamentalist states, and non-fundamentalist 
states.  Therefore, particular states were combined with neighboring states to ensure 
sufficient sample sizes of Muslims for these models.  The state combinations are as 
follows: Tamil Nadu, Pondicherry, and Andaman and Nicobar Islands; Kerela and 
Lakshadweep; Gujarat and Dadra Nagar Haveli; Harayana, Chandigarh, Himachal 
Pradesh, and Punjab; Sikkim, Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Arunchal Pradesh, 
Manipur, and Tripura; and Karnataka,Goa, and Daman and Dui.  The remaining states 
are not combined with any other states, Assam, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, West Bengal, and New Delhi.  Even though 
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only the poverty analyses, particularly for enrollment since the sample size is much 
smaller compared to employment, requires state combinations to secure sufficient 
sample sizes for Muslims, we utilize these state combinations for all models to be 
consistent across analyses. 
Research Design and Methods 
I have argued that Muslim women’s lives are affected by a variety of 
processes including, modernization, religious discrimination and Muslim identity 
politics. In order to examine how these processes shape Muslim women’s lives, I 
have focused on three key sets of independent variables – gender, religion and 
historical period. The role of gender and religion in determining education and wage 
employment has been discussed in detail above. However, my hypotheses focus on 
social changes over the past twenty years and hence, historical period plays an 
important role in my analyses. I focus on four major effects: (1) The main effect of 
historical period indicates the secular change in education and employment brought 
about by the passing of time and increasing modernization; (2) The interaction 
between historical period and gender indicates how these forces of modernization 
further diminish gender inequality in Indian society; (3) The interaction between 
historical period and religion is meant to capture increasing isolation and 
marginalization of Muslims over time; (4) The interaction between gender, religion 
and historical period uniquely captures the way in which rising fundamentalism and 




To better tease out the influence of Hindu fundamentalism on all Muslims and 
Muslim women, models are run on all states combined, states that are known to have 
stronger elements of Hindu fundamentalism, and non-fundamentalist states.  States 
were deemed to have Hindu fundamentalist leanings if they were early and strong 
supporters of the Hindu nationalist party, the BJP and are known to have considerable 
communal tensions.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, several western and northern Indian 
states, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Rajastan, awarded 
the BJP many seats in the early to mid-1990s, demonstrating their Hindu nationalist 
leanings before the BJP’s power was solidified in the late 1990s (Chiriyankandath 
1998).  An analysis of Lok Sabha election data also revealed that New Delhi was an 
early supporter of Hindu nationalist parties (see Table 8).  In 1991, roughly 71 percent 
or 5 of the 7 Lok Sabha seats went to the BJP or SHS, another Hindu nationalist party.  
Moreover, an analysis of the Varshney-Wilkinson dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence 
in India 1950-1995, indicates that all of these states have experienced Hindu-Muslim 
riots from 1982 to 1995 (see Table 9).  Since these states were supporters of the BJP 
during a time when the party was arguably the most overtly anti-Muslim and because 
they also experienced Hindu-Muslim riots from 1982 to 1995, the following states 
were selected to represent Hindu fundamentalist states for this dissertation: Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, New Delhi, Gujarat, and Uttar Pradesh.   
Table 10 shows various socioeconomic and social characteristics by states and 
the means of these characteristics by fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states.  
Three additional states besides the fundamentalist states are highlighted in this table.  
Chhattisgarh and Uttaranchal are highlighted because they were formerly part of the 
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states of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh repectively.  Both of these states 
achieved statehood in 2000, therefore for this dissertation they are a part of Madhya 
Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.  Dadra and Nagar Haveli were combined with Gujart to 
ensure an adequate number of Muslims in the poverty analysis, therefore Dadra and 
Nagar Haveli is also highlighted.   
Looking at the mean literacy rates12 of fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist 
states, we see that fundamentalist states have a slightly lower level of literacy (66.9) 
compared to non-fundamentalist states (70.5).  This appears to be largely driven by 
lower literacy rates of females in fundamentalist states.  The literacy rate for females 
in fundamentalist states is 54.2 compared to 61.9 in non-fundamentalist states.  While 
there is a difference in the female literacy rate for fundamentalist and non-
fundamentalist states, the literacy rates for males is similar in both state categories, 
approximately 78 percent.  Higher percentages of workers are engaged in agricultural 
work in fundamentalist states relative to non-fundamentalist states.  In fundamentalist 
states, 36.1 percent of workers are cultivators13 and 18.7 percent are agricultural 
laborers14 compared to 29.9 percent and 15.8 percent in non-fundamentalist states 
respectively.    
There are also differences in monthly per capita expenditure15 by 
fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states by rural and urban area.  
                                                 
12 The literacy rate is calculated for individuals aged 7 and above.  A person is deemed literate if they 
can both read and write in any language (Census of India 2001 
http://demotemp257.nic.in/httpdoc/Metadata/Metada.htm#2m. 
13 Cultivators are individuals engaged in cultivation of Government owned land or land owned by 
private individuals or institutions (Census of India 2001 
http://demotemp257.nic.in/httpdoc/Metadata/Metada.htm#2m). 
14 Agricultural laborers are individuals who work on someone else’s land for payment of money , kind, 
or share (Census of India 2001 http://demotemp257.nic.in/httpdoc/Metadata/Metada.htm#2m)  
15 The monthly per capita expenditure of households is based on a 7 day recall.  
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Fundamentalist states have a lower rural mean monthly per capita expenditure (572.9) 
compared to non-fundamentalist states (646.1).  However, the urban mean monthly 
per capita expenditure for fundamentalist states (931.4) is higher than non-
fundamentalist states (901.9).  There is considerable variation in the proportion of 
Muslims among states.  Mizoram has the lowest proportion of Muslims (1.1 percent), 
while Lakshadweep has the highest proportion (95 percent).  Fundamentalist states 
(9.1 percent) have a lower mean proportion of Muslims compared to non-
fundamentalist states (14.3). 
Child sex ratios along with female literacy rates indicate that there is more 
discrimination towards females in fundamentalist states compared to non-
fundamentalist states.  As mentioned above, the female literacy rate is lower in 
fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states.  Child sex ratios, the 
number of females per 1000 males for children 0 to 6, are also lower in 
fundamentalist states.  The mean child sex ratio for fundamentalist states is 920.3 
compared to 938.0 for non-fundamentalist states.  This suggests that women are 
discriminated against in both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, but they 
are relatively worse off in fundamentalist states. 
In order to test the hypothesis that wealthier Muslims may be relatively more 
affected by Hindu fundamentalism compared to poorer Muslims, we divide the 
sample into those above the poverty line and those below the poverty and run models 
separately for these groups.  We use the Official Planning Commissions (Dubey and 
Palmer-Jones 2007) poverty lines by year (round), state, and whether one resides in 
an urban or rural area, since poverty lines vary by these factors (see Table 11).  For 
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each round of NSS data, individuals are designated as below (or above) the poverty 
line if per capita expenditure is below (or above) the Official Planning Commission’s 
state urban/rural poverty line.  The experience of Hindus and Muslims above the 
poverty line and Hindus and Muslims below the poverty line are then evaluated in all 
states, fundamentalist states, and non-fundamentalist states.         
 Enrollment is a dichotomous variable, therefore I will employ logistic 
regression.  Employment is a three category variable, thus multinomial logistic 
regression will be used.  The omitted category in the employment analysis is wage 
employment.  I will do a stepwise regression for these analyses.  To correct for 
correlation bias for siblings for the enrollment analysis and spouses in the 
employment analysis, we correct the standard errors by using the cluster command in 
STATA. 
 Coefficients and predicted probabilities from multivariate analysis are utilized 
to examine our hypotheses.  Predicted probabilities are calculated for each dependent 
variable category for relevant models by using the prvalue command in STATA.  
Depending on the hypothesis being tested, explanatory variables of interest are 
assigned a 1, while the rest of the independent and control variables are held equal to 
their means.  If the explanatory variable of interest is a series of dummy variables, 
then the category of interest is assigned a 1, while the other categories are assigned a 




Chapter 5: Educational Enrollment in the Context of 
Modernization, Religious Disadvantage and Discrimination, and 
the Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism and Muslim Identity Politics 
 
 This chapter examines the influence of modernization, religious disadvantage 
and discrimination, and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity 
politics on school enrollment from 1983 to 1999.  As discussed in Chapter 4, we 
utilize stepwise logistic regression to evaluate the impact of these historical processes 
on school enrollment.  Enrollment predicted probabilities are also used to help clarify 
the logistic regression results when necessary.   
Modernization and Secular Changes 
Modernizing forces such as economic growth, development, and the diffusion 
of western ideas regarding education have an important influence on educational 
enrollment in developing nations.  These forces have not only increased overall 
enrollment in many developing countries, but they have also played an important role 
in decreasing the gender gap in education. 
 Modernization influences both supply and demand of schooling, resulting in 
increases in educational enrollment. The Indian government has made great strides in 
providing both primary and secondary schools since the 1950s (Govinda 2002).  In 
particular, the 1990s was a period of time where the commitment to making schools 
more accessible, particularly primary schooling, was paramount.  By making schools 
more accessible disadvantaged groups, such as girls, scheduled castes, and scheduled 
tribes have all benefited.   
Not only has the supply of schooling increased tremendously, but also 
considerable demand for schooling has been generated (Caldwell et. al. 1985).   
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Parents increasingly want their children to have the opportunity to obtain better 
employment (Caldwell et. al. 1985, The Probe Team 1999) and receive non-economic 
benefits from schooling (Caldwell et. al. 1985).   
For this dissertation, the influence of modernization on enrollment in India is 
evaluated by looking at the variable “Historical Period.”  Looking at Table 12, Model 
1, we see that the coefficients for the years 1987, 1993, and 1999 are all positive and 
significant.  This suggests that relative to 1983, overall school enrollment increased 
for all three years, indicating that enrollment has increased over time.  This finding is 
consistent across all models, Model 1 to Model 6.  Predicted probabilities illustrate 
this trend: in 1983 the probability of being enrolled for children aged 12 to 15 was 
0.54, by 1999 this figure increased substantially to 0.75 (see Table 15).    
In addition, we find that school enrollment increased over time for states that 
have been defined as Hindu fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist (see Tables 13 
and 14).  Interestingly, the magnitude of the increase in school enrollment is greater 
for Hindu fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states.  This suggests 
that while modernizing forces positively influence enrollment in both fundamentalist 
and non-fundamentalist states, the growth has been somewhat higher in 
fundamentalist states.  Predicted probabilities of being enrolled in school further 
illustrate this finding.  Table 15 shows the predicted probabilities of being enrolled in 
all states as well as in fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states by year.  
Children in non-fundamentalist states have a higher probability of being enrolled 
compared to children in fundamentalist states for all years.  However, the enrollment 
gap between fundamentalist states and non-fundamentalist states decreases over time.  
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Specifically, the probability of being enrolled in non-fundamentalist states was 0.06 
higher than fundamentalist states in 1983, by 1999 this figure declined to 0.02. 
 Modernizing forces also have a vital impact on the gender gap in school 
enrollment in many developing countries.  In India, economic growth and 
development, the commitment of the Indian government to make schools more 
accessible, educational and literacy campaigns, and the educational commission’s and 
women’s groups efforts have had a considerable impact on girls’ education. However, 
there are also important cultural and economic barriers affecting household demand 
for girls’ schooling, mitigating the effects of modernization and development on girls’ 
enrollment.  Greater returns to boys’ schooling, males providing old age support to 
their parents, girls’ domestic responsibilities, and restrictions on girls’ movement at 
menarche are some factors that dampen school enrollment for girls. 
 Despite these barriers, demand for girls’ schooling has been increasing.  
Households want to educate their daughters to improve their chances in the marriage 
market (Caldwell et. al. 1985).  In addition, households indicate that they would like 
their daughters to enhance their domestic skills of letter writing and accounting (The 
Probe Team 1999).  More importantly, there has been a growing trend in household 
desire to enhance girls’ economic opportunities (Caldwell et. al. 1985, The Probe 
Team 1999).   
 We evaluate the influence of modernization on the gender gap in school 
enrollment by examining the variables “Male,” and “Male*Historical Period” 
interactions (Table 12, Model 2).  The variable “Male” is positive and significant, 
indicating that boys’ enrollment is higher than girls’ enrollment.  The coefficients for 
 
 95
the variables “Male*1987,” “Male*1993,” and “Male*1999” are all negative and 
significant, demonstrating that the gender gap in school enrollment decreased over 
time. Predicted probabilities for enrollment illuminate this trend.  Table 16 shows 
male and female enrollment predicted probabilities, and the gender difference and 
gender ratios for the predicted probabilities for all states combined, fundamentalist, 
and non-fundamentalist states by year.  Both males and females experience an 
increase in the probability of enrollment over time.  However, the gender difference 
in the predicted probability declines from 0.30 in 1983 to 0.12 in 1999, illustrating 
that the gender gap in school enrollment has declined over time in India. This trend 
occurred in all, Hindu fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states (See Tables 13 
and 14 for Hindu fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states respectively).      
The magnitude of the coefficients and the gender difference in predicted 
probabilities suggest that males in fundamentalist states have more of an advantage 
over females compared to males in non-fundamentalist states.  The coefficient for 
males in fundamentalist states is 1.515 compared to 1.064 for boys in non-
fundamentalist states (Tables 13 and 14, Model 2).  Looking at Table 16, in 1983, the 
gender difference in predicted probabilities show that the probability of being 
enrolled for boys in fundamentalist states was 0.36 higher than the probability of girls 
being enrolled.  In non-fundamentalist states, the probability of boys being enrolled 
was only 0.26 higher than the probability of girls being enrolled.  This larger gender 
difference in predicted probabilities for fundamentalist states compared to non-
fundamentalist states persists over time, demonstrating that the gender gap in 
enrollment is larger in fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states.   
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Religious Discrimination and Disadvantage 
Muslims experience considerable discrimination and disadvantage in school 
enrollment.  One source of discrimination is the provision of public schools, which is 
lower in areas with higher concentrations of Muslims (Jeffery and Jeffery 1998, 
Jeffery et. al. 2005).  Another source of discrimination is teacher bias towards Hindus 
in public and non-Islamic private schools affecting Muslim educational outcomes.  
Furthermore, labor market discrimination reduces the returns to Muslim schooling, 
depressing Muslim enrollment.  Therefore, we expect discrimination and historical 
disadvantage to result in lower Muslim school enrollment relative to non-scheduled 
caste Hindus.  
The variable “Muslim” in Table 12, Model 4, is negative and significant, 
substantiating our hypothesis that Muslims are less likely to be enrolled in school 
compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus.  Tables 13 and 14 display results for 
fundamentalist states and non-fundamentalist states respectively.  Looking at the 
magnitude of the coefficient for “Muslim” in both Hindu fundamentalist and non-
fundamentalist states, the magnitude of the coefficient is larger in fundamentalist 
states compared to non-fundamentalist states.  Specifically, the coefficient for 
“Muslim” in Model 4 in fundamentalist states is -1.086 and in non-fundamentalists 
states it is -0.706.  While Muslims are less likely to be enrolled in school compared to 
non-scheduled caste Hindus in both Hindu fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist 
states, the magnitude of the coefficients indicate that the effect is greater in Hindu 
fundamentalist states.  Predicted probabilities reveal a similar observation.  Table 17 
displays the predicted probabilities for enrollment for Hindus and Muslims over time 
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for all states combined, fundamentalist states, and non-fundamentalist states.  The 
Hindu Muslim difference in predicted probabilities of enrollment in fundamentalist 
states is higher for every year compared to non-fundamentalist states.   This finding 
suggests that Muslims experience more discrimination and disadvantage in Hindu 
fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states.  
 To examine whether the intensification of Hindu fundamentalism has a 
negative effect on Muslim enrollment over time we examine “Muslim*Historical 
Period” interactions.  Looking at Table 12, Model 4, variable “Muslim*1987,” the 
coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that compared to 1983, the Hindu-
Muslim gap in school enrollment increased.  “Muslim*1993” and “Muslim*1999” are 
both negative, but not significant, suggesting that the Hindu-Muslim enrollment gap 
has not widened significantly in 1993 and 1999 compared to 1983.  We find similar 
results in both Hindu fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states.  Table 17 
illustrates that the Hindu Muslim difference in predicted probabilities increases from 
1983 to 1987 for all states combined, fundamentalist states, and non-fundamentalist 
states.  The difference in predicted probabilities decrease from 1983 compared to 
1999, however, as the regression results indicate, this decrease is not significant.  
 The results suggest that discrimination against Muslims worsened in all, 
Hindu fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states during a period where Hindu-
Muslim tensions were on the rise in the late 1980’s.  Tensions between Muslims and 
Hindus were simmering during the Shah Bano case, a hotly debated issue, with overt 
anti-Muslim rhetoric.  These tensions considerably worsened during the 1990s.  At 
the same time, the economic growth India experienced in the 1990s was 
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unprecedented and the Indian government made crucial strides in the provision of 
education.  Despite this strong economic growth and also important gains in school 
accessibility, the enrollment gap between Hindus and Muslims did not diminish in 
1993 and 1999 compared to 1983, suggesting that rise of Hindu fundamentalism and 
anti-Muslim rhetoric played an important role in dampening school enrollment for 
Muslims during this period.  
Literature suggests that wealthier Muslims may be more affected by the 
intensification of Hindu fundamentalism relative to poorer Muslims.  Tables 18 
through 23 show models for all, fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states for 
those below the poverty line and those above the poverty line.  Looking at Model 4, 
the variable “Muslim” and the “Muslim*Historical Period” interactions, we see that 
there is some evidence to support that wealthier Muslims are more affected by Hindu 
fundamentalism compared to poorer Muslims.  The enrollment gap between Muslims 
and Hindus below the poverty line is not significantly different in 1987, 1993, and 
1999 relative to 1983 (Table 18).  For Muslims above the poverty line, the enrollment 
gap between Hindus and Muslims increases from 1983 to 1987, then the enrollment 
gap is not significantly different in 1993 and 1999 compared to 1983 (Table 21). This 
suggests that Muslims above the poverty line may have been adversely affected by 
Hindu fundamentalism from 1983 to 1987 compared to Muslims below the poverty 
line, however, this is not the case after 1987.  After 1987, for Muslims below and 
above the poverty line, the differences in enrollment they experience compared to 
non-scheduled caste Hindus remains the same in 1993 and 1999 relative to 1983. 
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Gender and Religious Discrimination and Disadvantage 
Muslim females face similar discrimination in schooling compared to Hindu 
women.  Various cultural and economic factors inhibit girls’ schooling.  Among these 
factors are girls’ domestic duties, the practice of purdah around the age of menarche, 
and the lower returns to education for girls compared to boys.  Muslim girls also face 
the same discrimination that Muslim boys face in school.  Due to this interplay 
between gender and religious discrimination, we expect Muslim girls’ enrollment to 
be lower than Muslim boys’.  
In Table 12, Model 5, the variables “Male,” “Muslim,” and “Muslim*Male” 
suggest that Muslim women are less likely to be enrolled in school relative to Muslim 
males.  This is true for all states combined, fundamentalist states, and non-
fundamentalist states.  Predicted probabilities demonstrate this finding.  The predicted 
probabilities for Muslim male and female enrollment are 0.63 and 0.37 respectively.  
We also find that the Muslim gender difference in enrollment is greater in 
fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states.  The gender difference 
in the predicted probabilities for fundamentalist states is 0.33 compared to 0.26 in 
non-fundamentalist states. 
The Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism and Muslim Identity Politics 
We expect that as Hindu fundamentalism intensifies, the Muslim community 
will respond by using Muslim women as symbols for the community.  Literature 
discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that in these circumstances women are idealized as 
wives and mothers.  These representations pull women back into the domestic sphere.  
Modernizing forces will continue to have an important impact on enrollment for 
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Muslim women, however, we expect that if religious identity politics has an effect on 
Muslim women’s enrollment, then the Muslim gender gap in enrollment will increase.  
While we do not find an increase in the Muslim gender gap in enrollment, we find 
evidence of religious identity politics by comparing the Muslim and non-scheduled 
caste Hindu gender differences in predicted probabilities in all states combined, 
fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states. 
We first turn our attention to Table 24, which shows the enrollment predicted 
probabilities for Muslim and non-scheduled caste Hindu males and females, and the 
Muslim and Hindu predicted probability gender difference and ratio.  The Muslim 
and Hindu gender differences in predicted probabilities over time in all states, 
fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states provides evidence for the Hindu 
fundamentalism/Muslim identity politics hypothesis.  In all, fundamentalist and non-
fundamentalist states, we find that the Muslim and Hindu gender difference in 
predicted probabilities decreases over time.  In all, fundamentalist, and non-
fundamentalist states we find the Muslim gender difference in predicted probabilities 
is lower than the non-scheduled caste Hindu difference in 1983.  While in 1999, the 
Muslim gender difference in predicted probabilities remains lower than the non-
scheduled caste Hindu gender difference for all and non-fundamentalist states, this is 
not true for fundamentalist states.  In non-fundamentalist states, the Muslim gender 
difference in predicted probabilities was 0.2140 in 1983, the same figure was 0.2482 
for Hindus.  By 1999, Muslims continued to have a smaller gender difference in 
predicted probabilities of enrollment, 0.0346 compared to 0.0781 for non-scheduled 
caste Hindus.  In contrast, in fundamentalist states, while the Muslims gender 
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difference in predicted probabilities is lower than Hindus in 1983, by 1999 the gender 
difference for Muslims is higher than Hindus.  Specifically, in fundamentalist states, 
the Muslim gender difference in predicted probabilities decreases from 0.2839 in 
1983 to 0.1996 in 1999, the Hindu gender difference was 0.3556 in 1983 and 
decreased to 0.1521 in 1999.  This comparison between all states and non-
fundamentalist states versus fundamentalist states suggests that Hindu 
fundamentalism/Muslim identity politics may adversely affect Muslim women’s 
enrollment in fundamentalist states.   
In Table 13, Model 5, the Wald test statistic for the addition of 
Muslim*Male*Period, SC*Male*Period, and ST*Male*Period corroborates the story 
that the predicted probabilities indicate.  For all and non-fundamentalist states, the 
addition of the three way interaction terms are not statistically significant, indicating 
that adding these nine variables to the model does not improve model fit (Table 12 
and 14).  However, for fundamentalist states, the Wald test is significant for the 
addition of these nine variables, indicating that these variables improve the fit of the 
model (Table 13). 
Interestingly, there is some evidence that the rise of Hindu fundamentalism 
and Muslim identity politics may have a larger influence on wealthier Muslim women 
compared to poorer Muslim women. Table 25 shows the predicted probabilities and 
the gender difference of predicted probabilities for Muslims and Hindus below and 
above the poverty line.  In fundamentalist states, Muslims below the poverty line 
experience a smaller gender gap in predicted probabilities compared to Hindus below 
the poverty line from 1983 to 1999.  In contrast, for Muslims and Hindus above the 
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poverty line in fundamentalist states, the Muslim gender difference in predicted 
probabilities was lower than Hindus in 1983, however, we see that by 1999 Muslims 
experience a larger gender gap in predicted probabilities compared to Non-scheduled 
caste Hindus, 0.21 and 0.13 respectively.  This suggests that Hindu fundamentalism 
and Muslim identity politics may play a greater role for Muslim women above the 
poverty line.  However, the results are not statistically significant, nor do the Wald 
tests indicate that the model fit is improved with the addition of 
Muslim*Male*Historical Period interactions.  Nevertheless, this observation is 
interesting and warrants further examination. 
Conclusion 
 Our findings suggest that modernization has increased overall enrollment 
from 1983 to 1999.  It appears that economic growth, the diffusion of ideas regarding 
the importance of education, and efforts to make schooling more accessible have 
influenced school enrollment in India.  While modernization played an important role 
in increasing educational enrollment in both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist 
states, these forces had a greater effect in fundamentalist states.  Modernizing forces 
also reduced the gender gap in education from 1983 to 1999.   
   Muslims in India have experienced considerable disadvantage and 
discrimination.  The rise of Hindu fundamentalism exacerbates the disadvantage and 
discrimination that Muslims face.  Muslims do have lower enrollment in education 
compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus; pointing to the discrimination they face in 
education. Moreover, Muslim enrollment relative to non-scheduled caste Hindu 
enrollment is even lower in fundamentalist states, suggesting that fundamentalist 
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states are more discriminatory towards Muslims.  The rise of Hindu fundamentalism 
also has a negative impact on Muslims over time.  Modernizing forces had a strong 
influence on enrollment, particularly in fundamentalist states.  However, the rise of 
Hindu fundamentalism counteracted the influence of modernizing forces on Muslims.  
Specifically, the religious gap in education increased from 1983 to 1987, then the gap 
remained unchanged in 1993 and 1999 relative to 1983.  This persistent religious gap 
in school enrollment in the context of strong modernizing forces such as greater 
school accessibility and significant economic growth, demonstrates the considerable 
influence Hindu fundamentalism has on Muslim school enrollment.  We do find some 
evidence that Muslims above the poverty line are more affected by Hindu 
fundamentalism than Muslims below the poverty line for the period of 1983 to 1987.  
However, from 1993 to 1999 it appears that Muslims below and above the poverty 
line were similarly affected by Hindu fundamentalism.   
  Muslim women face double disadvantage for being female and Muslim.  
Similar to Hindu women they have lower levels of enrollment compared to men in 
Indian society because of economic and cultural factors.  Like Muslim men, they face 
discrimination and disadvantage in schooling because of their religious affiliation. We 
find that Muslim women are less likely to be enrolled in school compared to Muslim 
men.  Muslim women’s lives are also shaped by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism 
and Muslim identity politics.  The comparison of Muslim women’s experience in 
fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states reveals that Muslim women’s 
enrollment is dampened by the complex relationship between Hindus and Muslims in 
fundamentalist states.  Interestingly, there is evidence that wealthier Muslim women 
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may be more affected by these religious tensions. However, our results are not 




Chapter 6:Wage Employment in the Context of Modernization, 
Religious Disadvantage and Discrimination, and the Rise of 
Hindu Fundamentalism and Muslim Identity Politics 
 
 This chapter examines wage employment in the context of three historical 
forces: modernization, religious disadvantage and discrimination, and the rise of 
Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics.  Stepwise multinomial logistic 
regression and employment predicted probabilities are utilized to evaluate the impact 
of these historical processes on wage employment over time.  As discussed in Chapter 
4, the omitted category for the multinomial regressions is wage employment.     
Modernization and Secular Changes 
 Literature suggests that economic growth increases overall employment and 
changes the structure of employment, generating more wage work (World Bank 
1995).  India experienced economic growth from 1983 to 1999.  The 1990s, in 
particular, was a period of intense growth.  Therefore, we expect modernizing forces 
will increase overall wage employment over time in India.  
 The variable “Historical Period” is used to evaluate whether wage 
employment has increased over time relative to self-employment and being out of the 
labor force.  Our findings support the hypothesis that modernizing forces increase 
wage employment over time, although the increase has been modest.  Looking at 
Table 26, Model 1, the coefficients for 1987, 1993, and 1999 are negative and 
significant indicating that self-employment has declined relative to wage employment 
over time.  In contrast to the clear self-employment trend over time, the trend for the 
category “unemployed/out of the labor force” is mixed.  From 1983 to 1987, there 
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was no change in unemployment/out of the labor force relative to wage employment.  
For 1993, the coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that in 1993 compared 
to 1983, being unemployed or out of the labor force increased relative to wage 
employment.  The coefficient for 1999 is negative and significant, suggesting that 
compared to 1983, unemployment or being out of the labor force decreased relative to 
wage employment. Employment predicted probabilities support and clarify these 
assessments.  Table 29 displays the predicted probabilities for wage employment, 
self-employment, and unemployment/out of the labor force over time.  In all states 
combined, the probability of being employed in wage work increased from 1983 to 
1999.  The predicted probability of being employed in wage work was 0.38 in 1983 
and increased to 0.41 in 1999.  There was a corresponding decline in self-employment 
during this period.  The probability of being self-employed in 1983 is 0.44 and 
declines to 0.41 in 1999.  The probability of being unemployed or out of the labor 
force increased slightly from 1983 to 1999, however, since wage employment 
increased during the same period, relative to wage employment, the likelihood of 
being unemployed or out of the labor force decreased.  The increase in wage 
employment and corresponding decrease in self-employment and 
unemployment/being out of the labor force indicates that economic growth as well as 
changes in the sectoral composition of the economy moderately shifted the structure 
of jobs in India. 
 This trend is relatively more pronounced in fundamentalist states compared to 
non-fundamentalist states.  Tables 27 and 28 show multinomial regression 
coefficients for fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states respectively.  Looking 
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at Model 1 in both tables, the sign, magnitude, and significance of the coefficients 
reveal that self-employment declined relative to wage employment more dramatically 
in fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states.  Employment 
predicted probabilities illustrate this trend.  In 1983, in fundamentalist states, the 
probability of being engaged in wage employment was 0.34.  The probability 
increases to 0.39 in 1999, an increase of 0.05.  While non-fundamentalist states also 
experienced an increase in wage employment from 1983 (0.40) to 1999 (0.43), the 
probability of being employed in wage work increased 0.03 during this period.  
Fundamentalist states also experience a greater decline in self-employment compared 
to non-fundamentalist states.  In fundamentalist states, the predicted probability of 
self-employment declines from 0.52 in 1983 to 0.46 in 1999, a 0.06 decline.  Non-
fundamentalist states also experience a decline, but it is considerably smaller.  The 
predicted probability of being self-employed in non-fundamentalist states is 0.39 in 
1983 and declines to 0.38 in 1999, a 0.01 decline.  For both fundamentalist and non-
fundamentalist states, the trend for being unemployed or out of the labor force is 
mixed from period to period, however from the periods 1983 to 1999, both 
fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states experience a decrease in the 
unemployment/being out of the labor force relative to wage employment (see Tables 
27 and 28 Model 1).16  Thus, the trends of wage employment, self employment, and 
unemployment/out of the labor force suggest that both fundamentalist and non-
                                                 
16 Note that the predicted probability of being unemployed/out of the labor force declines slightly for 
fundamentalist states (0.1401 to 1499 from 1983 to 1999).  Even though unemployment/out of the 
labor force increases slightly, it declines relative to wage employment from 1983 to 1999 because of 
the increase of wage employment during this period.  The slight increase in the probability of being 
unemployed out of the labor force may be caused by individuals engaged in self employment moving 
to wage work and also moving into the unemployed/out of the labor force category. 
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fundamentalist states experience a modest increase in wage employment over time, 
however, fundamentalist states experience a slightly greater increase compared to 
non-fundamentalist states.          
 Modernizing forces may also play an important role in the gender gap in wage 
employment.  Modernization may break down economic and cultural practices, which 
hinder women’s employment.  Additionally, as modernizing forces increase 
educational opportunities for women, this increase in human capital may increase 
women’s opportunities in wage employment.  Even if women’s wage employment 
increases, the gender gap in wage employment may increase if men benefit more in 
the labor market from modernizing forces than women. Moreover, cultural and 
economic practices and norms hindering women’s employment may take time to 
break down, dampening the growth of women’s wage employment relative to men. 
 To evaluate the trend in gender differences in wage employment over time we 
look at the variables “Historical Period,” “Male,” and “Male*Historical Period” 
interactions (Table 26 Model 2).   Male self-employment declines relative to wage 
employment, while women’s self employment first increases relative to wage 
employment from 1983 to 1987, then decreases in 1993 and 1999.  Overall, from 
1983 to 1999, the gender gap in self-employment relative to wage employment 
decreases.  For men, unemployment increases slightly from 1983 to 1999 relative to 
wage employment.  For women, being unemployed or out of the labor forces 
decreases slightly over time.  Predicted probabilities for employment by gender and 
the gender difference in predicted probabilities illustrate these findings (Table 30).  
For all states combined, wage employment modestly increases for both men and 
 
 109
women over time.  The probability of males being engaged in wage employment is 
0.48 in 1983 and increases to 0.51 in 1999.  Women’s engagement in wage 
employment is considerably less than males, but women also experience a slight 
increase in wage employment over time.  The probability of being engaged in wage 
work for women is 0.12 in 1983 and increases to 0.13 in 1999.  These results suggest 
that men experience a greater increase in wage employment compared to women 
from 1983 to 1999.  The gender difference in the predicted probability of wage 
employment reflects this trend, increasing over time from 0.36 to 0.38.  The 
probability of men being engaged in self-employment decreases from 0.51 to 0.47 
from 1983 to 1999.  Women also experience a slight decline in the probability of 
being self-employed, 0.15 in 1983 to 0.14 in 1999.  Driven mostly by the decreases in 
the probability of male’s being engaged in self-employment, the gender gap in self-
employment declines from 1983 to 1999.  The probability of males’ being 
unemployed or out of the labor force increases slightly from 0.0178 to 0.0200.  For 
women, this probability decreases slightly from 0.7342 to 0.7333.  Males increase in 
the probability of unemployment/out of the labor force and women’s decrease in this 
probability results in a slight decrease in the gender gap for unemployment/being out 
of the labor force.         
 Wage employment increases for both men and women in fundamentalist and 
non-fundamentalist states, however men in fundamentalist states experience a greater 
increase in wage employment.  The probability of males being employed in wage 
work is 0.41 in 1983 and increases to 0.48 in 1999 in fundamentalist states.  Men in 
non-fundamentalist states have a higher probability of being employed in wage work 
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compared to men in fundamentalist states, but they do not experience as great an 
increase from 1983 to 1999. In non-fundamentalist states, the probability of males 
being employed in wage work increases from 0.52 in 1983 to 0.53 in 1999.  Women 
in fundamentalist states have a slightly higher probability of being employed in wage 
work compared to women in non-fundamentalist states.  The probability of women 
being engaged in wage work in fundamentalist states is 0.12 in 1983 and increases to 
0.14 in 1999. Similarly, the probability of women being employed in wage work in 
non-fundamentalist states is 0.11 in 1983 and increases to 0.13 in 1999.  Since men in 
fundamentalist states experience a more pronounced increase in wage employment, 
the gender difference in the predicted probability of wage employment increases from 
0.30 in 1983 to 0.34 in 1999.  In contrast, in non-fundamentalist states, the gender 
difference in the wage employment predicted probability does not change, remaining 
at 0.40. 
 As wage employment increases for men in fundamentalist states, there is a 
corresponding decrease in self-employment.  The probability of men being engaged 
in wage work is 0.57 in 1983 and decreases to 0.51 in 1999.  Men in non-
fundamentalist states have a lower probability of being self-employed compared to 
men in fundamentalist states and they experience only a slight decline in the 
probability of being self employed.  The probability of being self-employed for men 
in non-fundamentalist states is 0.46 in 1983 and this figure decreases to 0.45 in 1999.  
Women in fundamentalist states have a higher probability of being engaged in self-
employment compared to women in non-fundamentalist states.  Furthermore, women 
in fundamentalist states experience a decline in self-employment from 0.21 in 1983 to 
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0.17 in 1999, while the probability of self-employment for women in non-
fundamentalist states remains virtually unchanged, remaining at 0.12. 
 In both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, relative to wage work, 
the probability of being employed or out of the labor force increases slightly for men.  
In fundamentalist states, for men, the probability of being unemployed or out of the 
labor force is 0.0132 in 1983 and decreases to 0.0163 in 1999.  Men in non-
fundamentalist states also experience a slight increase in being unemployed or out of 
the labor force, the probability increases from 0.0210 in 1983 to 0.0219 in 1999.  For 
women, the unemployment/out of the labor force trend is different in fundamentalist 
and non-fundamentalist states. In fundamentalist states, the probability of women 
being unemployed or out of the labor force increases from 1983 (0.68) to 1999 (0.69).  
In contrast, in non-fundamentalist states, this figure decreases for women from 0.77 
in 1983 to 0.75 in 1999.  Wald test statistics substantiate our findings for all states 
combined, fundamentalist states and non-fundamentalist states.  That is to say, adding 
Male*Historical Period interactions to Model 2 improves the model fit for all states 
combined, fundamentalist states and non-fundamentalist states and this improvement 
is statistically significant at 0.000 level.   
 Overall, our results suggest that modernizing forces modestly increase wage 
employment over time.  These forces increase wage employment for both men and 
women in fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states.  Men in fundamentalist 
states experience more of an increase in wage employment over time, increasing the 
gender difference in the predicted probability of wage employment.  In non-
fundamentalist states, men and women experience a similar increase in wage 
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employment from 1983 to 1999, thus the gender difference in predicted probabilities 
remains unchanged.  Therefore, it appears that economic restructuring associated with 
modernization has increased the gender gap in wage employment in fundamentalist 
states, but has not had an impact on the gender gap in wage employment in non-
fundamentalist states.   
Religious Discrimination and Disadvantage   
 Literature suggests that Muslims face substantial discrimination and 
disadvantage in the labor market (Das 2002, Hasan 2005, Khandker 1992).  The 
disadvantage and discrimination that Muslims experience in education dampens their 
opportunities in the labor market.  However, even when human capital is taken into 
account, Muslims continue to face disadvantage in the labor market compared to 
Hindus (Khandker 1992).    
 As indicated in Model 4 of Table 26, the variable “Muslim” is significant and 
negative for self-employment, suggesting that Muslims compared to Hindus are less 
likely to be engaged in self-employment relative to wage employment.  This 
statement needs to be qualified in the context of other literature, which suggests that 
Muslims are far more entrepreneurial and tend to be located in petty trade and 
artisanal work. My models combine agricultural self-employment with petty trade 
and other types of self-employment. Since Muslims are less likely to engage in 
farming, overall they are somewhat less likely to be self-employed. The variable 
“Muslim” is significant, positive, and large for unemployed/out of the labor force, 
indicating that Muslims compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus, are more likely to 
be unemployed/out of the labor force relative to being engaged in wage employment.  
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Predicted probabilities presented in Table 31 better illustrate the relationship between 
employment and religious affiliation.   The results suggest that Muslims are slightly 
less likely to be employed in wage work compared to Hindus.  The probability of 
being employed in wage work for Muslims is 0.31, while the probability for Hindus is 
0.33.  Muslims are also less likely to be self-employed compared to non-scheduled 
caste Hindus, the probability of Muslim self-employment is 0.41 compared to 0.47 
for Non-scheduled caste Hindus.  Furthermore, Muslims are more likely to be 
unemployed/out of the labor force compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus.  The 
probability of Muslims being unemployed/out of the labor force is 0.28 compared to 
0.19 for Non-scheduled caste Hindus. Note that is reflects the probabilities evaluated 
at the mean value for all other variables.  
 As Hindu fundamentalism intensifies the disadvantage and discrimination 
Muslims face will likely worsen.  Table 32 displays predicted probabilities for wage, 
self, and other employment for Hindus and Muslims over time.  In all states 
combined, both Hindus and Muslims experience an increase in wage employment.  
The probability of wage employment for Hindus is 0.33 in 1983 and increases to 0.36 
in 1999.  Muslims also experience an increase in wage employment, in 1983 the 
probability of being engaged in wage employment was 0.32 for Muslims, this figure 
increases to 0.34 in 1999.  The Hindu-Muslim difference in predicted probabilities 
increases slightly during this period since Hindus experience a greater increase in 
wage employment over time compared to Muslims. This trend provides some 
evidence that Hindu fundamentalism may dampen Muslim progress in wage 
employment relative to Hindus but the effect is small.    
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 The experience of Muslims in fundamentalist states compared to non-
fundamentalist states provides further evidence that Muslim wage employment is 
influenced by Hindu fundamentalism (see Table 32).  In 1983, Muslims in 
fundamentalist states appear to have a slight advantage over Hindus in wage 
employment.  However, Hindus experience a substantial increase in wage 
employment compared to Muslims, increasing the difference in their predicted 
probability of wage employment.  In 1983, the probability of wage employment for 
Hindus is 0.28, this figure increases to 0.33 in 1999.  For Muslims, the probability of 
being engaged in wage employment increases from 0.31 in 1983 to 0.32 in 1999.  In 
non-fundamentalist states, both Hindus and Muslims experience an increase in wage 
employment.  The probability of Hindu wage employment is 0.35 in 1983 increasing 
to 0.38 in 1999.  Muslims experience a similar increase, the probability of Muslims 
being engaged in wage employment was 0.32 in 1983 increasing to 0.36 in 1999.  
Since Muslims experienced a slightly higher increase, the wage employment gap 
between Muslims and Hindus decreases slightly.    
 Literature suggests that wealthier Muslims may be more affected by the rise of 
Hindu fundamentalism compared to poorer Muslims.  Our results do not support this 
hypothesis; in fact, we find the opposite is true.  Tables 33 and 34 display the 
predicted probabilities of wage employment, self-employment, and being 
unemployed or out of the labor forces over time for all states combined, 
fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states, for individuals below and above the 
poverty line respectively.  Muslims below the poverty line appear to be more 
influenced by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism compared to Muslims above the 
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poverty line.  In all states combined, fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, 
non-scheduled caste Hindus experience an increase in the probability of being 
engaged in wage employment, while Muslims experience a slight decrease from 1983 
to 1999.  For all states combined, for non-scheduled caste Hindus below the poverty 
line, the probability of being engaged in wage employment increases from 0.37 in 
1983 to 0.44 in 1999.  In contrast to non-scheduled caste Hindus, the probability of 
Muslims being engaged in wage employment decreases slightly, from 0.3855 in 1983 
to 0.3841 in 1999.  We see this same trend for non-scheduled caste Hindus and 
Muslims in fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states.   
 In contrast to the experience of non-scheduled caste Hindus and Muslims 
below the poverty line, both non-scheduled caste Hindus and Muslims above the 
poverty line experience an increase in wage employment over time in all states 
combined, fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states.  In all states combined, the 
probability of non-scheduled caste Hindus being engaged in wage employment 
increases from 0.29 to 0.34.  Muslims also experience an increase in the probability 
of being engaged in wage employment, from 0.26 in 1983 to 0.33 in 1999.  We see 
similar trends for fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states.  Muslims below the 
poverty line experience a slight decline in wage employment over time, while non-
scheduled caste Hindus below and above the poverty line and Muslims above the 
poverty line experience an increase in wage employment over time, suggesting that 
Muslims below the poverty line may be affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalist 
more than Muslims above the poverty line. It is important to note that these results on 
poverty and change in the employment sector must be treated with caution since the 
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two are closely related, as the type of work determines income. Since the purpose of 
this dissertation is to examine broad trends rather than ascribe causation, this 
endogeneity may be acceptable. 
Gender and Religious Discrimination and Disadvantage 
  
Muslim women experience discrimination for being Muslim and, like their 
Hindu sisters experience gender discrimination in the labor market.  Therefore, we 
expect Muslim women to have lower levels of wage employment compared to 
Muslim men.  Our hypothesis is substantiated by the results.  The predicted 
probability of wage employment is around 0.45 for Muslim men and about 0.06 for 
Muslim women.  In fundamentalist states, the predicted probability for Muslim men’s 
wage employment is lower (0.40) than in non-fundamentalist states (0.48).  Muslim 
women in fundamentalist states (0.07) and non-fundamentalist states (0.06) have a 
similar wage employment predicted probability. 
The Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism and Muslim Identity Politics 
The rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics may have 
adverse consequences for Muslim women.  This complex relationship between 
Hindus and Muslims may result in the Muslim community utilizing Muslim women 
as symbols for the community. Literature suggests that under these circumstances 
women represent motherhood and being a good wife, returning them to the domestic 
sphere.  This may have a negative influence on Muslim women’s employment. 
We find evidence that identity politics is playing a role in Muslim women’s 
employment.  Looking at Table 41, the predicted probabilities for all states suggest 
that Muslim women’s wage employment decreases over time, from 0.07 in 1983 to 
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0.06 in 1999.  This differs from the experience of Muslim males, Hindu males, and 
Hindu females, all of whom experience an increase in the probability of being 
engaged in wage employment.  The predicted probability of being engaged in wage 
employment for Muslim males is 0.45 in 1983 and increases to 0.47 in 1999.  Hindu 
males experience a similar increase, 0.42 in 1983 increasing to 0.44 in 1999.  The 
probability of Hindu women being engaged in wage employment also increases from 
0.09 in 1983 to 0.10 in 1999.  
The gender differences in the predicted probabilities in Table 41 provide 
further evidence for the influence of the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim 
identity politics on Muslim women’s wage employment.  The Muslim gender 
difference in predicted probabilities increases from 1983 (0.38) to 1999 (0.41), while 
the Hindu gender difference remains unchanged at 0.33 in both 1983 and 1999.   
The different experience of Muslim women in fundamentalist states versus 
non-fundamentalist states provides further evidence for our hypothesis that the 
complex relationship between the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity 
politics negatively affects Muslim women.  We see similar trends for fundamentalist 
states for wage employment as for the all states models.  Muslim men, and non-
scheduled caste Hindu men and women’s wage employment increases over time, 
while Muslim women’s wage employment decreases.  Muslim men’s probability of 
wage employment increases from 0.40 in 1983 to 0.42 in1999.  Hindu men also 
experience an increase in wage employment from 0.36 to 0.39 from 1983 to 1999.  
Non-Scheduled caste Hindu women’s probability of wage employment also increased 
from 0.0876 to 0.1043 from 1983 to 1999.  However, Muslim women do not see these 
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gains in wage employment over time.  The probability of Muslim women’s 
employment actually decreases slightly from 0.0832 to 0.0659 from 1983 to 1999.  In 
contrast to fundamentalist states, in non-fundamentalist states, Muslim women 
experience gains in wage employment over time like Muslim men and non-scheduled 
caste Hindu men and women.  In non-fundamentalist states, the probability of being 
engaged in wage employment increases from 0.48 in 1983 to 0.50 in 1999.  Non-
scheduled caste Hindu males experience a slight increase in the probability of being 
engaged in wage employment, from 0.46 in 1983 to 0.47 in 1999.  For non-scheduled 
caste Hindu women the probability of being engaged in wage employment increases 
slightly from 0.0922 in 1983 to 0.1062 in 1999.  In contrast to fundamentalist states, 
Muslim women experience an increase in the probability of being engaged in wage 
employment from 0.0582 in 1983 to 0.0631 in 1999. The different employment 
experience of Muslim women in fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states 
suggests that the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics may 
influence Muslim women’s employment.   
Further substantiating our findings, the Wald tests are significant for 
Muslim*Male*Period interactions for Model 6 for all states combined, 
fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states indicating the goodness of fit of the 
model when these variables are added (Tables 26, 27, and 28). 
Literature suggests that wealthier Muslims may be more affected by the rise of 
Hindu fundamentalism relative to poorer Muslims. If this were the case, then we 
would expect Muslim women above the poverty line to be more adversely affected by 
the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics.  We find evidence that 
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the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics affects both poor and 
wealthy Muslim women, however poorer Muslim women may be affected more.  In 
fundamentalist states, poorer Muslim women’s wage employment decreases, while 
the probability of wage employment increases for Muslim males, non-scheduled caste 
Hindu males and females (Table 42).  Poorer Muslim women’s wage employment 
also decreases slightly in non-fundamentalist states.  The probability of Muslim men’s 
engagement in wage employment also decreases, while the probability of being 
engaged in wage employment for non-scheduled caste Hindu men and women 
increases from 1983 to 1999.   
For wealthier Muslim women, they also experience a decrease in wage 
employment over time in fundamentalist states, however, unlike poorer Muslim 
women, they experience an increase in wage employment in non-fundamentalist 
states (Table 43).  Surprisingly, non-scheduled caste Hindu men experience a slight 
decrease in wage employment in both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, 
while both Muslim men and non-scheduled caste Hindu women experience an 
increase in wage employment.   
Overall, it appears that poorer Muslim women have been more adversely 
affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics compared 
to wealthier Muslims women.  Poorer Muslim women experienced declines in wage 
employment in both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, while wealthier 
Muslims also experienced a decline in wage employment in fundamentalist states, yet 
they did not have this experience in non-fundamentalist states.  This suggests that 
both groups, Muslim women above and below the poverty line are influenced by the 
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rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics, but poorer Muslim 
women may be affected more.  
Conclusion  
We find that economic growth and modernization seems to have had some 
impact on the likelihood of engaging in wage work in India. Over time economic 
growth and other modernizing factors have modestly increased wage employment and 
decreased self-employment, slowly changing the structure of the Indian economy.  
These forces have had a greater impact on fundamentalist states relative to non-
fundamentalist states.   
Men and women in fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states experience 
increases in wage employment.  However, it appears that men have benefited more 
from these forces than women in fundamentalist states.  Men made greater gains in 
wage employment compared to women, increasing the gender gap in wage 
employment in fundamentalist states.  In contrast, in non-fundamentalist states, the 
gender gap in wage employment remained unchanged.  While women have made 
gains in wage employment, it appears that economic and cultural practices remain 
obstacles for them even as modernization progresses.      
Muslims face disadvantage in wage employment compared to Hindus.  The 
rise of Hindu fundamentalism further dampens Muslims disadvantage as illustrated 
by the experience of Muslims in fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states.  In 
fundamentalist states, Hindus experience a greater increase in wage employment 
compared to Muslims, increasing the wage work gap.  In contrast, the wage 
employment gap between Hindus and Muslims decreases slightly in non-
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fundamentalist states.  Moreover, there is evidence that poorer Muslims may be more 
affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism relative to wealthier Muslims. 
As hypothesized, Muslim women experience lower levels of wage 
employment compared to Muslim men.  They experience both gender discrimination 
and discrimination for being Muslim.  Our findings also suggest that identity politics 
has influenced Muslim women’s employment over time.  In all states combined, we 
find Muslim women’s employment decreases over time, as other groups experience 
an increase in wage employment. The different experience of Muslim women in 
fundamentalist versus non-fundamentalist states provides more evidence that the rise 
of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics has influenced Muslim 
women’s wage work. Muslim women in fundamentalist states experience a decline in 
wage employment, while Muslim men, Hindu men, and Hindu women all experience 
an increase in wage employment over time.  In contrast to fundamentalist states, 
Muslim women in non -fundamentalist states experience an increase in wage 
employment, just as other groups do.  Furthermore, consistent with our finding that 
poorer Muslims are more affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism compared to 
wealthier Muslims, it appears that poorer Muslim women’s wage employment is more 
influenced by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics.  While 
both Muslim women below and above the poverty line appear to be affected by these 
forces, poorer Muslim women appear to be more greatly affected.    
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion: School Enrollment and 
Wage Employment in the Context of Modernization, Religious 
Disadvantage and Discrimination, and the Rise of Hindu 
Fundamentalism and Muslim Identity Politics 
  
Modernization and Secular Changes 
 
 Modernizing forces such as the diffusion of western notions of education, 
economic growth and development, and government efforts to increase the supply of 
schools has had an important impact on school enrollment in India.  School 
enrollment has increased considerably over time.  Specifically, for children ages 12 to 
15, the probability of being enrolled in school is 0.54 in 1983 and increases to 0.75 by 
1999.  Children in non-fundamentalist states have a higher probability of being 
enrolled in school, however, interestingly, modernizing forces may have a greater 
influence on enrollment in fundamentalist states.  In particular, fundamentalist states 
experienced greater gains in school enrollment from 1983 to 1999 compared to non-
fundamentalist states.   
This is surprising because out of the six fundamentalist states, three of them 
are among the worst performing in terms of education, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya 
Pradesh, and Rajastan.17  It is possible that the educational experience of 
Maharashtra, Gujarat and Delhi, the other three fundamentalist states, are driving the 
greater gains in enrollment for fundamentalist states. A lower starting level may also 
lead to greater gains as the other states begin to approach a ceiling in enrollment. It is 
also possible that poor performing states are more sensitive to increases in the supply 
of schools and national literacy and educational campaigns.  Some non-
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fundamentalist states in the south of India, such as Kerela, have had a long history of 
promoting education, these states may not have been as sensitive to increases in 
educational investments and educational campaigns in the 1990s as other states, such 
as Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh or Rajastan.  Furthermore, successful schemes 
such as mid-day meals,18 pioneered and universalized in Tamil Nadu, a non-
fundamentalist state, in 1982, were adopted by many states in the 1990s (Govinda 
2002).  Since mid-day meals tend to boost the enrollment of poorer children, perhaps 
enrollment is more sensitive to these types of schemes in poorer states such as Uttar 
Pradesh.  On the other hand, institutional and infra-structural problems may hinder 
the progress of these schemes in poorer states.   
 Modernizing forces also had an influence on wage employment, but to a much 
lesser extent.  Literature suggests that economic growth and development changes the 
structure of the economy, creating more wage work.  Since India has been 
experiencing economic development and growth over time, particularly in the 1990s, 
one would expect wage work to increase considerably.   However, we only find a 
modest increase in wage work in all states combined.  Individuals in non-
fundamentalist states have a higher probability of being employed in wage work 
compared to individuals in fundamentalist states.  However, fundamentalist states 
experience a slightly greater increase in wage work compared to non-fundamentalist 
states.  It does appear that the structure of the economy has shifted slightly over time 
                                                                                                                                           
17 Bihar, defined as a non-fundamentalist state for this dissertation, is also a poor-performing state in 
terms of education. 
18 Mid-day meals were initially designed as lunch programs, where lunch is served to children at 
school.  However, this varies according to state.  Some states have mid-day meal schemes, which do 
not distribute hot meals at lunch, instead they distribute dry rations monthly or quarterly.  Dry ration 
mid-day meal schemes are likely to boost enrollment, but they do not ensure attendance. 
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as individuals primarily move out of self-employment to wage work.  However, there 
may have been a series of factors that dampened employment growth as GNP 
increased in the 1990s.   
Some attribute the dampening of employment growth during the 1980s and 
1990s to a rigid labor market, arguing that an inflexible labor market increases costs 
for businesses and impedes investment and growth (Sharma 2006).  While some labor 
market rigidities exist, there is evidence that the labor market has become more 
flexible as the organized sector declines and firms hire temporary workers (Sharma 
2006).  Others argue that increases in wages due to inflation and labor market 
pressures dampened employment in the 1980s and 1990s (Ahluwalia 1992 cited in 
Sharma 2006, ILO-ARTEP 1993 cited in Sharma 2006, Sundaram and Tendulkar 
2002 cited in Sharma 2006), causing businesses to starting making adjustments and 
investments in capital rather than labor (Ghose 1994 cited in Sharma 2006).  
Additionally, India adopted liberalization policies in the 1990s likely also influencing 
the labor market.  Therefore, wages, labor market flexibility, investments in capital, 
and liberalization policies may have adversely affected the labor market, hindering 
wage employment growth. 
Overall, it appears that enrollment is more positively affected by modernizing 
factors compared to wage employment.  While both school enrollment and wage 
employment increased from 1983 to 1999, the increase in school enrollment has been 
much more dramatic, while the increase in wage employment has been quite modest.  
There are a myriad of factors that have affected enrollment and employment over 
time, however, the differential role of the government in education and the labor 
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market during this period may have had an impact of the dissimilar trends in 
enrollment and employment.  The Indian government was directly involved in 
shaping education by making important efforts to increase school enrollment through 
increased supply of schools, educational and literacy campaigns, and educational 
schemes such as mid-day meals.  In contrast, the labor market, as was the rest of the 
economy, was subject to less governmental guidance and control as India was forced 
to adopt liberalization policies.  While these policies may have outcomes widely 
valued by many, such as GNP growth, these policies take away the power for the 
government to help shape employment outcomes during immense economic change.  
In addition, school enrollment does not appear to be as sensitive to economic 
restructuring as the labor market.  Therefore, the role of the government and the 
process of liberalization may have differentially affected school enrollment and wage 
employment from 1983 to 1999. 
 Modernizing forces also influence gender differences in enrollment and wage 
employment.   While cultural and economic obstacles continue to dampen girls’ 
enrollment, significant progress has been made as evidenced by the decreasing gender 
difference in school enrollment over time. Girls’ school enrollment is sensitive to 
access to schools, therefore the increased supply in schools has had an important 
impact on girls schooling over time. Also, modernizing forces change ideologies 
about gender, breaking down some of the cultural and economic barriers of education 
for girls.   
Both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states experience decreases in the 
gender gap in enrollment for children ages 12 to 15, however, the gap remains larger 
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in fundamentalist states.  While the gap is larger in fundamentalist states, they did 
experience a slightly greater decline in the gender gap in enrollment compared to the 
decline non-fundamentalist states experienced.  However, the gap remains larger in 
fundamentalist states because many of the fundamentalist states, such as Uttar 
Pradesh, and Rajastan have more cultural and economic obstacles for girls’ education.  
While many of the non-fundamentalist states such as Kerela, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, 
and Himachal Pradesh have less gender inequality in many realms. 
 Modernizing forces do increase women’s employment over time; however, 
these factors do not decrease the gender gap in wage employment.  In fundamentalist 
states, both men and women experience an increase in wage employment over time, 
however, men experience more gains in wage employment relative to women, 
increasing the gender gap in wage employment.  In non-fundamentalist states, men 
and women experience a similar increase in wage employment over time; therefore, 
gender differentials in wage employment remain the same over time.      
 Several factors could be contributing to the slight increase in women’s 
employment over time.  Modernization could break down ideologies about gender 
roles, breaking down barriers to women’s employment.  However, even if 
modernizing forces break down obstacles for women’s employment, it appears that 
modernizing forces benefit men more than women, increasing the gender gap in wage 
employment.  Literature suggests that liberalization or structural adjustment policies 
have adverse effects on women’s employment.  It may be that these policies 
dampened women’s employment relative to men’s, increasing the gender gap in wage 
employment.  Goldin (1995), in discussing the U shaped female labor force function 
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to illustrate the relationship between development and female labor force 
participation, argues that once a sufficient number of women complete secondary 
schooling and the availability of white-collar employment increases, then married 
women’s engagement in wage employment increases.  In other words, once a 
particular threshold has been reached for girls’ secondary schooling and white-collar 
employment expansion, then female labor force participation will begin to follow the 
rising portion of the U.  While secondary schooling for girls and white-collar jobs 
have been increasing it does not appear that sufficient gains have been made to 
significantly boost wage employment for women. 
 It appears that modernizing forces differentially impact the gender gap in 
school enrollment and wage employment.  The gender gap in enrollment declined in 
all states combined, fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states.  In contrast, the 
gender gap in wage employment increased in fundamentalist states and persisted in 
non-fundamentalist states.  This indicates that modernizing forces are more effective 
at breaking down barriers to girls’ schooling compared to barriers women face in the 
labor market.  This may be because efforts to increase the supply of schools have an 
important impact on girls schooling, that is, households are more willing to send their 
daughters to school if it is close.  Additionally, many efforts have been made by the 
government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to promote girls schooling.   
While efforts have been made by NGOs and women’s organizations to promote 
women’s employment, it appears these forces have not been as successful in this 
arena as efforts to promote education.  Perhaps ideologies about women and men’s 
roles as they relate to the labor market are more difficult to break down.  These 
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ideologies have a strong effect on both households and employers.  Moreover, an 
important difference between the enrollment experience of girls and women’s wage 
employment experience is that the supply of schools increased, while the employment 
growth rate declined.  
Religious Discrimination and Disadvantage 
Muslims face discrimination and disadvantage in both school enrollment and 
wage employment.  Muslims in India have lower levels of enrollment compared to 
non-scheduled caste Hindus, reflecting past and present discrimination.  Muslims are 
even worse off in fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states, 
experiencing a larger religious gap in school enrollment in fundamentalist states 
compared to non-fundamentalist states.  In all states combined, fundamentalist and 
non-fundamentalist states, there is an increase in the religious gap in educational 
enrollment from 1983 to 1999.  For the years 1993 and 1999, the religious difference 
in education is not significantly different from 1983, demonstrating that the school 
enrollment gap between Muslims and non-scheduled caste Hindus has persisted over 
time.  This religious gap in enrollment has persisted despite major advances in 
enrollment due to modernizing forces, further highlighting the extent of the 
discrimination and disadvantage Muslims experience.   
The comparison of the enrollment experience of girls’ and Muslims in India 
over time sheds further light on the strength of Hindu fundamentalism in shaping 
Muslims’ lives.  Modernization theory posits that as development proceeds, ascriptive 
qualities such as gender, race, and ethnicity will diminish in importance and 
individual achievements will become more important.  We see that indeed, 
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modernizing forces had a significant influence on the gender gap in enrollment over 
time despite cultural and economic factors that hinder girls’ educational outcomes.  
However, there is no corresponding effect in the ascriptive characteristic of being 
Muslim.  Rather, the religious gap in enrollment persists over time. 
Muslims are slightly less likely than non-scheduled caste Hindus to be 
engaged in wage employment.  In fundamentalist states, non-scheduled caste Hindus 
made greater gains in wage employment, increasing the religious gap in wage 
employment over time.  In contrast, in non-fundamentalist states, there is a slight 
decline the religious gap in wage employment.   
The religious gap in school enrollments is much larger than the gap in wage 
employment.  However, this does not necessarily mean that Muslims fair better in the 
labor market.  Being unemployed or out of the labor force is higher for Muslims.  
Muslims who are a part of the labor force experience discrimination.  Muslims are 
less likely to be in the private and public organized sectors; instead, they tend to be in 
the informal unprotected market (Government of India 2006).  Therefore, seemingly 
similar wage employment predicted probabilities for Muslims and non-scheduled 
caste Hindus mask many of the inequalities that exist in the labor market.      
Gender and Religious Discrimination and Disadvantage 
 Muslim women face discrimination and disadvantage in education and 
employment.  Similar to Hindu women relative to Hindu men, Muslim women are 
less likely to be enrolled in school and to be engaged in wage employment compared 
to Muslim men.  Muslim women also face religious discrimination for being Muslim, 
therefore compared to non-scheduled caste Hindu men and women and Muslim men, 
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Muslim women are the least likely out of the four groups to be enrolled in school or 
to be engaged in wage employment.  
The Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism and Muslim Identity Politics 
Muslim women not only face a double disadvantage for their gender and 
religion, but we also find evidence of the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim 
identity politics adversely affecting Muslim women.  Muslim women residing in 
fundamentalist states appear to be negatively affected by the rise of Hindu 
fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics.  As discussed above, our results suggest 
that all Muslims face considerable discrimination and disadvantage in all states, both 
fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist, but Muslims face even more discrimination 
in fundamentalist states.  This has a corresponding influence on Muslim women in 
fundamentalist states, where the complex relationship between Hindu 
fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics further dampens their enrollment and 
decreases wage employment.   
As mentioned previously in relation to all Muslims, modernizing forces have a 
greater influence on children’s enrollment in fundamentalist states compared to non-
fundamentalist states.  Furthermore, modernizing forces have a greater impact on the 
gender differences in school enrollment in fundamentalist states.  Despite the 
important role modernization has played in increasing school enrollment and reducing 
gender differences in enrollment in fundamentalist states, it appears that Muslim girls 
do not benefit from these forces as much as Hindu men and women and Muslim men.  
In contrast to fundamentalist states, Muslim women in non-fundamentalist states do 
make considerable gains in enrollment relative to other groups.  Therefore, the 
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experience of Muslim girls in fundamentalist states compared to other groups and the 
comparison between Muslim girls in fundamentalist states and non-fundamentalist 
states suggests that Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics play an 
important role in Muslim girls’ enrollment in fundamentalist states. 
Evidence suggests that in the face of communal tensions, fearing for the safety 
of their daughters, Muslim households are reluctant to send their daughters to school, 
particularly middle schools that are further away from home (Government of India 
2006).  This could be a contributing factor to Muslim girls’ dampened enrollment 
growth in fundamentalist states. Additionally, in the face of Hindu fundamentalism, 
the Muslim community may use women as symbols and repositories for community 
and tradition.   
As discussed in Chapter 2, often in religious identity political movements, 
education is valued in so far as it makes girls good wives and aids in their domestic 
abilities.  This may dampen Muslim girls’ enrollment, if it is viewed that girls do not 
need to attend middle school to obtain the necessary domestic skills.  Additionally, 
communal tensions may result in Muslims households sending their daughters to 
Madrasas.  They may feel that Madrasa education would help preserve Muslim 
heritage and tradition, which can be passed on to future generations. Due to 
differences in language and curriculum, it is often difficult to transition to a 
government or non-Islamic private school, thus potentially dampening girls’ 
secondary school enrollment.  
There is also evidence that Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity 
politics has influenced Muslim women’s wage employment.  Similar to school 
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enrollment, the experience of Muslim women in fundamentalist and non-
fundamentalist states illustrates that Muslim women’s lives are affected by communal 
tensions.  Muslim women in fundamentalist states experience a decline in wage 
employment over time.  While the decline is small, it is still important in lieu of the 
experiences of Muslim men, and Hindu men and women in fundamentalist states. All 
three groups experience an increase in wage employment over time.  Further weight 
is added to this observation once we take into consideration the experience of Muslim 
women in non-fundamentalist states. In contrast to their experience in fundamentalist 
states, Muslim women experience an increase in wage employment, as do Muslim 
men and non-scheduled caste Hindu men and women.  These two different 
experiences point to the influence of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity 
politics affecting Muslim women’s wage employment.   
A hostile communal environment and fear of harassment may cause Muslim 
women to withdraw from the labor force.  Discrimination against Muslim women 
may also intensify as communal tensions worsen.  Muslim women may come to 
represent the community, which often involves calls for women to return to the 
domestic sphere and be good wives and mothers.  This representation is at odds with 
employment, which takes mothers and wives away from their domestic duties, their 
children, and their husbands.  
 As expected, it appears that wage employment is more affected by Hindu 
fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics compared to school enrollment.  
Muslim women’s wage employment actually declines in fundamentalist states, 
whereas Muslim girls’ enrollment has increased in fundamentalist states, but remains 
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dampened compared to other groups.  While both enrollment and wage employment 
are in opposition to women’s domestic roles, enrollment is still viewed as being 
important for women to be good mothers, contributing to the greater influence that 
Hindu Fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics have on Muslim women’s wage 
employment compared to school enrollment.    
 In sum, modernizing forces had a more profound affect on enrollment 
compared to wage employment.  Not only have modernizing forces increased overall 
enrollment, but they have also decreased the gender gap in school enrollment.  In 
contrast, modernizing forces have only modestly increased wage employment and the 
gender gap has increased in fundamentalist states and persisted in non-fundamentalist 
states.   
 Muslims face discrimination in the educational system and the labor market.  
The religious gap in enrollment persists even though modernizing forces have clearly 
benefited other disadvantaged groups such as girls.  This persistence of the religious 
gap in school enrollment, when there were crucial gains made in school enrollment 
via increases in access to schools and educational campaigns indicates that the rise of 
Hindu Fundamentalism has had an adverse affect on Muslim school enrollment.  
 Muslims do not appear to fair as badly in wage employment relative to school 
enrollment, particularly in non-fundamentalist states, where the religious gap in wage 
employment decreases slightly over time.  In contrast to non-fundamentalist states, 
the religious gap in wage employment increases in fundamentalist states.   
 Muslim women have the lowest levels of school enrollment and wage 
employment compared to Muslim men and Non-scheduled caste Hindu men and 
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women.  The rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics further 
disadvantage Muslim women in school enrollment and wage employment.   
 The findings of this dissertation indicate that communal tensions have been 
detrimental to Muslims.  While both Muslim men and women face discrimination and 
disadvantage in school enrollment and wage employment and their experiences in 
these arenas have worsened due to the rise of Hindu fundamentalism, Muslim women 
are more adversely affected by these tensions.   
 It is important that more efforts are made to reveal and understand the true 
plight of Muslims in India instead of relying on rhetoric based on communalism.  
Recent efforts by scholars and the government are important steps toward 
understanding the Muslim experience in India, however more concerted efforts are 
necessary.  The discrimination and disadvantage that Muslims face in India is 
increasingly documented.  It is now time for greater efforts to combat rampant 
discrimination against Muslims.  Furthermore, it is apparent that special efforts are 
needed to focus on Muslim women. 
 These findings are not only relevant to current debates in India, but also to the 
experience of Muslims in western countries.  Historical discrimination against 
Muslims in many western countries and now global events such as the “War on 
Terror” have intensified negative rhetoric and discrimination against Muslims in 
Western countries, threatening to further isolate Muslim communities.  The debates 
about veiling in England and France, riots in France set off by two boys being chased 
to their death by police were the product of discontent from discrimination and 
marginalization, the unusual intolerant rhetoric from the Netherlands after Theo Van 
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Gogh was stabbed by a Muslim, rhetoric utilized in immigration and the war on terror 
debates, increasingly threaten Muslim communities in Western countries.  Like in 
India, this increased intolerance and racism towards Muslims, will have adverse 





Table 1 Urban Rural Incidence of Poverty by Social Group 
 
Urban Rural 
Total 22.8 22.7 
Hindu   
  All 20.4 22.6 
  Scheduled Castes and Tribes 36.4 34.8 
  Other Backward Castes 25.1 19.5 
  Upper Caste Hindus 8.3 9.0 
Muslims 38.4 26.9 
Other Minorities 12.2 14.3 
Source: Government of India 2006. 
 
 137
Table 2 Means and Standard Deviations of Independent and  
Control Variables for Enrollment Analysis 
 
 Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.272 0.445 0 1 
Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.220 0.414 0 1 
Historical Period 55 (1999) 0.244 0.430 0 1 
Male 0.536 0.499 0 1 
Male*Historical Period 43 0.147 0.354 0 1 
Male*Historical Period 50 0.149 0.356 0 1 
Male*Historical Period 55 0.111 0.314 0 1 
Muslim 0.147 0.355 0 1 
Scheduled Caste 0.119 0.324 0 1 
Scheduled Tribe 0.129 0.335 0 1 
Muslim*Male 0.041 0.197 0 1 
Scheduled Caste*Male 0.028 0.166 0 1 
Scheduled Tribe*Male 0.038 0.191 0 1 
Muslim*Period 43 0.038 0.190 0 1 
Muslim*Period 50 0.033 0.178 0 1 
Muslim*Period 55 0.040 0.195 0 1 
Scheduled Caste*Period 43 0.030 0.169 0 1 
Scheduled Caste*Period 50 0.024 0.153 0 1 
Scheduled Caste*Period 55 0.031 0.173 0 1 
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43 0.078 0.267 0 1 
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50 0.082 0.274 0 1 
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55 0.059 0.236 0 1 
Muslim*Male*Period 43 0.022 0.146 0 1 
Muslim*Male*Period 50 0.015 0.121 0 1 
Muslim*Male*Period 55 0.020 0.140 0 1 
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43 0.021 0.144 0 1 
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50 0.018 0.133 0 1 
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55 0.021 0.144 0 1 
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43 0.016 0.125 0 1 
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50 0.013 0.113 0 1 
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55 0.016 0.126 0 1 
Age 13.383 1.172 12 15 
Age Squared 180.471 31.562 144 225
Urban 0.345 0.475 0 1 
Household Size 6.605 2.348 1 12 
Log Monthly Expenditure 6.078 0.699 0 9.2 
Andra Pradesh 0.061 0.240 0 1 
Assam 0.041 0.198 0 1 
Bihar 0.087 0.282 0 1 




Table 2 Means and Standard Deviations of Independent and  
Control Variables for Enrollment Analysis 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max
Jammu and Kashmir 0.033 0.180 0 1 
Madhya Pradesh 0.078 0.269 0 1 
Maharashtra 0.078 0.268 0 1 
Orissa 0.038 0.190 0 1 
Rajasthan 0.049 0.217 0 1 
West Bengal 0.067 0.250 0 1 
New Delhi 0.008 0.089 0 1 
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman 0.063 0.243 0 1 
Kerele/Lakshadweep 0.034 0.182 0 1 
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli 0.045 0.208 0 1 
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh 0.062 0.242 0 1 
Northeast 0.067 0.249 0 1 
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui 0.048 0.214 0 1 




Table 3 Means and Standard Deviations of Independent and  
Control Variables for Employment Analysis 
Variable  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.3 0.4 0 1
Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.2 0.4 0 1
Historical Period 55 (1999) 0.3 0.4 0 1
Male 0.5 0.5 0 1
Male*Historical Period 43 0.1 0.3 0 1
Male*Historical Period 50 0.1 0.4 0 1
Male*Historical Period 55 0.1 0.3 0 1
Muslim 0.1 0.3 0 1
Scheduled Caste 0.1 0.3 0 1
Scheduled Tribe 0.1 0.3 0 1
Muslim*Male 0.0 0.2 0 1
Scheduled Caste*Male 0.0 0.2 0 1
Scheduled Tribe*Male 0.0 0.2 0 1
Muslim*Period 43 0.0 0.2 0 1
Muslim*Period 50 0.0 0.2 0 1
Muslim*Period 55 0.0 0.2 0 1
Scheduled Caste*Period 43 0.0 0.2 0 1
Scheduled Caste*Period 50 0.0 0.2 0 1
Scheduled Caste*Period 55 0.0 0.2 0 1
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43 0.1 0.2 0 1
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50 0.1 0.3 0 1
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55 0.1 0.2 0 1
Muslim*Male*Period 43 0.0 0.1 0 1
Muslim*Male*Period 50 0.0 0.1 0 1
Muslim*Male*Period 55 0.0 0.1 0 1
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43 0.0 0.1 0 1
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50 0.0 0.1 0 1
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55 0.0 0.1 0 1
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43 0.0 0.1 0 1
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50 0.0 0.1 0 1
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55 0.0 0.1 0 1
Age 37.4 8.9 25 55
Age Squared 1478.8 696.2 625 3025
Urban 0.4 0.5 0 1
Household Size 5.9 2.6 1 12
Primary School 0.2 0.4 0 1
Middle School 0.2 0.4 0 1
College 0.1 0.2 0 1
Never Married 0.1 0.2 0 1
Widow/Divorced/Separated 0.1 0.2 0 1
Number of Kids in Household 2.2 1.7 0 6
Andra Pradesh 0.1 0.3 0 1
Assam 0.0 0.2 0 1
Bihar 0.1 0.3 0 1
Continued on next page 
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Table 3 Means and Standard Deviations of Independent and  
Control Variables for Employment Analysis Continued 
Variable  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.0 0.2 0 1
Madhya Pradesh 0.1 0.3 0 1
Maharashtra 0.1 0.3 0 1
Orissa 0.0 0.2 0 1
Rajasthan 0.0 0.2 0 1
West Bengal 0.1 0.3 0 1
New Delhi 0.0 0.1 0 1
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman 0.1 0.3 0 1
Kerele/Lakshadweep 0.0 0.2 0 1
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli 0.0 0.2 0 1
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh 0.1 0.2 0 1
Northeast 0.1 0.3 0 1
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui 0.1 0.2 0 1




Table 4 Unweighted Frequencies and Weighted Percentages of Children  






Total Sample 215,970  
Round 38 (1983) 56,948  
Round 43 (1987) 58,741  
Round 50 (1993) 47,565  
Round 55 (1999) 52,716  
Total Enrollment   
All Rounds 137,001 58.2 
Round 38 (1983) 29,798 47.2 
Round 43 (1987) 35,217 52.6 
Round 50 (1993) 33,355 62.7 
Round 55 (1999) 38,631 67.0 
Male Enrollment   
All Rounds 82,239 66.8 
Round 38 (1983) 19,010 58.7 
Round 43 (1987) 21,850 62.7 
Round 50 (1993) 19,699 70.9 
Round 55 (1999) 21,680 72.9 
Hindu Male Enrollment   
All Rounds 52,670 72.9 
Round 38 (1983) 12,557 64.8 
Round 43 (1987) 14,265 69.4 
Round 50 (1993) 12,944 77.2 
Round 55 (1999) 12,904 79.1 
Muslim Male Enrollment   
All Rounds 10,320 57.2 
Round 38 (1983) 2,393 48.8 
Round 43 (1987) 2,805 52.4 
Round 50 (1993) 2,124 61.8 
Round 55 (1999) 2,998 63.2 
Female Enrollment   
All Rounds 54,762 48.0 
Round 38 (1983) 10,788 33.5 
Round 43 (1987) 13,367 40.5 
Round 50 (1993) 13,656 52.8 
Round 55 (1999) 16,951 60.4 
Hindu Female Enrollment   
All Rounds 36,124 54.3 
Round 38 (1983) 7,550 39.2 
Round 43 (1987) 9,147 47.4 
Round 50 (1993) 9,175 60.0 
Round 55 (1999) 10,252 67.5 




Table 4 Unweighted Frequencies and Weighted Percentages of Children  





Muslim Female Enrollment  
All Rounds 6,916 42.4 
Round 38 (1983) 1,332 29.2 
Round 43 (1987) 1,648 33.2 
Round 50 (1993) 1,549 46.8 
Round 55 (1999) 2,387 53.7 




Table 5 Unweighted Frequencies and Weighted Percentages of  
Enrollment by State 
State Unweighted Frequency 
Weighted 
Percentage 
A & N Islands 1,156 84.6 
Andhra Pradesh 6,771 45.2 
Arunachal Pradesh 705 62.2 
Assam 6,558 73.4 
Bihar 10,152 49.1 
Chandigarh 342 82.6 
Dadra & Nagar Havel 255 50.1 
Daman & Diu 177 81.1 
Delhi 1,410 81.9 
Goa  452 82.2 
Gujarat 5,966 61.5 
Haryana 2,639 66.4 
Himachal Pradesh 3,535 79.1 
Jammu & Kashmir 4,510 65.5 
Karnataka 5,583 54.9 
Kerala 5,834 85.9 
Lakshdweep 564 90.3 
Madhya Pradesh 9,834 55.3 
Maharashtra 12,147 71.0 
Manipur 2,899 88.0 
Meghalaya 1,796 71.5 
Mizoram 2,285 90.5 
Nagaland 830 89.2 
Orissa 4,453 51.1 
Pondicherry 564 76.5 
Punjab 3,069 61.9 
Rajasthan 5,715 51.0 
Sikkim 1,095 85.7 
Tamil Nadu 6,958 59.7 
Tripura 2,327 80.9 
Uttar Pradesh 17,108 54.1 
West Bengal 9,312 61.0 




Table 6 Unweighted Frequencies and Weighted Percentages of Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and  
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force by Gender, Religion, and Round  



















Employment   
All Rounds 259,274 33.57 292,611 34.48 286,924 31.95 838,809 100 
Round 38 63,197 32.68 71,829 36.13 66,028 31.2 201,054 100 
Round 43 66,769 32.88 81,189 35.5 75,688 31.61 223,646 100 
Round 50 62,211 33.74 67,017 33.51 69,161 32.74 198,389 100 
Round 55 67,097 34.52 72,576 33.44 76,047 32.04 215,720 100 
Male Employment         
All Rounds 196,794 47.85 216,515 49.43 13,494 2.72 426,803 100 
Round 38 47,326 46.17 52,697 51.3 2,676 2.54 102,699 100 
Round 43 51,159 47.41 58,775 49.49 3,971 3.1 113,905 100 
Round 50 47,565 48.58 50,395 49.02 2,894 2.4 100,854 100 
Round 55 50,744 48.69 54,648 48.47 3,953 2.84 109,345 100 
Hindu Male Employment        
All Rounds 113,541 42.59 140,345 54.5 8,742 2.9 262,628 100 
Round 38 27,288 41.35 33,529 41.35 1,735 2.58 62,552 100 
Round 43 29,763 42.69 37,593 53.97 2,581 3.34 69,937 100 
Round 50 28,052 43.42 34,017 53.95 1,984 2.63 64,053 100 
Round 55 28,438 42.69 35,206 54.27 2,442 3.04 66,086 100 
Muslim Male Employment        
All Rounds 21,086 43.27 29,088 53.74 1,649 3 51,823 100 
Round 38 5,421 43.14 7,537 54.05 360 2.81 13,318 100 
Round 43 5,788 43.02 8,260 54.1 461 2.88 14,509 100 
Round 50 4,416 42.43 5,848 54.89 315 2.69 10,579 100 
Round 55 5,461 44.2 7,443 52.33 513 3.47 13,417 100 






Table 6 Unweighted Frequencies and Weighted Percentages of Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and  
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force by Gender, Religion, and Round Continued 



















Female Employment         
All Rounds 62,480 18.98 76,096 19.21 273,430 61.81 412,006 100 
Round 38 15,871 18.79 19,132 20.52 63,352 60.7 98,355 100 
Round 43 15,610 17.97 22,414 21.14 71,717 60.88 109,741 100 
Round 50 14,646 18.54 16,622 17.63 66,267 63.82 97,535 100 
Round 55 16,353 20.19 17,928 18.25 72,094 61.56 106,375 100 
Hindu Female Employment        
All Rounds 32,421 15.2 46,904 20.79 173,790 64.01 253,115 100 
Round 38 8,007 14.74 11,975 22.05 39,824 63.21 59,806 100 
Round 43 8,319 14.76 13,710 22.59 45,539 62.65 67,568 100 
Round 50 7,821 14.98 10,476 19.37 43,308 65.65 61,605 100 
Round 55 8,274 16.06 10,743 19.76 45,119 64.18 64,136 100 
Muslim Female Employment        
All Rounds 3,526 8.73 4,536 10.26 42,737 81 50,799 100 
Round 38 988 9.65 1,061 10.1 10,907 80.25 12,956 100 
Round 43 933 8.98 1,356 11.07 11,799 79.95 14,088 100 
Round 50 757 8.35 917 9.41 8,854 82.24 10,528 100 
Round 55 848 8.25 1,202 10.46 11,177 81.29 13,227 100 
Source: National Sample Survey Organization 1983-1999, author’s tabulations.
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Table 7 Unweighted Frequencies and Weighted Percentages of  
Wage Employment by State 
State Unweighted Frequency 
Weighted 
Percentage
Andhra Pradesh 22,788 43.1 
A & N Islands 2,342 40.3 
Arunachal Pradesh 949 27.9 
Assam 8,689 26.8 
Bihar 20,287 30.1 
Chandigarh 957 51.5 
Dadra & Nagar Havel 945 43.5 
Daman & Diu 361 42.1 
Delhi 3,047 38.7 
Goa 892 39.3 
Gujarat 12,755 37.5 
Haryana 2,927 26.1 
Himachal Pradesh 3,390 20.1 
Jammu & Kashmir 5,241 20.5 
Karnataka 14,192 39.0 
Kerala 10,252 40.4 
Lakshdweep 751 38.3 
Madhya Pradesh 20,284 34.5 
Maharashtra 27,903 44.3 
Manipur 2,148 17.0 
Meghalaya 2,796 24.8 
Mizoram 2,341 18.7 
Nagaland 1,094 31.1 
Orissa 10,156 34.7 
Pondicherry 1,312 47.2 
Punjab 6,027 35.6 
Rajasthan 7,907 22.2 
Sikkim 1,464 27.1 
Tamil Nadu 22,547 47.0 
Tripura 3,651 30.2 
Uttar Pradesh 19,922 20.4 
West Bengal 18,957 32.1 




Table 8 Lok Sabha Election Results, Total Seats, Number of Elected Hindu Nationalist Seats, and Percent of Elected Hindu Nationalist 
Seats by State and Election Year 
 1991  1998  1999  





















Andrhra Pradesh 42 1 2.4 42 4 9.5 42 7 16.7 
Arunachal Pradesh 2 0 0.0 2 0 0.0 2 0 0.0 
Assam 14 2 14.3 14 1 7.1 14 2 14.3 
Bihar 52 5 9.6 54 20 37.0 54 23 42.6 
Goa  2 0 0.0 2 0 0.0 2 2 100.0 
Gujarat 26 20 76.9 26 19 73.1 26 20 76.9 
Haryana 10 0 0.0 10 1 10.0 10 5 50.0 
Himachal Pradesh 4 2 50.0 4 3 75.0 4 3 75.0 
Jammu and Kashmir Not Available  6 2 33.3 6 2 33.3 
Karnataka 28 4 14.3 28 13 46.4 28 7 25.0 
Kerala 20 0 0.0 20 0 0.0 20 0 0.0 
Madhya Pradesh 40 12 30.0 40 30 75.0 40 29 72.5 
Maharashtra 48 9 18.8 48 10 20.8 48 28 58.3 
Manipur 2 0 0.0 2 0 0.0 2 0 0.0 
Meghalaya 2 0 0.0 2 0 0.0 2 0 0.0 
Mizoram 1 0 0.0 1 0 0.0 1 0 0.0 
Nagaland 1 0 0.0 1 0 0.0 1 0 0.0 
Orissa 21 0 0.0 21 7 33.3 21 9 42.9 
Punjab 13 0 0.0 13 3 23.1 13 1 7.7 
Rajastan 25 12 48.0 25 5 20.0 25 16 64.0 
Sikkim 1 0 0.0 1 0 0.0 1 0 0.0 
Tamil Nadu 39 0 0.0 39 3 7.7 39 4 10.3 
Tripura 2 0 0.0 2 0 0.0 2 0 0.0 




Table 8 Lok Sabha Election Results, Total Seats, Number of Elected Hindu Nationalist Seats, and Percent of Elected Hindu Nationalist 
Seats by State and Election Year Continued 
 1991  1998  1999  





















Uttar Pradesh 84 51 60.7 85 57 67.1 85 29 34.1 
West Bengal 42 0 0.0 42 1 2.4 42 2 4.8 
Andaman & Nicobar 1 0 0.0 1 0 0.0 1 1 100.0 
Chandigarh 1 0 0.0 1 1 100.0 1 0 0.0 
Dadra and Nagar Haveli 1 0 0.0 1 1 100.0 1 0 0.0 
Daman and Dui 1 1 100.0 1 1 100.0 1 0 0.0 
Delhi 7 5 71.4 7 6 85.7 7 7 100.0 
Lakshadweep 1 0 0.0 1 0 0.0 1 0 0.0 
Pondicherry 1 0 0.0 1 0 0.0 1 0 0.0 
Source: Election Commission of India, http://www.eci.gov.in/database/database.asp, author’s tabulations. 
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Table 9 Number of Riots from 1983 to 1995 by State 
 
  Frequency Percent 
State   
Andhra Pradesh 29 4.32 
Assam 10 1.49 
Bihar 38 5.66 
Gujarat 192 28.61 
Haryana 2 0.3 
Jammu & Kashmir 24 3.58 
Karnataka 62 9.24 
Kerala 8 1.19 
Madhya Pradesh 18 2.68 
Maharashtra 114 16.99 
Manipur 1 0.15 
Orissa 6 0.89 
Rajasthan 19 2.83 
Tamil Nadu 13 1.94 
Uttar Pradesh 95 14.16 
West Bengal 20 2.98 
Delhi 20 2.98 
   
Total 671 100 




Table 10 Literacy, Employment, Monthly Per Capita Expenditure, Proportion of Muslims, and Child Sex Ratios by State 
 

















Worker Rural Urban     
India 64.8 75.3 53.7 31.7 26.5 4.2 37.6 502 860 13.4 927 
Andaman & Nicobar Islands 81.3 86.3 75.2 15.8 3.8 5.2 75.3 737 1121 8.2 957 
Andhra Pradesh 60.5 70.3 50.4 22.5 39.6 4.7 33.1 464 791 9.2 961 
Arunachal Pradesh 54.3 63.8 43.5 57.8 3.9 1.3 37.0 788 871 1.9 964 
Assam 63.3 71.3 54.6 39.1 13.2 3.6 44.0 460 842 30.9 965 
Bihar 47.0 59.7 33.1 29.3 48.0 3.9 18.8 414 599 16.5 942 
Chandigarh 81.9 86.1 76.5 0.6 0.2 1.1 98.1 1040 1398 3.9 845 
Chhattisgarh 64.7 77.4 51.9 44.5 31.9 2.1 21.5 418 717 2.0 975 
Dadra & Nagar Haveli 57.6 71.2 40.2 34.6 12.9 0.7 51.8 646 1336 3.0 979 
Daman & Diu 78.2 86.8 65.6 5.5 1.8 1.6 91.0 969 1010 7.8 926 
Delhi 81.7 87.3 74.7 0.8 0.3 3.1 95.7 1110 1474 11.7 868 
Goa 82.0 88.4 75.4 9.6 6.8 2.8 80.7 976 1198 6.8 938 
Gujarat 69.1 79.7 57.8 27.3 24.3 2.0 46.4 560 928 9.1 883 
Haryana 67.9 78.5 55.7 36.0 15.3 2.6 46.1 739 927 5.8 819 
Himachal Pradesh 76.5 85.3 67.4 65.3 3.1 1.8 29.8 702 1221 2.0 896 
Jammu & Kashmir 55.5 66.6 43.0 42.4 6.6 6.2 44.8 732 1073 67.0 941 
Jharkhand 53.6 67.3 38.9 38.5 28.2 4.3 29.1 460 599 13.8 965 
Karnataka 66.6 76.1 56.9 29.2 26.5 4.1 40.2 530 918 12.2 946 
Kerala 90.9 94.2 87.7 7.0 15.8 3.6 73.6 793 937 24.7 960 
Lakshadweep 86.7 92.5 80.5 0.0 0.0 5.9 94.1 - - 95.0 959 
Madhya Pradesh 63.7 76.1 50.3 42.8 28.7 4.0 24.5 418 717 6.4 932 
Continued on next page 
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Table 10 Literacy, Employment, Monthly Per Capita Expenditure, Proportion of Muslims, and Child Sex Ratios by State 
Continued 

















Worker Rural Urban     
Maharashtra 76.9 86.0 67.0 28.7 26.3 2.6 42.4 487 974 10.6 913 
Manipur 70.5 80.3 60.5 40.2 12.0 10.3 37.6 572 687 8.8 957 
Meghalaya 62.6 65.4 59.6 48.1 17.7 2.2 32.0 603 989 4.3 973 
Mizoram 88.8 90.7 86.7 54.9 5.7 1.5 37.9 915 1041 1.1 964 
Nagaland 66.6 71.2 61.5 64.7 3.6 2.6 29.0 1071 1328 1.8 964 
Orissa 63.1 75.3 50.5 29.8 35.0 4.9 30.3 374 628 2.1 953 
Pondicherry 81.2 88.6 73.9 3.2 21.1 1.8 73.9 598 812 6.1 967 
Punjab 69.7 75.2 63.4 22.6 16.3 3.7 57.4 776 921 1.6 798 
Rajasthan 60.4 75.7 43.9 55.3 10.6 2.9 31.2 551 809 8.5 909 
Sikkim 68.8 76.0 60.4 49.9 6.5 1.6 42.0 548 886 1.4 963 
Tamil Nadu 73.5 82.4 64.4 18.4 31.0 5.4 45.3 522 886 5.6 942 
Tripura 73.2 81.0 64.9 27.0 23.8 3.0 46.1 547 912 8.0 966 
Uttar Pradesh 56.3 68.8 42.2 41.1 24.8 5.6 28.5 483 714 18.5 916 
Uttaranchal 71.6 83.3 59.6 50.1 8.3 2.3 39.3 483 714 11.9 908 
West Bengal 68.6 77.0 59.6 19.2 25.0 7.4 48.5 469 854 25.2 960 
            
Mean            
Fundamentalist States 66.9 78.4 54.2 36.1 18.7 2.8 42.4 572.9 931.4 9.1 920.3 
Non-Fundamentalist States 70.5 78.3 61.9 29.9 15.8 3.7 50.6 646.1 901.9 14.3 938.0 




Table 11 Official Planning Commission Urban and Rural Poverty Lines by Year and 
State 
 
 1983 1987 1993  1999
 Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
All India 89.5 115.65 115.2 162.16 205.84 281.35 327.56 454.11 
Andhra Pradesh 72.66 106.43 108.29 151.88 163.02 278.14 262.94 457.4 
Assam 98.32 97.51 122.92 126.6 232.05 212.42 365.43 343.99 
Bihar 97.48 111.8 120.5 150.25 212.16 238.49 333.07 379.78 
Gujarat 83.29 123.22 127.3 173.18 202.11 297.22 318.94 474.41 
Haryana 88.57 103.48 113.93 143.22 233.79 258.23 362.81 420.2 
Himachal Pradesh 88.57 102.26 117.04 144.1 233.79 253.61 367.45 420.2 
J&K 91.75 99.62 109.56 148.38 233.79 253.61 367.45 420.2 
Karnataka 83.31 120.19 114.39 171.18 186.63 302.89 309.59 511.44 
Kerala 99.35 122.64 120.84 163.29 243.84 280.54 374.79 477.06 
Madhya Pradesh 83.59 122.82 108.52 178.35 193.1 317.16 311.34 481.65 
Maharashtra 88.24 126.47 119.58 189.17 194.94 328.56 318.63 539.71 
Orissa 106.28 124.81 111.28 165.4 194.03 298.22 323.92 473.12 
Punjab 88.57 101.03 108.52 144.98 233.79 253.61 362.68 388.15 
Rajasthan 80.24 113.55 119.69 165.38 215.89 280.85 344.03 465.92 
Tamil Nadu 96.15 120.3 121.54 165.82 196.53 296.63 307.64 475.6 
Uttar Pradesh 83.85 110.23 105.29 154.15 213.01 258.65 336.88 416.29 
West Bengal 105.55 105.91 114.28 149.96 220.74 247.53 350.17 409.22 
New Delhi 88.57 123.29 122.9 176.91 233.79 309.48 362.68 505.45 
Source: Dubey and Palmer-Jones 2007.
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Table 12 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children Ages 12-15 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Independent Variables                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.246 *** 0.018 0.329 *** 0.025 0.268 *** 0.018 0.389 *** 0.029 0.388 *** 0.029 0.380 *** 0.032
Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.654 *** 0.020 0.833 *** 0.027 0.703 *** 0.020 0.914 *** 0.031 0.915 *** 0.031 0.901 *** 0.034
Historical Period 55 (1999) 0.943 *** 0.023 1.260 *** 0.029 1.032 *** 0.023 1.373 *** 0.036 1.374 *** 0.036 1.336 *** 0.040
Male 0.968 *** 0.014 1.261 *** 0.025 1.021 *** 0.019 1.296 *** 0.026 1.299 *** 0.028 1.270 *** 0.033
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)    -0.143 *** 0.035    -0.136 *** 0.035 -0.134 *** 0.035 -0.121 ** 0.045
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)    -0.322 *** 0.037    -0.326 *** 0.037 -0.328 *** 0.037 -0.301 *** 0.048
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)    -0.611 *** 0.041    -0.634 *** 0.041 -0.636 *** 0.041 -0.560 *** 0.056
Muslim       -0.776 *** 0.033 -0.855 *** 0.044 -0.722 *** 0.048 -0.730 *** 0.054
Scheduled Caste       -0.612 *** 0.029 -0.480 *** 0.039 -0.590 *** 0.044 -0.666 *** 0.054
Scheduled Tribe       -0.714 *** 0.039 -0.768 *** 0.047 -0.741 *** 0.056 -0.814 *** 0.072
Muslim*Male       -0.269 *** 0.045    -0.227 *** 0.044 -0.211 ** 0.079
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.110 ** 0.038    0.171 *** 0.038 0.294 *** 0.073
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.094 + 0.049    -0.041  0.049 0.077  0.090
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)          -0.155 ** 0.058 -0.157 ** 0.057 -0.179 * 0.074
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)          -0.028  0.062 -0.044  0.062 -0.035  0.080
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)          -0.084  0.073 -0.105  0.072 -0.069  0.088
Scheduled Caste*Period 43          -0.159 ** 0.052 -0.157 ** 0.052 -0.091  0.074
Scheduled Caste*Period 50          -0.136 * 0.054 -0.122 * 0.054 -0.057  0.076
Scheduled Caste*Period 55          -0.013  0.057 0.010  0.057 0.141 + 0.078
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43          0.062  0.066 0.060  0.065 0.089  0.098
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50          -0.015  0.076 -0.018  0.076 0.063  0.104
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55          -0.025  0.070 -0.030  0.070 0.101  0.101
Muslim*Male*Period 43 (1987)                0.037  0.105
Muslim*Male*Period 50 (1993)                -0.018  0.113
Muslim*Male*Period 55 (1999)                               -0.075   0.127




Table 12 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children Ages 12 to 15 Continued 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                -0.103  0.100
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                -0.101  0.102
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                -0.234 * 0.108
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                -0.042  0.126
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                -0.131  0.133
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                -0.233 + 0.134
Age 3.081 *** 0.177 3.071 *** 0.177 3.043 *** 0.180 3.031 *** 0.180 3.034 *** 0.180 3.036 *** 0.180
Age Squared -0.125 *** 0.007 -0.125 *** 0.007 -0.124 *** 0.007 -0.124 *** 0.007 -0.124 *** 0.007 -0.124 *** 0.007
Urban 0.751 *** 0.022 0.758 *** 0.022 0.824 *** 0.022 0.831 *** 0.022 0.831 *** 0.022 0.831 *** 0.022
Household Size 0.038 *** 0.004 0.038 *** 0.004 0.039 *** 0.004 0.039 *** 0.004 0.039 *** 0.004 0.039 *** 0.004
Log Monthly Expenditure 0.883 *** 0.025 0.891 *** 0.025 0.755 *** 0.025 0.762 *** 0.025 0.762 *** 0.025 0.762 *** 0.025
Andra Pradesh -0.415 *** 0.035 -0.413 *** 0.035 -0.468 *** 0.034 -0.465 *** 0.034 -0.466 *** 0.034 -0.465 *** 0.034
Assam 0.982 *** 0.042 0.990 *** 0.042 1.169 *** 0.043 1.178 *** 0.044 1.180 *** 0.043 1.180 *** 0.043
Bihar -0.063 * 0.030 -0.057 + 0.030 -0.069 * 0.031 -0.065 * 0.031 -0.063 * 0.031 -0.064 * 0.030
Jammu and Kashmir 0.389 *** 0.046 0.396 *** 0.047 0.769 *** 0.048 0.793 *** 0.049 0.788 *** 0.049 0.788 *** 0.049
Madhya Pradesh 0.071 * 0.029 0.077 ** 0.029 0.104 *** 0.030 0.110 *** 0.030 0.109 *** 0.030 0.109 *** 0.030
Maharashtra 0.732 *** 0.032 0.738 *** 0.032 0.729 *** 0.032 0.736 *** 0.032 0.736 *** 0.032 0.736 *** 0.032
Orissa 0.111 ** 0.035 0.116 *** 0.035 0.103 ** 0.036 0.107 ** 0.036 0.107 ** 0.036 0.107 ** 0.036
Rajasthan -0.330 *** 0.033 -0.326 *** 0.033 -0.296 *** 0.034 -0.291 *** 0.034 -0.291 *** 0.034 -0.290 *** 0.034
West Bengal 0.396 *** 0.039 0.399 *** 0.039 0.572 *** 0.038 0.579 *** 0.038 0.582 *** 0.038 0.582 *** 0.038
New Delhi 0.599 *** 0.144 0.594 *** 0.142 0.626 *** 0.137 0.616 *** 0.134 0.624 *** 0.134 0.624 *** 0.135
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman 0.338 *** 0.035 0.345 *** 0.035 0.262 *** 0.035 0.268 *** 0.035 0.270 *** 0.035 0.269 *** 0.035
Kerele/Lakshadweep 1.870 *** 0.051 1.898 *** 0.051 2.072 *** 0.051 2.114 *** 0.052 2.105 *** 0.052 2.106 *** 0.052
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli 0.286 *** 0.038 0.290 *** 0.038 0.297 *** 0.039 0.300 *** 0.039 0.302 *** 0.039 0.302 *** 0.039
Continued on next page 
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Table 12 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Continued 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh 0.452 *** 0.040 0.456 *** 0.040 0.481 *** 0.041 0.484 *** 0.040 0.488 *** 0.041 0.488 *** 0.041
Northeast 1.267 *** 0.045 1.279 *** 0.045 1.533 *** 0.048 1.545 *** 0.048 1.544 *** 0.048 1.547 *** 0.048
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui 0.033  0.036 0.038  0.036 0.014  0.036 0.020  0.036 0.021  0.036 0.021  0.036
Intercept -25.135 *** 1.188 -25.284 *** 1.191 -23.868 *** 1.209 -24.008 *** 1.210 -24.032 *** 1.210 -24.031 *** 1.210
                   
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested    mper43 = 0  musmale = 0  musper43 = 0 musmale = 0  musmaleper43 = 0 
    mper50 = 0  scmale = 0  musper50 = 0 scmale = 0  musmaleper50 = 0 
    mper55 = 0  stmale = 0  musper55 = 0 stmale = 0  musmaleper55 = 0 
          scper43 = 0     scmaleper43 = 0 
          scper50 = 0     scmaleper50 = 0 
          scper55 = 0     scmaleper55 = 0 
          stper43 = 0     stmaleper43 = 0 
          stper50 = 0     stmaleper50 = 0 
          stper55 = 0     stmaleper55 = 0 
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested    3   3   9   3   9   
chi2    249.5   57.0   25.7   59.3   7.3   
Prob > chi2       0.000     0.000     0.002     0.000     0.607     
+p<.1 *p< .05  **p<.01  ***<.001 
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Table 13 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Hindu Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Independent Variables                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.273 *** 0.026 0.353 *** 0.038 0.283 *** 0.026 0.397 *** 0.042 0.396 *** 0.042 0.392 *** 0.045
Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.647 *** 0.028 0.857 *** 0.039 0.693 *** 0.029 0.921 *** 0.044 0.920 *** 0.044 0.883 *** 0.048
Historical Period 55 (1999) 1.018 *** 0.033 1.380 *** 0.043 1.104 *** 0.033 1.461 *** 0.050 1.460 *** 0.050 1.406 *** 0.055
Male 1.181 *** 0.021 1.515 *** 0.036 1.253 *** 0.027 1.570 *** 0.037 1.572 *** 0.040 1.522 *** 0.045
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)    -0.131 ** 0.050    -0.127 * 0.052 -0.125 * 0.052 -0.119 + 0.064
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)    -0.364 *** 0.053    -0.378 *** 0.054 -0.376 *** 0.054 -0.303 *** 0.068
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)    -0.694 *** 0.059    -0.728 *** 0.059 -0.726 *** 0.059 -0.614 *** 0.079
Muslim       -1.005 *** 0.051 -1.086 *** 0.064 -0.990 *** 0.074 -0.992 *** 0.088
Scheduled Caste       -0.642 *** 0.045 -0.526 *** 0.055 -0.656 *** 0.067 -0.821 *** 0.092
Scheduled Tribe       -0.659 *** 0.055 -0.866 *** 0.068 -0.750 *** 0.081 -0.852 *** 0.110
Muslim*Male       -0.211 *** 0.064    -0.150 * 0.065 -0.140  0.115
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.114 + 0.058    0.191 *** 0.059 0.443 *** 0.114
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.233 *** 0.070    -0.168 * 0.071 -0.009  0.130
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)          -0.161 + 0.088 -0.163 + 0.087 -0.138  0.124
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)          -0.059  0.094 -0.074  0.093 -0.019  0.127
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)          0.030  0.098 0.008  0.097 -0.024  0.131
Scheduled Caste*Period 43          -0.167 * 0.077 -0.167 * 0.078 -0.169  0.127
Scheduled Caste*Period 50          -0.124  0.080 -0.109  0.082 0.073  0.126
Scheduled Caste*Period 55          0.052  0.084 0.084  0.085 0.377 ** 0.124
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43          0.081  0.095 0.072  0.093 0.108  0.151
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50          0.171 + 0.098 0.154  0.097 0.275 + 0.150
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55          0.056  0.100 0.031  0.099 0.200  0.148
Muslim*Male*Period 43                -0.041  0.162
Muslim*Male*Period 50                -0.113  0.168
Muslim*Male*Period 55                               0.054   0.178
Continued on next page 
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Table 13 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Hindu Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Continued 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                0.005  0.157
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                -0.284 + 0.161
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                -0.509 ** 0.164
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                -0.047  0.184
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                -0.197  0.187
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                -0.296  0.190
Age 3.182 *** 0.258 3.151 *** 0.259 3.130 *** 0.262 3.092 *** 0.263 3.101 *** 0.263 3.099 *** 0.263
Age Squared -0.129 *** 0.010 -0.128 *** 0.010 -0.128 *** 0.010 -0.127 *** 0.010 -0.127 *** 0.010 -0.127 *** 0.010
Urban 0.769 *** 0.032 0.780 *** 0.032 0.922 *** 0.032 0.936 *** 0.032 0.936 *** 0.032 0.936 *** 0.032
Household Size 0.040 *** 0.005 0.041 *** 0.005 0.041 *** 0.005 0.041 *** 0.005 0.041 *** 0.005 0.041 *** 0.005
Log Monthly Expenditure 0.894 *** 0.037 0.905 *** 0.038 0.739 *** 0.037 0.748 *** 0.037 0.748 *** 0.037 0.748 *** 0.037
Madhya Pradesh 0.070 * 0.030 0.076 * 0.030 0.082 * 0.032 0.086 ** 0.032 0.086 ** 0.032 0.087 ** 0.032
Maharashtra 0.752 *** 0.033 0.762 *** 0.033 0.739 *** 0.034 0.747 *** 0.034 0.747 *** 0.034 0.748 *** 0.034
Rajasthan -0.335 *** 0.035 -0.332 *** 0.035 -0.310 *** 0.036 -0.307 *** 0.036 -0.306 *** 0.036 -0.305 *** 0.036
New Delhi 0.623 *** 0.149 0.621 *** 0.146 0.618 *** 0.143 0.607 *** 0.141 0.619 *** 0.141 0.622 *** 0.142
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli 0.304 *** 0.039 0.310 *** 0.040 0.298 *** 0.041 0.302 *** 0.041 0.304 *** 0.041 0.305 *** 0.041
Intercept -25.98 *** 1.729 -26.03 *** 1.737 -24.42 *** 1.757 -24.42 *** 1.764 -24.48 *** 1.765 -24.44 *** 1.763
Continued on next page 
 
 158
Table 13 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Hindu Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Continued 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.  SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested    mper43 = 0  musmale = 0 musper43 = 0 musmale = 0 musmaleper43 = 0 
    mper50 = 0  scmale = 0  musper50 = 0 scmale = 0  musmaleper50 = 0 
    mper55 = 0  stmale = 0  musper55 = 0 stmale = 0  musmaleper55 = 0 
          scper43 = 0     scmaleper43 = 0 
          scper50 = 0     scmaleper50 = 0 
          scper55 = 0     scmaleper55 = 0 
          stper43 = 0     stmaleper43 = 0 
          stper50 = 0     stmaleper50 = 0 
          stper55 = 0     stmaleper55 = 0 
                   
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested    3   3   9   3   9   
chi2    160.4   28.7   17.8   26.7   17.8   
Prob > chi2       0.000    0.000     0.038     0.000     0.038     
+p<.1 *p< .05  **p<.01  ***<.001 
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Table 14 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Independent Variables                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.222 *** 0.025 0.317 *** 0.034 0.251 *** 0.025 0.383 *** 0.039 0.381 *** 0.039 0.375 *** 0.044
Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.662 *** 0.028 0.830 *** 0.036 0.716 *** 0.028 0.922 *** 0.043 0.927 *** 0.043 0.932 *** 0.047
Historical Period 55 (1999) 0.882 *** 0.033 1.179 *** 0.041 0.972 *** 0.033 1.314 *** 0.051 1.317 *** 0.051 1.293 *** 0.057
Male 0.786 *** 0.020 1.064 *** 0.035 0.814 *** 0.025 1.089 *** 0.036 1.079 *** 0.039 1.067 *** 0.046
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)    -0.169 *** 0.048    -0.160 *** 0.049 -0.157 *** 0.049 -0.145 * 0.063
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)    -0.309 *** 0.051    -0.308 *** 0.051 -0.318 *** 0.051 -0.330 *** 0.067
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)    -0.575 *** 0.057    -0.593 *** 0.058 -0.600 *** 0.058 -0.552 *** 0.078
Muslim       -0.640 *** 0.043 -0.706 *** 0.059 -0.588 *** 0.064 -0.602 *** 0.069
Scheduled Caste       -0.609 *** 0.038 -0.446 *** 0.053 -0.571 *** 0.059 -0.588 *** 0.068
Scheduled Tribe       -0.748 *** 0.056 -0.672 *** 0.067 -0.701 *** 0.077 -0.741 *** 0.096
Muslim*Male       -0.253 *** 0.061    -0.211 *** 0.059 -0.185 + 0.108
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.149 ** 0.051    0.204 *** 0.051 0.234 * 0.098
Scheduled Tribe*Male       0.005  0.070    0.047  0.069 0.114  0.128
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)          -0.146 + 0.077 -0.147 + 0.076 -0.209 * 0.094
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)          0.035  0.083 0.024  0.082 0.020  0.104
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)          -0.136  0.102 -0.149  0.100 -0.059  0.120
Scheduled Caste*Period 43          -0.147 * 0.070 -0.142 * 0.071 -0.047  0.094
Scheduled Caste*Period 50          -0.151 * 0.073 -0.135 + 0.073 -0.160 + 0.096
Scheduled Caste*Period 55          -0.058  0.078 -0.034  0.078 -0.012  0.104
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43          0.052  0.092 0.053  0.092 0.076  0.130
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50          -0.199 + 0.115 -0.196 + 0.116 -0.163  0.147
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55          -0.108  0.097 -0.104  0.097 -0.024  0.140
Muslim*Male*Period 43                0.112  0.141
Muslim*Male*Period 50                0.011  0.153
Muslim*Male*Period 55                               -0.176   0.174
Continued on next page 
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Table 14 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Continued 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                -0.161  0.133
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                0.051  0.136
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                -0.039  0.146
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                -0.036  0.176
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                -0.051  0.192
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                -0.147  0.190
Age 3.048 *** 0.243 3.054 *** 0.243 3.027 *** 0.247 3.038 *** 0.247 3.036 *** 0.247 3.042 *** 0.247
Age Squared -0.124 *** 0.009 -0.124 *** 0.009 -0.123 *** 0.009 -0.124 *** 0.009 -0.124 *** 0.009 -0.124 *** 0.009
Urban 0.738 *** 0.029 0.742 *** 0.029 0.758 *** 0.030 0.761 *** 0.030 0.762 *** 0.030 0.762 *** 0.030
Household Size 0.037 *** 0.006 0.037 *** 0.006 0.037 *** 0.006 0.038 *** 0.005 0.038 *** 0.005 0.038 *** 0.005
Log Monthly Expenditure 0.877 *** 0.035 0.883 *** 0.035 0.772 *** 0.034 0.778 *** 0.034 0.779 *** 0.034 0.779 *** 0.034
Andra Pradesh -0.359 *** 0.039 -0.362 *** 0.039 -0.394 *** 0.038 -0.394 *** 0.038 -0.396 *** 0.038 -0.396 *** 0.038
Assam 1.020 *** 0.044 1.021 *** 0.044 1.182 *** 0.046 1.182 *** 0.046 1.184 *** 0.046 1.184 *** 0.046
J&K 0.432 *** 0.050 0.432 *** 0.050 0.746 *** 0.052 0.769 *** 0.053 0.764 *** 0.053 0.766 *** 0.053
Orissa 0.157 *** 0.038 0.155 *** 0.038 0.169 *** 0.039 0.170 *** 0.039 0.169 *** 0.039 0.169 *** 0.039
West Bengal 0.437 *** 0.043 0.434 *** 0.042 0.597 *** 0.042 0.600 *** 0.041 0.600 *** 0.041 0.599 *** 0.041
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman 0.375 *** 0.038 0.375 *** 0.038 0.322 *** 0.040 0.325 *** 0.039 0.324 *** 0.039 0.324 *** 0.039
Kerele/Lakshadweep 1.882 *** 0.053 1.897 *** 0.053 2.045 *** 0.054 2.072 *** 0.054 2.065 *** 0.054 2.066 *** 0.054
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh 0.490 *** 0.044 0.487 *** 0.044 0.530 *** 0.045 0.530 *** 0.045 0.531 *** 0.045 0.531 *** 0.045
Northeast 1.294 *** 0.048 1.298 *** 0.048 1.569 *** 0.053 1.565 *** 0.053 1.569 *** 0.053 1.570 *** 0.053
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui 0.082 * 0.039 0.081 * 0.039 0.073 + 0.040 0.075 + 0.040 0.075 + 0.040 0.075 + 0.040
Intercept -24.85 *** 1.633 -25.08 *** 1.634 -23.85 *** 1.663 -24.14 *** 1.662 -24.12 *** 1.661 -24.16 *** 1.661
Continued on next page 
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Table 14 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Continued 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.  SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested    mper43 = 0  musmale = 0 musper43 = 0 musmale = 0 musmaleper43 = 0 
    mper50 = 0  scmale = 0  musper50 = 0 scmale = 0  musmaleper50 = 0 
    mper55 = 0  stmale = 0  musper55 = 0 stmale = 0  musmaleper55 = 0 
          scper43 = 0     scmaleper43 = 0 
          scper50 = 0     scmaleper50 = 0 
          scper55 = 0     scmaleper55 = 0 
          stper43 = 0     stmaleper43 = 0 
          stper50 = 0     stmaleper50 = 0 
          stper55 = 0     stmaleper55 = 0 
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested    3   3   9   3   9   
chi2    111.5   32.4   21.2   36.8   7.6   
Prob > chi2       0.000     0.000     0.012     0.000     0.579    
+p<.1 *p< .05  **p<.01  ***<.001 
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Table 15 Enrollment Predicted Probabilities for All, Fundamentalist, and Non-fundamentalist States Over Time 
 




1983 0.5392 0.5027 0.5632 0.0605 
1987 0.5995 0.5705 0.6169 0.0464 
1993 0.6922 0.6588 0.7143 0.0555 
1999 0.7504 0.7368 0.7570 0.0202 
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Table 16 Enrollment Predicted Probabilities by Gender, Gender Difference in 
Predicted Probabilities, and Gender Ratio 
 





     
All States     
1983 0.6762 0.3718 0.3044 0.5498 
1987 0.7156 0.4513 0.2643 0.6307 
1993 0.7769 0.5765 0.2004 0.7421 
1999 0.7999 0.6761 0.1238 0.8452 
     
Fundamentalist     
1983 0.665 0.3038 0.3612 0.4568 
1987 0.7125 0.3831 0.3294 0.5377 
1993 0.7646 0.5068 0.2578 0.6628 
1999 0.7976 0.6343 0.1633 0.7953 
     
Non-Fundamentalist     
1983 0.6798 0.4228 0.2570 0.6219 
1987 0.711 0.5014 0.2096 0.7052 
1993 0.7814 0.6269 0.1545 0.8023 




Table 17 Educational Enrollment Predicted Probabilities for Children ages 12-15 by 
Religion 
 







All States     
1983 0.5694 0.3600 0.2094 0.6322 
1987 0.6610 0.4154 0.2456 0.6284 
1993 0.7673 0.5770 0.1903 0.7520 
1999 0.8392 0.6712 0.1680 0.7998 
     
Fundamentalist     
1983 0.5323 0.2776 0.2547 0.5215 
1987 0.6287 0.3274 0.3013 0.5208 
1993 0.7408 0.4765 0.2643 0.6432 
1999 0.8306 0.6306 0.2000 0.7592 
     
Non-Fundamentalist     
1983 0.5893 0.4147 0.1746 0.7037 
1987 0.6778 0.4731 0.2047 0.6980 
1993 0.7831 0.6487 0.1344 0.8284 
1999 0.8422 0.6970 0.1452 0.8276 
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Table 18 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line 
  Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4     Model 5     Model 6     
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Independent Variables                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.191 *** 0.028 0.258 *** 0.039 0.206 *** 0.028 0.321 *** 0.047 0.321 *** 0.047 0.284 *** 0.053
Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.613 *** 0.030 0.805 *** 0.042 0.660 *** 0.031 0.893 *** 0.052 0.892 *** 0.052 0.887 *** 0.059
Historical Period 55 (1999) 0.868 *** 0.039 1.227 *** 0.047 0.950 *** 0.039 1.350 *** 0.062 1.349 *** 0.062 1.255 *** 0.069
Male 0.991 *** 0.023 1.283 *** 0.038 1.055 *** 0.032 1.323 *** 0.039 1.330 *** 0.044 1.269 *** 0.053
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)    -0.107 * 0.053    -0.110 * 0.055 -0.109 * 0.055 -0.044  0.074
Male*Historical Period 50  (1993)    -0.321 *** 0.056    -0.334 *** 0.058 -0.331 *** 0.058 -0.328 *** 0.081
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999)    -0.660 *** 0.066    -0.698 *** 0.067 -0.694 *** 0.067 -0.512 *** 0.099
Muslim       -0.620 *** 0.053 -0.800 *** 0.068 -0.596 *** 0.075 -0.678 *** 0.081
Scheduled Caste       -0.543 *** 0.044 -0.373 *** 0.054 -0.489 *** 0.063 -0.538 *** 0.074
Scheduled Tribe       -0.760 *** 0.057 -0.833 *** 0.064 -0.848 *** 0.080 -1.056 *** 0.110
Muslim*Male       -0.386 *** 0.072    -0.327 *** 0.071 -0.190  0.119
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.113 * 0.057    0.175 ** 0.058 0.258 * 0.102
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.048  0.072    0.021  0.073 0.328 * 0.131
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)          -0.133  0.089 -0.140  0.088 -0.094  0.113
Muslim*Period 50  (1993)          0.028  0.096 -0.003  0.094 0.027  0.121
Muslim*Period 55  (1999)          -0.063  0.124 -0.109  0.121 0.086  0.142
Scheduled Caste*Period 43          -0.179 * 0.075 -0.179 * 0.076 -0.128  0.109
Scheduled Caste*Period 50          -0.191 * 0.078 -0.180 * 0.079 -0.194 + 0.112
Scheduled Caste*Period 55          -0.069  0.088 -0.044  0.088 0.092  0.119
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43          0.095  0.090 0.096  0.091 0.368 * 0.149
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50          0.045  0.097 0.047  0.097 0.175  0.154
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55          0.040  0.103 0.044  0.104 0.373 * 0.156
Muslim*Male*Period 43                -0.078  0.161
Muslim*Male*Period 50                -0.038  0.168
Muslim*Male*Period 55                               -0.370 + 0.205
Continued on the next page 
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Table 18 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line 
Continued 
  Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4     Model 5     Model 6     
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                -0.086  0.145
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                0.034  0.150
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                -0.258  0.163
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                -0.406 * 0.183
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                -0.164  0.191
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                -0.546 ** 0.203
Age 3.086 *** 0.287 3.055 *** 0.288 3.049 *** 0.292 3.029 *** 0.293 3.020 *** 0.293 3.026 *** 0.292
Age Squared -0.125 *** 0.011 -0.124 *** 0.011 -0.124 *** 0.011 -0.123 *** 0.011 -0.123 *** 0.011 -0.123 *** 0.011
Urban 0.789 *** 0.032 0.798 *** 0.033 0.824 *** 0.033 0.834 *** 0.034 0.835 *** 0.034 0.835 *** 0.034
Household Size 0.041 *** 0.007 0.041 *** 0.007 0.044 *** 0.006 0.044 *** 0.006 0.044 *** 0.006 0.045 *** 0.006
Log Monthly Expenditure 0.118 *** 0.020 0.122 *** 0.021 0.101 *** 0.020 0.104 *** 0.020 0.104 *** 0.020 0.104 *** 0.020
Andra Pradesh -0.331 *** 0.060 -0.337 *** 0.061 -0.365 *** 0.061 -0.373 *** 0.061 -0.373 *** 0.061 -0.374 *** 0.061
Assam 1.038 *** 0.062 1.039 *** 0.062 1.208 *** 0.064 1.205 *** 0.065 1.213 *** 0.065 1.213 *** 0.065
Bihar -0.131 ** 0.045 -0.130 ** 0.046 -0.141 ** 0.046 -0.143 ** 0.046 -0.142 ** 0.046 -0.141 ** 0.046
Jammu and Kashmir 0.549 *** 0.096 0.553 *** 0.099 0.751 *** 0.104 0.762 *** 0.108 0.760 *** 0.107 0.761 *** 0.107
Madhya Pradesh 0.087 + 0.045 0.086 + 0.046 0.172 *** 0.047 0.169 *** 0.047 0.169 *** 0.048 0.169 *** 0.047
Maharashtra 0.733 *** 0.048 0.734 *** 0.049 0.754 *** 0.048 0.754 *** 0.048 0.754 *** 0.048 0.755 *** 0.048
Orissa 0.051  0.052 0.054  0.052 0.090 + 0.053 0.090 + 0.053 0.091 + 0.053 0.090 + 0.053
Rajasthan -0.291 *** 0.064 -0.296 *** 0.064 -0.232 *** 0.065 -0.236 *** 0.065 -0.237 *** 0.065 -0.239 *** 0.065
West Bengal 0.295 *** 0.069 0.294 *** 0.069 0.469 *** 0.066 0.470 *** 0.064 0.474 *** 0.064 0.473 *** 0.063
New Delhi 0.763 *** 0.184 0.756 *** 0.186 0.816 *** 0.184 0.789 *** 0.185 0.812 *** 0.186 0.813 *** 0.186
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman 0.387 *** 0.051 0.391 *** 0.051 0.294 *** 0.052 0.295 *** 0.052 0.297 *** 0.052 0.296 *** 0.051
Kerele/Lakshadweep 1.961 *** 0.078 1.996 *** 0.079 2.117 *** 0.078 2.171 *** 0.080 2.154 *** 0.079 2.157 *** 0.079
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli 0.322 *** 0.065 0.325 *** 0.066 0.367 *** 0.067 0.370 *** 0.068 0.369 *** 0.068 0.369 *** 0.068




Table 18 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line 
Continued 
  Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4     Model 5     Model 6     
                                      
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh 0.532 *** 0.081 0.536 *** 0.081 0.553 *** 0.082 0.549 *** 0.081 0.556 *** 0.081 0.555 *** 0.081
Northeast 1.335 *** 0.078 1.354 *** 0.079 1.568 *** 0.081 1.575 *** 0.082 1.582 *** 0.083 1.584 *** 0.083
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui 0.161 ** 0.060 0.165 ** 0.060 0.152 * 0.059 0.155 ** 0.059 0.157 ** 0.059 0.158 ** 0.059
Intercept -21.187 *** 1.913 -21.184 *** 1.923 -20.566 *** 1.949 -20.647 *** 1.954 -20.590 *** 1.953 -20.597 *** 1.949
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested    mper43 = 0  musmale = 0  musper43 = 0  musmale = 0  musmaleper43 = 0 
    mper50 = 0  scmale = 0  musper50 = 0  scmale = 0  musmaleper50 = 0 
    mper55 = 0  stmale = 0  musper55 = 0  stmale = 0  musmaleper55 = 0 
          scper43 = 0     scmaleper43 = 0 
          scper50 = 0     scmaleper50 = 0 
          scper55 = 0     scmaleper55 = 0 
          stper43 = 0     stmaleper43 = 0 
          stper50 = 0     stmaleper50 = 0 
          stper55 = 0     stmaleper55 = 0 
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested    3   3   9   3   9   
chi2    113.8   40.2   15.5   40.5   11.9   
Prob > chi2       0.000     0.000     0.078     0.000     0.220     




Table 19 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Independent Variables                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.165 *** 0.040 0.230 *** 0.061 0.174 *** 0.040 0.262 *** 0.071 0.262 *** 0.071 0.220 ** 0.079
Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.542 *** 0.044 0.761 *** 0.065 0.573 *** 0.045 0.782 *** 0.077 0.782 *** 0.077 0.706 *** 0.086
Historical Period 55 (1999) 0.921 *** 0.053 1.332 *** 0.067 1.007 *** 0.052 1.425 *** 0.086 1.425 *** 0.086 1.308 *** 0.095
Male 1.152 *** 0.034 1.486 *** 0.054 1.223 *** 0.047 1.548 *** 0.055 1.548 *** 0.063 1.443 *** 0.072
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)    -0.100  0.078    -0.116  0.079 -0.115  0.079 -0.045  0.105
Male*Historical Period 50  (1993)    -0.355 *** 0.083    -0.393 *** 0.085 -0.394 *** 0.085 -0.263 * 0.116
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999)    -0.744 *** 0.095    -0.803 *** 0.094 -0.803 *** 0.095 -0.581 *** 0.144
Muslim       -0.885 *** 0.078 -1.071 *** 0.094 -0.968 *** 0.108 -1.042 *** 0.132
Scheduled Caste       -0.525 *** 0.067 -0.434 *** 0.075 -0.543 *** 0.094 -0.753 *** 0.120
Scheduled Tribe       -0.817 *** 0.084 -1.068 *** 0.092 -1.005 *** 0.118 -1.237 *** 0.170
Muslim*Male       -0.238 * 0.094    -0.154  0.097 -0.029  0.168
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.070  0.086    0.157 + 0.088 0.473 ** 0.150
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.170  0.104    -0.087  0.107 0.251  0.193
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)          -0.112  0.128 -0.116  0.126 0.039  0.180
Muslim*Period 50  (1993)          0.088  0.143 0.070  0.141 0.181  0.198
Muslim*Period 55  (1999)          0.121  0.154 0.092  0.153 0.172  0.200
Scheduled Caste*Period 43          -0.145  0.109 -0.145  0.110 -0.123  0.177
Scheduled Caste*Period 50          -0.068  0.116 -0.057  0.118 0.239  0.179
Scheduled Caste*Period 55          0.001  0.127 0.027  0.129 0.370 * 0.178
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43          0.231 + 0.129 0.227 + 0.128 0.456 * 0.229
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50          0.324 * 0.139 0.314 * 0.138 0.463 * 0.231
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55          0.097  0.149 0.081  0.150 0.456 * 0.228
Muslim*Male*Period 43                -0.249  0.233
Muslim*Male*Period 50                -0.192  0.245
Muslim*Male*Period 55                               -0.136   0.274





Table 19 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line 
Continued 
 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                -0.042  0.220
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                -0.459 * 0.227
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                -0.579 * 0.243
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                -0.328  0.269
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                -0.204  0.280
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                -0.620 * 0.293
Age 2.766 *** 0.423 2.660 *** 0.426 2.696 *** 0.424 2.584 *** 0.426 2.578 *** 0.427 2.582 *** 0.425
Age Squared -0.113 *** 0.016 -0.109 *** 0.016 -0.111 *** 0.016 -0.106 *** 0.016 -0.106 *** 0.016 -0.106 *** 0.016
Urban 0.796 *** 0.044 0.810 *** 0.046 0.887 *** 0.046 0.907 *** 0.048 0.907 *** 0.048 0.907 *** 0.047
Household Size 0.037 *** 0.008 0.038 *** 0.008 0.044 *** 0.008 0.045 *** 0.008 0.045 *** 0.008 0.045 *** 0.008
Log Monthly Expenditure 0.130 *** 0.031 0.135 *** 0.031 0.109 *** 0.029 0.113 *** 0.029 0.113 *** 0.029 0.113 *** 0.029
Madhya Pradesh 0.084 + 0.046 0.083 + 0.046 0.183 *** 0.050 0.179 *** 0.051 0.179 *** 0.051 0.179 *** 0.050
Maharashtra 0.741 *** 0.049 0.745 *** 0.049 0.774 *** 0.050 0.776 *** 0.050 0.776 *** 0.050 0.777 *** 0.050
Rajasthan -0.291 *** 0.065 -0.297 *** 0.066 -0.228 *** 0.068 -0.239 *** 0.068 -0.239 *** 0.068 -0.239 *** 0.068
New Delhi 0.789 *** 0.187 0.786 *** 0.191 0.791 *** 0.189 0.769 *** 0.192 0.791 *** 0.193 0.797 *** 0.195
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli 0.336 *** 0.066 0.342 *** 0.067 0.388 *** 0.070 0.392 *** 0.071 0.392 *** 0.071 0.394 *** 0.071
Intercept -19.26 *** 2.816 -18.79 *** 2.838 -18.38 *** 2.829 -17.86 *** 2.847 -17.82 *** 2.847 -17.78 *** 2.837
Continued on next page 
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Table 19 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line 
Continued 
 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.  SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested    mper43 = 0  musmale = 0 musper43 = 0 musmale = 0 musmaleper43 = 0 
    mper50 = 0  scmale = 0  musper50 = 0 scmale = 0  musmaleper50 = 0 
    mper55 = 0  stmale = 0  musper55 = 0 stmale = 0  musmaleper55 = 0 
          scper43 = 0     scmaleper43 = 0 
          scper50 = 0     scmaleper50 = 0 
          scper55 = 0     scmaleper55 = 0 
          stper43 = 0     stmaleper43 = 0 
          stper50 = 0     stmaleper50 = 0 
          stper55 = 0     stmaleper55 = 0 
                   
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested    3   3   9   3   9   
chi2    71.3   10.7   13.5   8.8   13.8   
Prob > chi2       0.000    0.013    0.142     0.033     0.131    











Table 20 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Independent Variables                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.211 *** 0.038 0.289 *** 0.052 0.230 *** 0.039 0.370 *** 0.063 0.368 *** 0.063 0.331 *** 0.071
Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.676 *** 0.042 0.853 *** 0.056 0.731 *** 0.043 0.999 *** 0.070 0.997 *** 0.070 1.044 *** 0.079
Historical Period 55 (1999) 0.823 *** 0.057 1.154 *** 0.067 0.899 *** 0.056 1.297 *** 0.087 1.292 *** 0.087 1.214 *** 0.099
Male 0.857 *** 0.032 1.131 *** 0.052 0.916 *** 0.043 1.158 *** 0.055 1.166 *** 0.062 1.133 *** 0.075
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)    -0.130 + 0.074    -0.123  0.076 -0.119  0.076 -0.050  0.104
Male*Historical Period 50  (1993)    -0.308 *** 0.077    -0.305 *** 0.079 -0.299 *** 0.079 -0.398 *** 0.113
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999)    -0.618 *** 0.091    -0.644 *** 0.094 -0.633 *** 0.092 -0.477 *** 0.131
Muslim       -0.441 *** 0.071 -0.605 *** 0.093 -0.359 *** 0.101 -0.447 *** 0.104
Scheduled Caste       -0.560 *** 0.059 -0.325 *** 0.076 -0.454 *** 0.084 -0.419 *** 0.095
Scheduled Tribe       -0.667 *** 0.077 -0.610 *** 0.089 -0.677 *** 0.107 -0.866 *** 0.145
Muslim*Male       -0.460 *** 0.101    -0.410 *** 0.097 -0.259  0.165
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.156 * 0.076    0.202 ** 0.076 0.152  0.139
Scheduled Tribe*Male       0.040  0.097    0.098  0.098 0.382 * 0.179
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)          -0.145  0.122 -0.154  0.120 -0.170  0.148
Muslim*Period 50  (1993)          -0.025  0.128 -0.057  0.126 -0.077  0.155
Muslim*Period 55  (1999)          -0.181  0.178 -0.229  0.173 0.047  0.195
Scheduled Caste*Period 43          -0.204 * 0.102 -0.204 * 0.104 -0.114  0.140
Scheduled Caste*Period 50          -0.300 ** 0.106 -0.286 ** 0.107 -0.498 *** 0.144
Scheduled Caste*Period 55          -0.121  0.120 -0.096  0.120 -0.078  0.161
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43          0.002  0.128 0.006  0.129 0.351 + 0.194
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50          -0.205  0.135 -0.198  0.136 -0.079  0.206
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55          0.032  0.139 0.046  0.139 0.312  0.213
Muslim*Male*Period 43                0.028  0.222
Muslim*Male*Period 50                0.063  0.229
Muslim*Male*Period 55                               -0.535 + 0.281
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Table 20 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line 
Continued 
 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                -0.152  0.194
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                0.377 + 0.201
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                -0.059  0.219
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                -0.539 * 0.250
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                -0.143  0.262
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                -0.438  0.276
Age 3.437 *** 0.387 3.460 *** 0.386 3.428 *** 0.398 3.478 *** 0.397 3.468 *** 0.397 3.470 *** 0.396
Age Squared -0.139 *** 0.014 -0.139 *** 0.014 -0.139 *** 0.015 -0.140 *** 0.015 -0.140 *** 0.015 -0.140 *** 0.015
Urban 0.782 *** 0.044 0.788 *** 0.045 0.779 *** 0.047 0.780 *** 0.048 0.782 *** 0.048 0.783 *** 0.047
Household Size 0.044 *** 0.011 0.044 *** 0.010 0.044 *** 0.010 0.045 *** 0.009 0.045 *** 0.009 0.046 *** 0.009
Log Monthly Expenditure 0.108 *** 0.027 0.111 *** 0.027 0.092 *** 0.027 0.096 *** 0.026 0.096 *** 0.027 0.097 *** 0.027
Andra Pradesh -0.205 *** 0.064 -0.211 *** 0.065 -0.217 *** 0.066 -0.220 *** 0.066 -0.222 *** 0.066 -0.222 *** 0.065
Assam 1.154 *** 0.063 1.153 *** 0.064 1.292 *** 0.066 1.286 *** 0.066 1.296 *** 0.066 1.297 *** 0.066
J&K 0.659 *** 0.097 0.660 *** 0.098 0.840 *** 0.103 0.841 *** 0.108 0.836 *** 0.107 0.838 *** 0.107
Orissa 0.176 *** 0.054 0.177 *** 0.054 0.212 *** 0.057 0.212 *** 0.056 0.213 *** 0.056 0.213 *** 0.056
West Bengal 0.418 *** 0.072 0.415 *** 0.071 0.577 *** 0.068 0.583 *** 0.064 0.585 *** 0.063 0.582 *** 0.063
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman 0.503 *** 0.056 0.505 *** 0.056 0.446 *** 0.059 0.449 *** 0.058 0.449 *** 0.058 0.448 *** 0.058
Kerele/Lakshadweep 2.059 *** 0.080 2.084 *** 0.080 2.190 *** 0.080 2.230 *** 0.082 2.213 *** 0.081 2.217 *** 0.081
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh 0.641 *** 0.082 0.642 *** 0.082 0.695 *** 0.085 0.695 *** 0.083 0.701 *** 0.084 0.699 *** 0.084
Northeast 1.444 *** 0.079 1.458 *** 0.080 1.639 *** 0.083 1.642 *** 0.083 1.653 *** 0.084 1.653 *** 0.084
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui 0.282 *** 0.063 0.284 *** 0.063 0.291 *** 0.063 0.296 *** 0.063 0.297 *** 0.063 0.298 *** 0.063
Intercept -23.46 *** 2.582 -23.80 *** 2.580 -23.08 *** 2.655 -23.63 *** 2.652 -23.57 *** 2.648 -23.57 *** 2.646
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Table 20 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line 
Continued 
 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.  SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test    mper43 = 0  musmale = 0 musper43 = 0 musmale = 0 musmaleper43 = 0 
Variables Tested    mper50 = 0  scmale = 0  musper50 = 0 scmale = 0  musmaleper50 = 0 
    mper55 = 0  stmale = 0  musper55 = 0 stmale = 0  musmaleper55 = 0 
          scper43 = 0    scmaleper43 = 0 
          scper50 = 0    scmaleper50 = 0 
          scper55 = 0    scmaleper55 = 0 
          stper43 = 0     stmaleper43 = 0 
          stper50 = 0     stmaleper50 = 0 
          stper55 = 0     stmaleper55 = 0 
                   
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested    3   3   9   3   9   
chi2    51.3   31.4   14.2   33.2   17.7   
Prob > chi2       0.000     0.000     0.115    0.000     0.038     
+p<.1 *p< .05  **p<.01  ***<.001 
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Table 21 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty Line  
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Independent Variables                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.266 *** 0.024 0.355 *** 0.033 0.286 *** 0.024 0.399 *** 0.037 0.398 *** 0.037 0.406 *** 0.040
Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.734 *** 0.027 0.897 *** 0.035 0.772 *** 0.026 0.944 *** 0.039 0.945 *** 0.039 0.928 *** 0.042
Historical Period 55 (1999) 1.073 *** 0.028 1.363 *** 0.038 1.147 *** 0.029 1.433 *** 0.044 1.434 *** 0.044 1.427 *** 0.048
Male 0.982 *** 0.019 1.266 *** 0.034 1.028 *** 0.024 1.299 *** 0.035 1.299 *** 0.037 1.290 *** 0.042
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)    -0.162 *** 0.046    -0.154 *** 0.047 -0.153 *** 0.047 -0.169 ** 0.057
Male*Historical Period 50  (1993)    -0.304 *** 0.049    -0.306 *** 0.050 -0.308 *** 0.050 -0.271 *** 0.061
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999)    -0.577 *** 0.053    -0.593 *** 0.054 -0.597 *** 0.054 -0.582 *** 0.069
Muslim       -0.838 *** 0.042 -0.875 *** 0.056 -0.797 *** 0.063 -0.760 *** 0.076
Scheduled Caste       -0.586 *** 0.039 -0.548 *** 0.054 -0.647 *** 0.062 -0.751 *** 0.080
Scheduled Tribe       -0.587 *** 0.056 -0.647 *** 0.074 -0.583 *** 0.084 -0.534 *** 0.102
Muslim*Male       -0.180 *** 0.056    -0.142 * 0.056 -0.212 * 0.102
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.089 + 0.052    0.156 ** 0.053 0.322 ** 0.106
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.156 * 0.072    -0.105  0.072 -0.188  0.135
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)          -0.149 * 0.075 -0.148 * 0.074 -0.210 * 0.101
Muslim*Period 50  (1993)          -0.021  0.083 -0.028  0.082 -0.028  0.111
Muslim*Period 55  (1999)          -0.046  0.084 -0.053  0.083 -0.119  0.114
Scheduled Caste*Period 43          -0.097  0.072 -0.092  0.073 0.002  0.105
Scheduled Caste*Period 50          -0.023  0.076 -0.008  0.077 0.125  0.108
Scheduled Caste*Period 55          0.099  0.078 0.121  0.079 0.253 * 0.109
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43          0.042  0.100 0.038  0.099 -0.151  0.140
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50          -0.053  0.123 -0.056  0.122 -0.035  0.157
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55          -0.050  0.103 -0.058  0.102 -0.096  0.142
Muslim*Male*Period 43                0.116  0.136
Muslim*Male*Period 50                -0.008  0.153
Muslim*Male*Period 55                               0.126   0.159
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Table 21 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty Line 
Continued 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                -0.144  0.141
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                -0.223  0.145
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                -0.223  0.151
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                0.333 + 0.186
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                -0.047  0.200
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                0.060  0.193
Age 2.988 *** 0.232 2.983 *** 0.232 2.943 *** 0.234 2.928 *** 0.234 2.936 *** 0.234 2.938 *** 0.234
Age Squared -0.123 *** 0.009 -0.123 *** 0.009 -0.121 *** 0.009 -0.121 *** 0.009 -0.121 *** 0.009 -0.121 *** 0.009
Urban 0.941 *** 0.030 0.947 *** 0.029 0.996 *** 0.029 1.003 *** 0.029 1.003 *** 0.029 1.003 *** 0.029
Household Size 0.056 *** 0.004 0.056 *** 0.004 0.055 *** 0.004 0.056 *** 0.004 0.056 *** 0.004 0.056 *** 0.004
Log Monthly Expenditure 0.972 *** 0.033 0.980 *** 0.033 0.885 *** 0.032 0.892 *** 0.032 0.892 *** 0.032 0.892 *** 0.032
Andra Pradesh -0.485 *** 0.043 -0.480 *** 0.043 -0.538 *** 0.042 -0.532 *** 0.042 -0.533 *** 0.042 -0.534 *** 0.042
Assam 1.077 *** 0.057 1.089 *** 0.057 1.250 *** 0.059 1.262 *** 0.060 1.261 *** 0.059 1.261 *** 0.059
Bihar 0.080 + 0.041 0.088 * 0.041 0.086 * 0.041 0.093 * 0.041 0.094 * 0.041 0.093 * 0.041
Jammu and Kashmir 0.289 *** 0.053 0.296 *** 0.053 0.701 *** 0.055 0.720 *** 0.056 0.718 *** 0.056 0.719 *** 0.056
Madhya Pradesh 0.078 * 0.039 0.086 * 0.038 0.074 + 0.039 0.082 * 0.039 0.082 * 0.039 0.081 * 0.039
Maharashtra 0.803 *** 0.044 0.811 *** 0.044 0.780 *** 0.045 0.787 *** 0.045 0.787 *** 0.045 0.788 *** 0.045
Orissa 0.277 *** 0.052 0.282 *** 0.052 0.234 *** 0.052 0.237 *** 0.052 0.238 *** 0.052 0.238 *** 0.052
Rajasthan -0.377 *** 0.039 -0.371 *** 0.039 -0.364 *** 0.039 -0.355 *** 0.039 -0.355 *** 0.039 -0.354 *** 0.039
West Bengal 0.545 *** 0.044 0.552 *** 0.044 0.708 *** 0.044 0.718 *** 0.045 0.720 *** 0.045 0.720 *** 0.045
New Delhi 0.398 * 0.180 0.392 * 0.176 0.383 * 0.170 0.378 * 0.167 0.381 * 0.166 0.379 * 0.167
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman 0.328 *** 0.048 0.336 *** 0.048 0.280 *** 0.049 0.286 *** 0.049 0.287 *** 0.049 0.287 *** 0.049
Kerele/Lakshadweep 1.916 *** 0.068 1.939 *** 0.068 2.120 *** 0.069 2.154 *** 0.070 2.151 *** 0.070 2.150 *** 0.070
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli 0.263 *** 0.048 0.267 *** 0.048 0.254 *** 0.049 0.258 *** 0.049 0.260 *** 0.049 0.261 *** 0.049
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Table 21 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty Line 
Continued 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh 0.385 *** 0.047 0.388 *** 0.046 0.401 *** 0.047 0.407 *** 0.047 0.409 *** 0.047 0.408 *** 0.047
Northeast 1.197 *** 0.054 1.207 *** 0.055 1.417 *** 0.059 1.434 *** 0.059 1.426 *** 0.059 1.427 *** 0.059
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui -0.034  0.046 -0.029  0.045 -0.058  0.046 -0.055  0.046 -0.053  0.046 -0.053  0.046
Intercept -25.01 *** 1.569 -25.18 *** 1.572 -23.944 *** 1.581 -24.04 *** 1.585 -24.09 *** 1.585 -24.10 *** 1.584
          
Wald Test    mper43 = 0  musmale = 0 musper43 = 0 musmale = 0 musmaleper43 = 0 
Variables Tested    mper50 = 0  scmale = 0  musper50 = 0 scmale = 0  musmaleper50 = 0 
    mper55 = 0  stmale = 0  musper55 = 0 stmale = 0  musmaleper55 = 0 
          scper43 = 0     scmaleper43 = 0 
          scper50 = 0     scmaleper50 = 0 
          scper55 = 0     scmaleper55 = 0 
          stper43 = 0     stmaleper43 = 0 
          stper50 = 0     stmaleper50 = 0 
          stper55 = 0     stmaleper55 = 0 
                   
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested    3   3   9   3   9   
chi2    127.3   19.9   13.4   21.0   9.47   
Prob > chi2       0.000     0.000     0.145     0.000     0.395     
+p<.1 *p< .05  **p<.01  ***<.001 
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Table 22 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Fundamentalist States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty Line 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Independent Variables                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.341 *** 0.035 0.420 *** 0.049 0.349 *** 0.035 0.447 *** 0.053 0.446 *** 0.053 0.461 *** 0.057
Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.768 *** 0.037 0.953 *** 0.051 0.810 *** 0.038 1.012 *** 0.056 1.010 *** 0.056 0.987 *** 0.060
Historical Period 55 (1999) 1.160 *** 0.042 1.487 *** 0.056 1.227 *** 0.043 1.525 *** 0.062 1.525 *** 0.062 1.499 *** 0.066
Male 1.240 *** 0.028 1.557 *** 0.049 1.304 *** 0.035 1.604 *** 0.050 1.602 *** 0.053 1.582 *** 0.058
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)    -0.137 * 0.067    -0.124 + 0.068 -0.121 + 0.068 -0.151 + 0.081
Male*Historical Period 50  (1993)    -0.334 *** 0.071    -0.335 *** 0.073 -0.330 *** 0.073 -0.282 *** 0.087
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999)    -0.653 *** 0.076    -0.674 *** 0.077 -0.673 *** 0.077 -0.617 *** 0.097
Muslim       -1.046 *** 0.070 -1.068 *** 0.090 -0.993 *** 0.103 -0.968 *** 0.122
Scheduled Caste       -0.659 *** 0.060 -0.604 *** 0.080 -0.763 *** 0.098 -0.886 *** 0.145
Scheduled Tribe       -0.432 *** 0.075 -0.616 *** 0.104 -0.464 *** 0.118 -0.478 ** 0.153
Muslim*Male       -0.176 + 0.091    -0.123  0.091 -0.163  0.163
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.154 + 0.080    0.240 ** 0.082 0.426 * 0.174
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.295 ** 0.098    -0.236 * 0.099 -0.211  0.186
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)          -0.150  0.125 -0.148  0.124 -0.205  0.178
Muslim*Period 50  (1993)          -0.153  0.130 -0.164  0.129 -0.105  0.174
Muslim*Period 55  (1999)          0.003  0.132 -0.011  0.130 -0.087  0.179
Scheduled Caste*Period 43          -0.095  0.109 -0.094  0.111 -0.094  0.188
Scheduled Caste*Period 50          -0.056  0.114 -0.033  0.117 0.034  0.186
Scheduled Caste*Period 55          0.188  0.116 0.229 + 0.120 0.477 ** 0.182
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43          -0.002  0.145 -0.014  0.141 -0.163  0.212
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50          0.055  0.148 0.041  0.144 0.188  0.211
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55          0.033  0.144 0.006  0.142 0.031  0.204
Muslim*Male*Period 43                0.099  0.231
Muslim*Male*Period 50                -0.125  0.239
Muslim*Male*Period 55                               0.139   0.247
Continued on next page 
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Table 22 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Fundamentalist States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty 
Line Continued 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                0.010  0.228
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                -0.093  0.236
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                -0.446 + 0.235
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                0.257  0.266
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                -0.258  0.267
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                -0.053  0.265
Age 3.322 *** 0.338 3.321 *** 0.339 3.271 *** 0.343 3.258 *** 0.344 3.278 *** 0.344 3.281 *** 0.344
Age Squared -0.136 *** 0.013 -0.136 *** 0.013 -0.134 *** 0.013 -0.134 *** 0.013 -0.135 *** 0.013 -0.135 *** 0.013
Urban 1.059 *** 0.049 1.070 *** 0.048 1.190 *** 0.047 1.202 *** 0.047 1.203 *** 0.047 1.204 *** 0.047
Household Size 0.060 *** 0.006 0.061 *** 0.006 0.059 *** 0.006 0.059 *** 0.006 0.059 *** 0.006 0.059 *** 0.006
Log Monthly Expenditure 0.928 *** 0.049 0.941 *** 0.049 0.820 *** 0.048 0.834 *** 0.048 0.832 *** 0.048 0.831 *** 0.048
Madhya Pradesh 0.072 + 0.040 0.082 * 0.040 0.032  0.041 0.040  0.041 0.039  0.041 0.040  0.041
Maharashtra 0.830 *** 0.046 0.842 *** 0.046 0.785 *** 0.047 0.794 *** 0.047 0.794 *** 0.047 0.796 *** 0.047
Rajasthan -0.381 *** 0.041 -0.375 *** 0.041 -0.391 *** 0.042 -0.383 *** 0.042 -0.383 *** 0.042 -0.381 *** 0.042
New Delhi 0.408 * 0.193 0.403 * 0.187 0.363 + 0.186 0.353 + 0.182 0.359 * 0.182 0.357 + 0.183
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli 0.280 *** 0.050 0.286 *** 0.050 0.240 *** 0.052 0.243 *** 0.052 0.245 *** 0.052 0.246 *** 0.052
Intercept -27.07 *** 2.270 -27.32 *** 2.277 -25.78 *** 2.303 -25.96 *** 2.311 -26.07 *** 2.312 -26.08 *** 2.312
Continued on Next Page 
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Table 22 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Fundamentalist States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty 
Line Continued 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.   SE Coef.  SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested    mper43 = 0  musmale = 0 musper43 = 0 musmale = 0  musmaleper43 = 0 
    mper50 = 0  scmale = 0  musper50 = 0 scmale = 0  musmaleper50 = 0 
    mper55 = 0  stmale = 0  musper55 = 0 stmale = 0  musmaleper55 = 0 
          scper43 = 0    scmaleper43 = 0 
          scper50 = 0    scmaleper50 = 0 
          scper55 = 0    scmaleper55 = 0 
          stper43 = 0     stmaleper43 = 0 
          stper50 = 0     stmaleper50 = 0 
          stper55 = 0     stmaleper55 = 0 
                   
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested    3   3   9   3   9   
chi2    82.3   18.5   9.4   18.9   10.8   
Prob > chi2       0.000    0.000    0.403    0.000     0.287    
+p<.1 *p< .05  **p<.01  ***<.001 
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Table 23 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty Line 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Independent Variables                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.198 *** 0.033 0.301 *** 0.045 0.227 *** 0.033 0.348 *** 0.052 0.348 *** 0.052 0.360 *** 0.057
Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.709 *** 0.038 0.865 *** 0.049 0.749 *** 0.037 0.898 *** 0.055 0.903 *** 0.055 0.890 *** 0.060
Historical Period 55 (1999) 1.004 *** 0.039 1.281 *** 0.053 1.086 *** 0.039 1.378 *** 0.062 1.385 *** 0.063 1.399 *** 0.070
Male 0.756 *** 0.025 1.031 *** 0.048 0.771 *** 0.032 1.053 *** 0.049 1.038 *** 0.052 1.044 *** 0.061
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)    -0.193 ** 0.063    -0.184 ** 0.064 -0.186 ** 0.064 -0.209 ** 0.080
Male*Historical Period 50  (1993)    -0.297 *** 0.069    -0.297 *** 0.069 -0.308 *** 0.069 -0.281 *** 0.085
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999)    -0.548 *** 0.074    -0.564 *** 0.075 -0.578 *** 0.075 -0.608 *** 0.099
Muslim       -0.737 *** 0.054 -0.775 *** 0.072 -0.744 *** 0.080 -0.706 *** 0.097
Scheduled Caste       -0.573 *** 0.050 -0.516 *** 0.075 -0.623 *** 0.083 -0.688 *** 0.097
Scheduled Tribe       -0.736 *** 0.085 -0.694 *** 0.107 -0.676 *** 0.119 -0.535 *** 0.141
Muslim*Male       -0.097  0.072    -0.061  0.073 -0.136  0.130
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.113  0.069    0.179 * 0.070 0.285 * 0.140
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.074  0.105    -0.031  0.103 -0.287  0.202
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)          -0.120  0.095 -0.118  0.094 -0.205  0.125
Muslim*Period 50  (1993)          0.162  0.109 0.160  0.109 0.154  0.148
Muslim*Period 55  (1999)          -0.040  0.110 -0.041  0.109 -0.089  0.152
Scheduled Caste*Period 43          -0.077  0.097 -0.070  0.098 0.040  0.129
Scheduled Caste*Period 50          0.003  0.102 0.019  0.103 0.146  0.134
Scheduled Caste*Period 55          0.037  0.105 0.056  0.106 0.078  0.140
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43          0.097  0.140 0.097  0.139 -0.184  0.188
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50          -0.174  0.192 -0.173  0.191 -0.295  0.226
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55          -0.170  0.147 -0.172  0.147 -0.303  0.202
Muslim*Male*Period 43                0.167  0.172
Muslim*Male*Period 50                0.008  0.203
Muslim*Male*Period 55                               0.094   0.210
Continued on next page 
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Table 23 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the 
Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                -0.182  0.186
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                -0.228  0.189
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                -0.015  0.202
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                0.515 + 0.266
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                0.217  0.300
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                0.239  0.284
Age 2.749 *** 0.320 2.742 *** 0.320 2.716 *** 0.321 2.703 *** 0.321 2.705 *** 0.321 2.708 *** 0.321
Age Squared -0.113 *** 0.012 -0.113 *** 0.012 -0.112 *** 0.012 -0.112 *** 0.012 -0.112 *** 0.012 -0.112 *** 0.012
Urban 0.841 *** 0.035 0.845 *** 0.036 0.849 *** 0.035 0.853 *** 0.036 0.853 *** 0.036 0.853 *** 0.036
Household Size 0.054 *** 0.006 0.054 *** 0.006 0.055 *** 0.006 0.055 *** 0.006 0.055 *** 0.006 0.055 *** 0.006
Log Monthly Expenditure 1.017 *** 0.044 1.022 *** 0.044 0.950 *** 0.043 0.955 *** 0.043 0.955 *** 0.043 0.955 *** 0.043
Andra Pradesh -0.569 *** 0.049 -0.573 *** 0.049 -0.614 *** 0.048 -0.613 *** 0.047 -0.615 *** 0.047 -0.616 *** 0.047
Assam 0.960 *** 0.061 0.962 *** 0.061 1.119 *** 0.064 1.118 *** 0.064 1.117 *** 0.064 1.117 *** 0.064
J&K 0.177 ** 0.058 0.175 ** 0.058 0.506 *** 0.061 0.533 *** 0.063 0.531 *** 0.063 0.532 *** 0.063
Orissa 0.175 ** 0.056 0.171 ** 0.056 0.149 ** 0.056 0.149 ** 0.056 0.147 ** 0.056 0.148 ** 0.056
West Bengal 0.435 *** 0.050 0.433 *** 0.050 0.571 *** 0.050 0.573 *** 0.050 0.572 *** 0.050 0.572 *** 0.050
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman 0.221 *** 0.053 0.220 *** 0.053 0.175 *** 0.054 0.175 *** 0.054 0.175 *** 0.054 0.175 *** 0.054
Kerele/Lakshadweep 1.766 *** 0.072 1.775 *** 0.072 1.919 *** 0.073 1.939 *** 0.074 1.937 *** 0.073 1.936 *** 0.074
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh 0.271 *** 0.052 0.265 *** 0.052 0.284 *** 0.053 0.284 *** 0.053 0.284 *** 0.053 0.284 *** 0.053
Northeast 1.069 *** 0.059 1.069 *** 0.059 1.354 *** 0.069 1.354 *** 0.068 1.350 *** 0.068 1.350 *** 0.068
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui -0.132 * 0.051 -0.135 ** 0.051 -0.157 ** 0.051 -0.157 ** 0.051 -0.157 ** 0.051 -0.156 ** 0.051
Intercept -23.52 *** 2.176 -23.64 *** 2.179 -22.67 *** 2.180 -22.76 *** 2.181 -22.77 *** 2.180 -22.78 *** 2.180
Continued on next page 
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Table 23 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the 
Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test    mper43 = 0  musmale = 0 musper43 = 0 musmale = 0  musmaleper43 = 0 
Variables Tested    mper50 = 0  scmale = 0  musper50 = 0 scmale = 0  musmaleper50 = 0 
    mper55 = 0  stmale = 0  musper55 = 0 stmale = 0  musmaleper55 = 0 
          scper43 = 0     scmaleper43 = 0 
          scper50 = 0     scmaleper50 = 0 
          scper55 = 0     scmaleper55 = 0 
          stper43 = 0     stmaleper43 = 0 
          stper50 = 0     stmaleper50 = 0 
          stper55 = 0     stmaleper55 = 0 
                   
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested    3   3   9   3   9   
chi2    57.3   6.1   14.6   8.8   7.8   
Prob > chi2       0.000     0.106    0.1029    0.0324    0.56     
+p<.1 *p< .05  **p<.01  ***<.001 
 
 183



































All States         
1983 0.5149 0.2691 0.2458 0.5226 0.7311 0.4330 0.2981 0.5923 
1987 0.5443 0.3105 0.2338 0.5705 0.7789 0.5277 0.2512 0.6775 
1993 0.6471 0.4666 0.1805 0.7211 0.8320 0.6528 0.1792 0.7846 
1999 0.6664 0.5666 0.0998 0.8502 0.8553 0.7440 0.1113 0.8699 
         
Fundamentalist         
1983 0.4600 0.1761 0.2839 0.3828 0.7254 0.3656 0.3598 0.5040 
1987 0.4835 0.2161 0.2674 0.4469 0.7763 0.4604 0.3159 0.5931 
1993 0.5712 0.3365 0.2347 0.5891 0.8250 0.5822 0.2428 0.7057 
1999 0.6594 0.4598 0.1996 0.6973 0.8536 0.7015 0.1521 0.8218 
         
Non-Fundamentalist         
1983 0.5507 0.3367 0.2140 0.6114 0.7292 0.4810 0.2482 0.6596 
1987 0.5834 0.3747 0.2087 0.6423 0.7722 0.5741 0.1981 0.7435 
1993 0.6979 0.5683 0.1296 0.8143 0.8310 0.7018 0.1292 0.8445 
1999 0.6702 0.6356 0.0346 0.9484 0.8496 0.7715 0.0781 0.9081 
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Table 25 Educational Enrollment Predicted Probabilities for Children ages 12-15 


































Below Poverty Line         
All States         
1983 0.3899 0.1785 0.2114 0.4578 0.6033 0.2996 0.3037 0.4966 
1987 0.4061 0.2081 0.1980 0.5124 0.6590 0.6590 0.0000 1.0000 
1993 0.5250 0.3514 0.1736 0.6693 0.7267 0.5094 0.2173 0.7010 
1999 0.5026 0.4537 0.0489 0.9027 0.7617 0.6001 0.1616 0.7878 
Fundamentalist         
1983 0.3722 0.1260 0.2462 0.3385 0.6338 0.2903 0.3435 0.4580 
1987 0.3642 0.1575 0.2067 0.4325 0.6735 0.3376 0.3359 0.5013 
1993 0.4776 0.2594 0.2182 0.5431 0.7296 0.4532 0.2764 0.6212 
1999 0.5595 0.3876 0.1719 0.6928 0.7816 0.6019 0.1797 0.7701 
Non-Fundamentalist         
1983 0.4026 0.2194 0.1832 0.5450 0.5771 0.3053 0.2718 0.5290 
1987 0.4361 0.2481 0.1880 0.5689 0.6436 0.3795 0.2641 0.5897 
1993 0.5589 0.4250 0.1339 0.7604 0.7226 0.5554 0.1672 0.7686 
1999 0.4636 0.4979 -0.0343 1.0740 0.7404 0.5966 0.1438 0.8058 
Above Poverty Line         
All States         
1983 0.5968 0.3349 0.2619 0.5612 0.7963 0.5183 0.2780 0.6509 
1987 0.6307 0.3799 0.2508 0.6023 0.8321 0.6176 0.2145 0.7422 
1993 0.7337 0.5531 0.1806 0.7539 0.8829 0.7313 0.1516 0.8283 
1999 0.7763 0.6506 0.1257 0.8381 0.9010 0.8176 0.0834 0.9074 
Fundamentalist         
1983 0.5345 0.2174 0.3171 0.4067 0.7805 0.4224 0.3581 0.5412 
1987 0.5848 0.2641 0.3207 0.4516 0.8290 0.5369 0.2921 0.6476 
1993 0.6487 0.4017 0.2470 0.6192 0.8781 0.6625 0.2156 0.7545 
1999 0.7451 0.5327 0.2124 0.7149 0.8958 0.7661 0.1297 0.8552 
Non-Fundamentalist         
1983 0.6339 0.4111 0.2228 0.6485 0.8007 0.5856 0.2151 0.7314 
1987 0.6597 0.4491 0.2106 0.6808 0.8236 0.6695 0.1541 0.8129 
1993 0.7892 0.6647 0.1245 0.8422 0.8807 0.7749 0.1058 0.8799 
1999 0.7935 0.7214 0.0721 0.9091 0.8986 0.8514 0.0472 0.9475 
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Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.031 * 0.012 0.002  0.014 0.068 *** 0.020 0.028  0.017 -0.027 * 0.013 0.003  0.014
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.084 *** 0.013 0.035 * 0.015 -0.127 *** 0.021 0.034 + 0.018 -0.056 *** 0.013 0.055 *** 0.015
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.182 *** 0.014 -0.089 *** 0.016 -0.236 *** 0.022 -0.131 *** 0.019 -0.131 *** 0.015 -0.051 ** 0.017
Male -0.200 *** 0.008 -5.082 *** 0.020 -0.207 *** 0.015 -5.136 *** 0.038 -0.213 *** 0.011 -5.120 *** 0.025
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)       -0.140 *** 0.020 0.156 *** 0.043       
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)       0.061 ** 0.021 -0.146 *** 0.046       
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999)       0.076 *** 0.023 0.169 *** 0.049       
Muslim             -0.139 *** 0.034 0.543 *** 0.027
Scheduled Caste             -1.247 *** 0.021 -0.928 *** 0.017
Scheduled Tribe             -0.381 *** 0.023 -1.020 *** 0.023
Muslim*Male             0.078 * 0.036 -0.699 *** 0.053
Scheduled Caste*Male             0.128 *** 0.021 0.442 *** 0.043
Scheduled Tribe*Male             -0.052 * 0.021 0.793 *** 0.061
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)                   
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)                   
Muslim*Period 55  (1999)                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 43                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 50                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 55                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55                   
Muslim*Male*Period 43                   
Muslim*Male*Period 50                                     
Continued on next page 
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Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 55                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                   
Age -0.009 + 0.005 -0.220 *** 0.006 -0.009 + 0.005 -0.220 *** 0.006 -0.018 *** 0.005 -0.230 *** 0.006
Age Squared 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.613 *** 0.013 0.671 *** 0.015 -0.612 *** 0.013 0.672 *** 0.015 -0.676 *** 0.014 0.554 *** 0.015
Household Size 0.195 *** 0.003 0.241 *** 0.004 0.195 *** 0.003 0.241 *** 0.004 0.186 *** 0.004 0.235 *** 0.004
Primary School 0.543 *** 0.012 0.921 *** 0.016 0.545 *** 0.012 0.921 *** 0.016 0.432 *** 0.012 0.791 *** 0.016
Middle School 0.444 *** 0.013 1.099 *** 0.018 0.442 *** 0.013 1.099 *** 0.018 0.259 *** 0.013 0.945 *** 0.019
College -0.369 *** 0.026 0.193 *** 0.041 -0.372 *** 0.026 0.196 *** 0.041 -0.621 *** 0.027 -0.003  0.043
Never Married 0.144 *** 0.021 0.785 *** 0.044 0.142 *** 0.021 0.786 *** 0.044 0.108 *** 0.021 0.772 *** 0.043
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.212 *** 0.017 -0.750 *** 0.020 -0.214 *** 0.017 -0.751 *** 0.020 -0.218 *** 0.017 -0.771 *** 0.021
Number of Kids in Household -0.105 *** 0.005 -0.160 *** 0.006 -0.105 *** 0.005 -0.160 *** 0.006 -0.096 *** 0.005 -0.164 *** 0.006
Andra Pradesh -0.778 *** 0.022 -1.883 *** 0.026 -0.778 *** 0.022 -1.883 *** 0.026 -0.890 *** 0.022 -1.926 *** 0.026
Assam -0.724 *** 0.027 0.107 *** 0.033 -0.725 *** 0.027 0.105 ** 0.033 -0.833 *** 0.028 0.064 + 0.035
Bihar -0.735 *** 0.021 -0.234 *** 0.023 -0.735 *** 0.021 -0.234 *** 0.023 -0.795 *** 0.021 -0.233 *** 0.024
Jammu and Kashmir -0.238 *** 0.035 0.557 *** 0.038 -0.237 *** 0.035 0.547 *** 0.038 -0.370 *** 0.036 0.310 *** 0.042
Madhya Pradesh -0.530 *** 0.022 -1.557 *** 0.026 -0.531 *** 0.022 -1.557 *** 0.025 -0.553 *** 0.023 -1.370 *** 0.026
Maharashtra -1.021 *** 0.022 -2.115 *** 0.025 -1.021 *** 0.022 -2.115 *** 0.025 -1.134 *** 0.022 -2.123 *** 0.026
Orissa -0.887 *** 0.026 -0.799 *** 0.028 -0.888 *** 0.026 -0.799 *** 0.028 -0.893 *** 0.028 -0.596 *** 0.029
Rajasthan 0.157 *** 0.024 -0.789 *** 0.028 0.157 *** 0.024 -0.790 *** 0.028 0.152 *** 0.025 -0.681 *** 0.029
Continued on next page 
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Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
West Bengal -0.957 *** 0.023 -0.185 *** 0.026 -0.958 *** 0.023 -0.184 *** 0.026 -0.890 *** 0.024 -0.121 *** 0.026
New Delhi -0.863 *** 0.073 -0.737 *** 0.082 -0.862 *** 0.073 -0.734 *** 0.082 -0.874 *** 0.076 -0.679 *** 0.078
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman -1.193 *** 0.023 -1.912 *** 0.026 -1.194 *** 0.023 -1.913 *** 0.026 -1.237 *** 0.023 -1.908 *** 0.026
Kerele/Lakshadweep -1.785 *** 0.029 -1.333 *** 0.034 -1.785 *** 0.029 -1.332 *** 0.034 -1.877 *** 0.030 -1.462 *** 0.034
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli -0.901 *** 0.027 -1.381 *** 0.030 -0.902 *** 0.027 -1.382 *** 0.030 -0.987 *** 0.028 -1.310 *** 0.031
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh -0.639 *** 0.028 -0.288 *** 0.033 -0.640 *** 0.028 -0.288 *** 0.033 -0.501 *** 0.028 -0.128 *** 0.033
Northeast -0.204 *** 0.031 -0.758 *** 0.030 -0.204 *** 0.030 -0.759 *** 0.030 -0.187 *** 0.033 -0.394 *** 0.032
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui -0.875 *** 0.025 -1.589 *** 0.028 -0.875 *** 0.025 -1.590 *** 0.028 -0.968 *** 0.025 -1.616 *** 0.029
Intercept -0.132   0.091 4.805 *** 0.111 -0.124   0.092 4.813 *** 0.112 0.482 *** 0.094 5.347 *** 0.114
Continued on next page 
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Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested       [2]mper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    
       [3]mper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    
       [2]mper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0    
       [3]mper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0    
       [2]mper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0    
       [3]mper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0    
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested       6      6      
chi2       272.2      659.5      
Prob > chi2             0.000           0.000           




Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Continued 
  Model 4           Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Other   Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.058 * 0.023 0.001  0.021 0.060 ** 0.023 0.003  0.022 0.020  0.026 -0.032  0.024
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.090 *** 0.023 0.013  0.022 -0.088 *** 0.023 0.015  0.022 -0.115 *** 0.027 -0.016  0.024
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.175 *** 0.026 -0.107 *** 0.025 -0.172 *** 0.026 -0.104 *** 0.025 -0.224 *** 0.030 -0.147 *** 0.028
Male -0.190 *** 0.015 -5.167 *** 0.039 -0.215 *** 0.017 -5.166 *** 0.040 -0.259 *** 0.020 -5.277 *** 0.047
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.143 *** 0.020 0.174 *** 0.045 -0.146 *** 0.021 0.162 *** 0.044 -0.090 *** 0.027 0.286 *** 0.054
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.057 ** 0.021 -0.133 ** 0.047 0.055 ** 0.021 -0.151 *** 0.046 0.092 *** 0.028 -0.001  0.057
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999) 0.079 *** 0.024 0.169 *** 0.051 0.075 ** 0.024 0.146 ** 0.050 0.147 *** 0.032 0.288 *** 0.065
Muslim -0.151 *** 0.029 0.404 *** 0.033 -0.213 *** 0.041 0.508 *** 0.040 -0.327 *** 0.057 0.436 *** 0.045
Scheduled Caste -1.184 *** 0.025 -0.936 *** 0.032 -1.269 *** 0.030 -0.999 *** 0.032 -1.312 *** 0.039 -1.058 *** 0.034
Scheduled Tribe -0.290 *** 0.033 -1.034 *** 0.042 -0.258 *** 0.035 -1.057 *** 0.041 -0.350 *** 0.040 -1.132 *** 0.043
Muslim*Male       0.078 * 0.036 -0.704 *** 0.053 0.223 *** 0.060 -0.546 *** 0.107
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.127 *** 0.021 0.440 *** 0.043 0.187 *** 0.039 0.819 *** 0.094
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.056 ** 0.021 0.778 *** 0.062 0.085 + 0.043 1.124 *** 0.159
Muslim*Period 43 (1987) 0.092 * 0.040 -0.026  0.045 0.096 * 0.040 -0.010  0.049 0.138 + 0.081 0.054  0.064
Muslim*Period 50 (1993) 0.147 *** 0.041 0.114 * 0.047 0.146 *** 0.041 0.117 * 0.052 0.206 * 0.086 0.157 * 0.067
Muslim*Period 55  (1999) 0.046  0.046 0.009  0.052 0.045  0.046 0.029  0.058 0.342 *** 0.096 0.182 * 0.075
Scheduled Caste*Period 43 0.114 *** 0.034 0.074 + 0.041 0.114 *** 0.034 0.065  0.040 0.225 *** 0.053 0.138 ** 0.045
Scheduled Caste*Period 50 -0.014  0.035 0.110 ** 0.041 -0.016  0.035 0.108 ** 0.040 -0.021  0.056 0.168 *** 0.045
Scheduled Caste*Period 55 0.005  0.038 0.103 * 0.043 0.004  0.038 0.096 * 0.042 0.057  0.058 0.181 *** 0.048
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43 -0.113 ** 0.042 0.156 ** 0.053 -0.113 ** 0.043 0.135 ** 0.052 -0.021  0.056 0.216 *** 0.057
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50 -0.181 *** 0.045 0.120 * 0.056 -0.180 *** 0.045 0.115 * 0.055 -0.055  0.058 0.226 *** 0.060
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55 -0.152 ** 0.049 -0.049  0.059 -0.152 ** 0.049 -0.060  0.058 -0.026  0.062 0.029  0.063
Muslim*Male*Period 43             -0.058  0.084 -0.310 * 0.142
Muslim*Male*Period 50                         -0.078   0.090 -0.121   0.144




Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Continued 
  Model 4           Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 55             -0.370 *** 0.102 -0.182  0.153
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43             -0.163 ** 0.054 -0.299 * 0.117
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50             0.005  0.057 -0.521 *** 0.125
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55             -0.076  0.060 -0.559 *** 0.130
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43             -0.139 * 0.059 -0.400 * 0.185
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50             -0.195 *** 0.059 -0.635 ** 0.204
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55             -0.193 ** 0.061 -0.310  0.195
Age -0.018 *** 0.005 -0.229 *** 0.006 -0.018 *** 0.005 -0.230 *** 0.006 -0.018 *** 0.005 -0.230 *** 0.006
Age Squared 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.674 *** 0.014 0.551 *** 0.015 -0.675 *** 0.014 0.555 *** 0.015 -0.675 *** 0.014 0.555 *** 0.015
Household Size 0.186 *** 0.004 0.234 *** 0.004 0.186 *** 0.004 0.235 *** 0.004 0.186 *** 0.004 0.235 *** 0.004
Primary School 0.435 *** 0.012 0.796 *** 0.016 0.434 *** 0.012 0.792 *** 0.016 0.434 *** 0.012 0.792 *** 0.016
Middle School 0.256 *** 0.013 0.947 *** 0.019 0.256 *** 0.013 0.946 *** 0.019 0.257 *** 0.013 0.947 *** 0.019
College -0.630 *** 0.027 0.001  0.043 -0.626 *** 0.027 0.001  0.043 -0.626 *** 0.027 0.001  0.043
Never Married 0.107 *** 0.021 0.769 *** 0.044 0.107 *** 0.021 0.774 *** 0.043 0.106 *** 0.021 0.775 *** 0.043
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.219 *** 0.017 -0.767 *** 0.020 -0.220 *** 0.017 -0.772 *** 0.021 -0.220 *** 0.017 -0.772 *** 0.021
Number of Kids in Household -0.097 *** 0.005 -0.164 *** 0.006 -0.096 *** 0.005 -0.164 *** 0.006 -0.096 *** 0.005 -0.164 *** 0.006
Andra Pradesh -0.890 *** 0.022 -1.926 *** 0.026 -0.889 *** 0.022 -1.926 *** 0.026 -0.888 *** 0.022 -1.926 *** 0.026
Assam -0.837 *** 0.029 0.058 + 0.035 -0.835 *** 0.028 0.065 + 0.035 -0.835 *** 0.028 0.064 + 0.035
Bihar -0.797 *** 0.021 -0.236 *** 0.023 -0.795 *** 0.021 -0.234 *** 0.024 -0.795 *** 0.021 -0.234 *** 0.024
Jammu and Kashmir -0.353 *** 0.037 0.249 *** 0.039 -0.354 *** 0.037 0.313 *** 0.042 -0.354 *** 0.037 0.313 *** 0.042
Madhya Pradesh -0.555 *** 0.023 -1.379 *** 0.026 -0.554 *** 0.023 -1.371 *** 0.026 -0.554 *** 0.023 -1.371 *** 0.026
Maharashtra -1.135 *** 0.022 -2.121 *** 0.025 -1.134 *** 0.022 -2.123 *** 0.026 -1.134 *** 0.022 -2.123 *** 0.026
Orissa -0.896 *** 0.028 -0.599 *** 0.029 -0.893 *** 0.028 -0.596 *** 0.029 -0.893 *** 0.028 -0.596 *** 0.029




Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Continued 
  Model 4           Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Other   Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Rajasthan 0.151 *** 0.025 -0.684 *** 0.029 0.152 *** 0.025 -0.682 *** 0.029 0.152 *** 0.025 -0.681 *** 0.029
West Bengal -0.888 *** 0.024 -0.123 *** 0.026 -0.890 *** 0.024 -0.120 *** 0.026 -0.889 *** 0.024 -0.120 *** 0.026
New Delhi -0.874 *** 0.076 -0.673 *** 0.078 -0.873 *** 0.076 -0.675 *** 0.078 -0.873 *** 0.076 -0.676 *** 0.078
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman -1.239 *** 0.023 -1.912 *** 0.026 -1.236 *** 0.023 -1.909 *** 0.026 -1.236 *** 0.023 -1.910 *** 0.026
Kerele/Lakshadweep -1.879 *** 0.030 -1.455 *** 0.034 -1.876 *** 0.030 -1.461 *** 0.034 -1.877 *** 0.030 -1.461 *** 0.034
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli -0.990 *** 0.028 -1.314 *** 0.031 -0.988 *** 0.028 -1.310 *** 0.031 -0.988 *** 0.028 -1.311 *** 0.031
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh -0.500 *** 0.028 -0.120 *** 0.034 -0.501 *** 0.028 -0.129 *** 0.033 -0.501 *** 0.028 -0.128 *** 0.033
Northeast -0.188 *** 0.033 -0.391 *** 0.033 -0.184 *** 0.033 -0.394 *** 0.033 -0.183 *** 0.033 -0.393 *** 0.033
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui -0.969 *** 0.025 -1.616 *** 0.029 -0.967 *** 0.025 -1.616 *** 0.029 -0.967 *** 0.025 -1.616 *** 0.029
Intercept 0.474 *** 0.094 5.349 *** 0.114 0.484 *** 0.094 5.370 *** 0.115 0.518 *** 0.095 5.401 *** 0.115
Continued on next page 
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Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Continued 
  Model 4           Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Other   Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.  SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested [2]musper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    [2]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [3]musper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    [3]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [2]musper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0    [2]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [3]musper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0    [3]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [2]musper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0    [2]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [3]musper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0    [3]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [2]scper43 = 0          [2]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]scper43 = 0          [3]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]scper50 = 0          [2]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]scper50 = 0          [3]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]scper55 = 0          [2]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]scper55 = 0          [3]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [2]stper43 = 0          [2]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]stper43 = 0          [3]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]stper50 = 0          [2]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]stper50 = 0          [3]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]stper55 = 0          [2]stmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]stper55 = 0          [3]stmaleper55 = 0    
Number of Variables Tested 18      6      18      
chi2 114.6      651.3      76.5      
Prob > chi2 0.000           0.000          0.000           
+p<.1 *p< .05  **p<.01  ***<.001 
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Table 27 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States 
  Model 1         Model 2           Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.123 *** 0.018 -0.082 *** 0.022 -0.016  0.028 -0.046 + 0.026 -0.116 *** 0.019 -0.079 *** 0.022
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.163 *** 0.019 0.091 *** 0.023 -0.194 *** 0.030 0.108 *** 0.027 -0.147 *** 0.020 0.101 *** 0.023
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.283 *** 0.022 -0.084 *** 0.026 -0.340 *** 0.032 -0.133 *** 0.031 -0.234 *** 0.023 -0.042  0.026
Male -0.253 *** 0.013 -5.172 *** 0.034 -0.253 *** 0.021 -5.210 *** 0.064 -0.260 *** 0.018 -5.235 *** 0.042
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)       -0.157 *** 0.028 0.227 ** 0.073       
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)       0.044  0.030 -0.330 *** 0.078       
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999)       0.084 * 0.035 0.210 * 0.086       
Muslim             -0.188 *** 0.052 0.454 *** 0.046
Scheduled Caste             -1.229 *** 0.031 -1.014 *** 0.028
Scheduled Tribe             -0.593 *** 0.033 -1.077 *** 0.035
Muslim*Male             0.128 * 0.055 -0.541 *** 0.093
Scheduled Caste*Male             0.109 *** 0.031 0.483 *** 0.071
Scheduled Tribe*Male             -0.045  0.031 1.129 *** 0.109
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)                   
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)                   
Muslim*Period 55  (1999)                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 43                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 50                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 55                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55                   
Muslim*Male*Period 43                   
Muslim*Male*Period 50                                     
Continued on next page 
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Table 27 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2           Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 55                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                   
Age -0.026 *** 0.007 -0.224 *** 0.009 -0.026 *** 0.007 -0.224 *** 0.009 -0.036 *** 0.008 -0.236 *** 0.010
Age Squared 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.694 *** 0.021 0.880 *** 0.026 -0.693 *** 0.021 0.881 *** 0.026 -0.756 *** 0.023 0.753 *** 0.027
Household Size 0.211 *** 0.006 0.247 *** 0.006 0.211 *** 0.006 0.247 *** 0.006 0.200 *** 0.006 0.238 *** 0.006
Primary School 0.378 *** 0.019 0.809 *** 0.027 0.379 *** 0.019 0.809 *** 0.027 0.249 *** 0.020 0.664 *** 0.028
Middle School 0.237 *** 0.021 0.962 *** 0.031 0.233 *** 0.021 0.962 *** 0.031 0.032  0.022 0.783 *** 0.033
College -0.520 *** 0.042 -0.023  0.063 -0.524 *** 0.042 -0.019  0.064 -0.798 *** 0.043 -0.247 *** 0.068
Never Married 0.164 *** 0.037 0.917 *** 0.085 0.163 *** 0.037 0.918 *** 0.085 0.103 ** 0.037 0.884 *** 0.084
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.168 *** 0.025 -0.618 *** 0.033 -0.169 *** 0.025 -0.619 *** 0.033 -0.169 *** 0.026 -0.637 *** 0.033
Number of Kids in Household -0.122 *** 0.008 -0.175 *** 0.009 -0.122 *** 0.008 -0.174 *** 0.009 -0.112 *** 0.008 -0.175 *** 0.009
Madhya Pradesh -0.542 *** 0.022 -1.600 *** 0.027 -0.542 *** 0.022 -1.601 *** 0.027 -0.507 *** 0.024 -1.407 *** 0.028
Maharashtra -0.995 *** 0.022 -2.173 *** 0.027 -0.995 *** 0.022 -2.173 *** 0.027 -1.083 *** 0.024 -2.180 *** 0.029
Rajasthan 0.147 *** 0.024 -0.816 *** 0.029 0.146 *** 0.024 -0.818 *** 0.029 0.171 *** 0.026 -0.706 *** 0.030
New Delhi -0.750 *** 0.075 -0.833 *** 0.089 -0.748 *** 0.075 -0.827 *** 0.090 -0.756 *** 0.079 -0.766 *** 0.084
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli -0.883 *** 0.028 -1.420 *** 0.031 -0.883 *** 0.028 -1.421 *** 0.031 -0.931 *** 0.029 -1.348 *** 0.033
Intercept 0.332 * 0.141 5.001 *** 0.180 0.337 * 0.142 5.005 *** 0.180 1.004 *** 0.144 5.635 *** 0.182
Continued on next page 
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Table 27 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2           Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.  SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.  SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested       [2]mper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    
       [3]mper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    
       [2]mper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0    
       [3]mper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0    
       [2]mper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0    
       [3]mper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0    
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested       6      6      
chi2       196.7      261.2      
Prob > chi2            0.000           0.000          
Continued on next page 
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Table 27 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.003  0.033 -0.053  0.032 0.005  0.033 -0.048  0.033 -0.083 * 0.039 -0.118 *** 0.036
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.152 *** 0.034 0.074 * 0.033 -0.151 *** 0.034 0.075 * 0.033 -0.225 *** 0.040 0.012  0.036
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.246 *** 0.039 -0.082 * 0.041 -0.245 *** 0.039 -0.079 + 0.041 -0.335 *** 0.047 -0.152 *** 0.047
Male -0.225 *** 0.022 -5.218 *** 0.065 -0.249 *** 0.024 -5.258 *** 0.065 -0.342 *** 0.028 -5.410 *** 0.075
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.171 *** 0.029 0.233 ** 0.075 -0.175 *** 0.029 0.210 ** 0.073 -0.052  0.039 0.376 *** 0.089
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.039  0.031 -0.313 *** 0.080 0.038  0.031 -0.322 *** 0.077 0.140 *** 0.040 -0.127  0.094
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999) 0.072 * 0.036 0.192 * 0.089 0.070 + 0.037 0.170 + 0.087 0.196 *** 0.053 0.365 *** 0.112
Muslim -0.234 *** 0.047 0.262 *** 0.058 -0.331 *** 0.064 0.300 *** 0.067 -0.505 *** 0.086 0.181 * 0.071
Scheduled Caste -1.161 *** 0.036 -1.040 *** 0.042 -1.238 *** 0.042 -1.106 *** 0.043 -1.351 *** 0.053 -1.201 *** 0.046
Scheduled Tribe -0.401 *** 0.049 -0.956 *** 0.064 -0.376 *** 0.050 -0.984 *** 0.062 -0.541 *** 0.053 -1.113 *** 0.061
Muslim*Male       0.127 * 0.055 -0.538 *** 0.093 0.354 *** 0.089 -0.313  0.213
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.114 *** 0.031 0.482 *** 0.071 0.277 *** 0.053 0.905 *** 0.134
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.051 + 0.031 1.107 *** 0.110 0.207 *** 0.065 1.591 *** 0.288
Muslim*Period 43 (1987) 0.203 ** 0.065 0.125 + 0.076 0.207 *** 0.065 0.143 + 0.081 0.459 *** 0.124 0.362 *** 0.105
Muslim*Period 50 (1993) 0.230 *** 0.067 0.229 ** 0.082 0.228 *** 0.067 0.234 ** 0.087 0.253 + 0.136 0.254 * 0.112
Muslim*Period 55  (1999) 0.122  0.076 0.176 * 0.087 0.120  0.076 0.204 * 0.094 0.486 *** 0.146 0.419 *** 0.126
Scheduled Caste*Period 43 0.076  0.051 0.047  0.058 0.076  0.051 0.040  0.057 0.270 *** 0.075 0.155 * 0.066
Scheduled Caste*Period 50 -0.029  0.053 0.176 ** 0.061 -0.033  0.053 0.175 ** 0.059 0.121  0.081 0.298 *** 0.068
Scheduled Caste*Period 55 -0.016  0.057 0.125 + 0.064 -0.017  0.057 0.118 + 0.063 0.073  0.085 0.234 *** 0.073
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43 -0.222 *** 0.062 0.032  0.080 -0.223 *** 0.062 0.005  0.078 -0.050  0.075 0.146 + 0.081
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50 -0.272 *** 0.065 0.012  0.082 -0.271 *** 0.065 0.014  0.080 -0.080  0.079 0.176 * 0.083
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55 -0.296 *** 0.072 -0.265 ** 0.092 -0.297 *** 0.072 -0.278 ** 0.089 -0.054  0.088 -0.111  0.097
Muslim*Male*Period 43             -0.325 * 0.128 -0.603 * 0.259
Muslim*Male*Period 50                         -0.047   0.141 -0.080   0.269
Continued on next page 
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Table 27 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 55             -0.467 ** 0.155 -0.243  0.285
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43            -0.286 *** 0.075 -0.236  0.175
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50            -0.220 ** 0.082 -0.572 ** 0.196
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55            -0.129  0.088 -0.692 *** 0.203
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43            -0.266 ** 0.084 -0.545 + 0.324
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50            -0.298 *** 0.085 -0.890 * 0.363
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55            -0.384 *** 0.091 -0.484  0.352
Age -0.037 *** 0.008 -0.235 *** 0.010 -0.037 *** 0.008 -0.236 *** 0.010 -0.037 *** 0.008 -0.236 *** 0.010
Age Squared 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.750 *** 0.023 0.742 *** 0.027 -0.754 *** 0.024 0.755 *** 0.028 -0.754 *** 0.024 0.755 *** 0.028
Household Size 0.201 *** 0.006 0.236 *** 0.006 0.200 *** 0.006 0.237 *** 0.006 0.201 *** 0.006 0.237 *** 0.006
Primary School 0.252 *** 0.020 0.670 *** 0.028 0.251 *** 0.020 0.665 *** 0.028 0.251 *** 0.020 0.666 *** 0.028
Middle School 0.026  0.022 0.783 *** 0.033 0.026  0.022 0.784 *** 0.033 0.027  0.022 0.786 *** 0.033
College -0.810 *** 0.043 -0.239 *** 0.068 -0.806 *** 0.043 -0.242 *** 0.069 -0.806 *** 0.043 -0.241 *** 0.069
Never Married 0.103 ** 0.037 0.857 *** 0.084 0.102 ** 0.037 0.885 *** 0.084 0.102 ** 0.037 0.887 *** 0.084
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.170 *** 0.026 -0.634 *** 0.033 -0.171 *** 0.026 -0.639 *** 0.033 -0.171 *** 0.026 -0.639 *** 0.033
Number of Kids in Household -0.113 *** 0.008 -0.173 *** 0.009 -0.113 *** 0.008 -0.174 *** 0.009 -0.113 *** 0.008 -0.175 *** 0.009
Madhya Pradesh -0.513 *** 0.024 -1.412 *** 0.028 -0.510 *** 0.024 -1.411 *** 0.028 -0.510 *** 0.024 -1.411 *** 0.028
Maharashtra -1.084 *** 0.024 -2.173 *** 0.028 -1.083 *** 0.024 -2.180 *** 0.029 -1.083 *** 0.024 -2.180 *** 0.029
Rajasthan 0.169 *** 0.026 -0.704 *** 0.030 0.172 *** 0.026 -0.707 *** 0.030 0.172 *** 0.026 -0.706 *** 0.030
New Delhi -0.758 *** 0.079 -0.755 *** 0.084 -0.756 *** 0.079 -0.761 *** 0.084 -0.755 *** 0.079 -0.762 *** 0.084
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli -0.935 *** 0.029 -1.347 *** 0.033 -0.932 *** 0.029 -1.349 *** 0.033 -0.932 *** 0.029 -1.350 *** 0.033
Intercept 0.976 *** 0.145 5.614 *** 0.182 0.984 *** 0.145 5.639 *** 0.183 1.053 *** 0.145 5.698 *** 0.183
Continued on next page 
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Table 27 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested [2]musper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    [2]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [3]musper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    [3]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [2]musper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0    [2]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [3]musper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0    [3]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [2]musper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0    [2]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [3]musper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0    [3]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [2]scper43 = 0          [2]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]scper43 = 0          [3]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]scper50 = 0          [2]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]scper50 = 0          [3]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]scper55 = 0          [2]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]scper55 = 0          [3]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [2]stper43 = 0          [2]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]stper43 = 0          [3]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]stper50 = 0          [2]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]stper50 = 0          [3]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]stper55 = 0          [2]stmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]stper55 = 0          [3]stmaleper55 = 0    
                   
Number of Variables Tested 18      6      18      
chi2 88.6      256.0      70.5      
Prob > chi2 0.000           0.000           0.000           
+p<.1 *p< .05  **p<.01  ***<.001 
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Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States  
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.037 * 0.016 0.060 ** 0.019 0.131 *** 0.028 0.079 *** 0.023 0.038 * 0.017 0.059 ** 0.019
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.012  0.017 -0.014  0.019 -0.041  0.029 -0.021  0.024 0.023  0.017 0.011  0.020
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.087 *** 0.019 -0.103 *** 0.021 -0.129 *** 0.031 -0.138 *** 0.025 -0.034 + 0.019 -0.067 ** 0.021
Male -0.139 *** 0.011 -5.029 *** 0.025 -0.139 *** 0.021 -5.099 *** 0.048 -0.161 *** 0.015 -5.051 *** 0.030
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)       -0.128 *** 0.028 0.115 * 0.054       
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)       0.040  0.029 -0.022  0.057       
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999)      0.059 + 0.031 0.149 * 0.058       
Muslim             -0.081 + 0.046 0.591 *** 0.033
Scheduled Caste             -1.283 *** 0.029 -0.873 *** 0.021
Scheduled Tribe             -0.162 *** 0.033 -0.969 *** 0.032
Muslim*Male             0.037  0.049 -0.828 *** 0.063
Scheduled Caste*Male             0.171 *** 0.029 0.401 *** 0.054
Scheduled Tribe*Male             -0.054 + 0.030 0.632 *** 0.070
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)                   
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)                   
Muslim*Period 55  (1999)                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 43                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 50                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 55                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55                   
Muslim*Male*Period 43                                     
Continued on next page 
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Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 50                   
Muslim*Male*Period 55                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                  
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                  
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                  
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                  
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                  
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                  
Age 0.002  0.006 -0.221 *** 0.007 0.002  0.006 -0.221 *** 0.007 -0.005  0.006 -0.229 *** 0.008
Age Squared 0.000 * 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.511 *** 0.015 0.490 *** 0.017 -0.510 *** 0.015 0.491 *** 0.017 -0.590 *** 0.015 0.388 *** 0.017
Household Size 0.181 *** 0.004 0.238 *** 0.005 0.181 *** 0.004 0.238 *** 0.005 0.173 *** 0.004 0.234 *** 0.005
Primary School 0.676 *** 0.015 0.988 *** 0.019 0.677 *** 0.015 0.989 *** 0.019 0.576 *** 0.015 0.868 *** 0.019
Middle School 0.612 *** 0.016 1.195 *** 0.023 0.612 *** 0.016 1.195 *** 0.023 0.441 *** 0.017 1.054 *** 0.023
College -0.214 *** 0.031 0.356 *** 0.053 -0.216 *** 0.031 0.358 *** 0.053 -0.443 *** 0.032 0.174 *** 0.053
Never Married 0.107 *** 0.025 0.733 *** 0.050 0.106 *** 0.025 0.734 *** 0.050 0.084 *** 0.026 0.728 *** 0.050
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.210 *** 0.023 -0.823 *** 0.025 -0.212 *** 0.023 -0.825 *** 0.025 -0.226 *** 0.024 -0.847 *** 0.026
Number of Kids in Household -0.091 *** 0.006 -0.149 *** 0.007 -0.091 *** 0.006 -0.149 *** 0.007 -0.082 *** 0.007 -0.157 *** 0.007
Andra Pradesh -0.039 + 0.022 -1.605 *** 0.026 -0.039 + 0.022 -1.605 *** 0.026 -0.078 *** 0.022 -1.649 *** 0.026
Assam -0.031  0.027 0.331 *** 0.033 -0.032  0.027 0.329 *** 0.033 -0.098 *** 0.028 0.291 *** 0.035
Jammu and Kashmir 0.475 *** 0.036 0.784 *** 0.038 0.476 *** 0.036 0.780 *** 0.038 0.414 *** 0.037 0.543 *** 0.043
Orissa -0.163 *** 0.026 -0.555 *** 0.028 -0.164 *** 0.026 -0.555 *** 0.028 -0.142 *** 0.027 -0.361 *** 0.028
West Bengal -0.264 *** 0.023 0.060 * 0.026 -0.264 *** 0.023 0.061 * 0.026 -0.133 *** 0.024 0.115 *** 0.027
Continued on next page 
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Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman -0.493 *** 0.023 -1.627 *** 0.026 -0.493 *** 0.023 -1.627 *** 0.026 -0.454 *** 0.023 -1.627 *** 0.026
Kerele/Lakshadweep -1.111 *** 0.030 -1.108 *** 0.034 -1.111 *** 0.030 -1.108 *** 0.034 -1.133 *** 0.030 -1.243 *** 0.035
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh 0.060 * 0.028 -0.049  0.033 0.060 * 0.028 -0.049  0.033 0.279 *** 0.028 0.101 ** 0.033
Northeast 0.480 *** 0.031 -0.531 *** 0.030 0.480 *** 0.031 -0.531 *** 0.030 0.469 *** 0.033 -0.177 *** 0.033
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui -0.152 *** 0.025 -1.319 *** 0.028 -0.152 *** 0.025 -1.319 *** 0.028 -0.177 *** 0.025 -1.349 *** 0.029
Intercept -1.195 *** 0.118 4.501 *** 0.140 -1.193 *** 0.120 4.510 *** 0.141 -0.707 *** 0.122 4.990 *** 0.144
Continued on next page 
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Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.  SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested       [2]mper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    
       [3]mper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    
       [2]mper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0    
       [3]mper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0    
       [2]mper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0    
       [3]mper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0    
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested       6      6      
chi2       83.0      456.4      
Prob > chi2            0.000           0.000           
Continued on next page 
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Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.094 ** 0.031 0.037  0.029 0.095 ** 0.031 0.037  0.029 0.087 * 0.036 0.020  0.031
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.012  0.032 -0.034  0.029 -0.010  0.032 -0.030  0.030 -0.012  0.037 -0.050  0.032
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.095 ** 0.035 -0.135 *** 0.032 -0.092 ** 0.035 -0.131 *** 0.032 -0.127 ** 0.041 -0.162 *** 0.035
Male -0.131 *** 0.022 -5.146 *** 0.050 -0.161 *** 0.023 -5.118 *** 0.050 -0.178 *** 0.028 -5.210 *** 0.060
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.122 *** 0.029 0.141 * 0.056 -0.124 *** 0.029 0.136 * 0.055 -0.113 ** 0.037 0.237 *** 0.058
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.038  0.029 -0.016  0.059 0.035  0.029 -0.036  0.057 0.037  0.038 0.096  0.047
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999) 0.069 * 0.031 0.160 ** 0.061 0.064 * 0.032 0.141 * 0.059 0.113 ** 0.041 0.255 *** 0.058
Muslim -0.072 + 0.038 0.469 *** 0.040 -0.108 + 0.055 0.625 *** 0.050 -0.202 ** 0.078 0.572 *** 0.068
Scheduled Caste -1.208 *** 0.036 -0.873 *** 0.044 -1.323 *** 0.042 -0.936 *** 0.044 -1.315 *** 0.056 -0.980 *** 0.071
Scheduled Tribe -0.222 *** 0.042 -1.136 *** 0.052 -0.186 *** 0.048 -1.156 *** 0.053 -0.220 *** 0.060 -1.196 *** 0.075
Muslim*Male       0.039  0.049 -0.832 *** 0.063 0.155 + 0.081 -0.710 *** 0.081
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.166 *** 0.029 0.398 *** 0.054 0.157 ** 0.059 0.755 *** 0.085
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.058 + 0.030 0.618 *** 0.070 -0.007  0.056 0.876 *** 0.092
Muslim*Period 43 (1987) 0.025  0.050 -0.116 * 0.055 0.028  0.050 -0.105 + 0.062 -0.041  0.109 -0.110  0.060
Muslim*Period 50 (1993) 0.086  0.052 0.055  0.057 0.087 + 0.052 0.054  0.064 0.185  0.113 0.116  0.059
Muslim*Period 55  (1999) -0.013  0.058 -0.083  0.065 -0.013  0.058 -0.075  0.073 0.274 * 0.130 0.056  0.062
Scheduled Caste*Period 43 0.146 ** 0.047 0.100 + 0.056 0.146 ** 0.047 0.088  0.054 0.177 * 0.075 0.138 * 0.079
Scheduled Caste*Period 50 0.015  0.048 0.069  0.055 0.013  0.048 0.066  0.054 -0.100  0.079 0.106 + 0.085
Scheduled Caste*Period 55 0.031  0.051 0.096 + 0.058 0.030  0.051 0.088  0.056 0.071  0.082 0.162 ** 0.081
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43 0.068  0.057 0.315 *** 0.069 0.070  0.057 0.298 *** 0.067 0.107  0.084 0.350 *** 0.115
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50 -0.043  0.061 0.234 ** 0.076 -0.042  0.061 0.228 ** 0.074 0.034  0.087 0.305 *** 0.124
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55 0.073  0.062 0.208 ** 0.072 0.074  0.061 0.198 ** 0.071 0.097  0.088 0.230 ** 0.152
Muslim*Male*Period 43                         0.082   0.114 -0.146   0.166
Continued on next page 
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Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 50             -0.118  0.117 -0.171  0.166
Muslim*Male*Period 55             -0.348 * 0.139 -0.148  0.174
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43            -0.047  0.079 -0.335 * 0.152
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50            0.151 + 0.080 -0.510 *** 0.160
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55            -0.061  0.083 -0.482 ** 0.164
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43            -0.057  0.081 -0.336 + 0.198
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50            -0.117  0.082 -0.448 * 0.220
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55            -0.031  0.082 -0.202  0.196
Age -0.006  0.006 -0.228 *** 0.007 -0.005  0.006 -0.229 *** 0.008 -0.005  0.006 -0.229 *** 0.008
Age Squared 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.590 *** 0.015 0.390 *** 0.017 -0.590 *** 0.015 0.387 *** 0.017 -0.590 *** 0.015 0.388 *** 0.017
Household Size 0.174 *** 0.004 0.234 *** 0.005 0.173 *** 0.004 0.234 *** 0.005 0.173 *** 0.004 0.234 *** 0.005
Primary School 0.580 *** 0.015 0.873 *** 0.019 0.578 *** 0.015 0.869 *** 0.019 0.578 *** 0.015 0.869 *** 0.019
Middle School 0.439 *** 0.017 1.056 *** 0.023 0.440 *** 0.017 1.055 *** 0.023 0.440 *** 0.017 1.056 *** 0.023
College -0.449 *** 0.032 0.175 *** 0.053 -0.445 *** 0.032 0.178 *** 0.053 -0.445 *** 0.032 0.177 *** 0.053
Never Married 0.083 *** 0.026 0.731 *** 0.050 0.083 *** 0.026 0.729 *** 0.050 0.083 *** 0.026 0.729 *** 0.050
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.226 *** 0.024 -0.842 *** 0.026 -0.228 *** 0.024 -0.849 *** 0.026 -0.228 *** 0.024 -0.849 *** 0.026
Number of Kids in Household -0.083 *** 0.007 -0.157 *** 0.007 -0.082 *** 0.007 -0.157 *** 0.007 -0.082 *** 0.007 -0.157 *** 0.007
Andra Pradesh -0.077 *** 0.022 -1.650 *** 0.026 -0.078 *** 0.022 -1.649 *** 0.026 -0.077 *** 0.022 -1.649 *** 0.026
Assam -0.100 *** 0.028 0.281 *** 0.035 -0.099 *** 0.028 0.292 *** 0.035 -0.099 *** 0.028 0.292 *** 0.035
Jammu and Kashmir 0.428 *** 0.038 0.490 *** 0.041 0.426 *** 0.038 0.552 *** 0.044 0.426 *** 0.038 0.551 *** 0.044
Orissa -0.142 *** 0.027 -0.365 *** 0.029 -0.142 *** 0.027 -0.360 *** 0.028 -0.142 *** 0.027 -0.360 *** 0.028
West Bengal -0.130 *** 0.024 0.117 *** 0.026 -0.132 *** 0.024 0.117 *** 0.027 -0.132 *** 0.024 0.118 *** 0.027
Continued on next page 
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Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman -0.455 *** 0.023 -1.633 *** 0.026 -0.454 *** 0.023 -1.628 *** 0.026 -0.454 *** 0.023 -1.628 *** 0.026
Kerele/Lakshadweep -1.136 *** 0.030 -1.232 *** 0.035 -1.134 *** 0.030 -1.242 *** 0.035 -1.134 *** 0.030 -1.242 *** 0.035
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh 0.282 *** 0.028 0.110 *** 0.033 0.279 *** 0.028 0.100 ** 0.033 0.279 *** 0.028 0.100 ** 0.033
Northeast 0.466 *** 0.033 -0.187 *** 0.033 0.466 *** 0.033 -0.181 *** 0.033 0.467 *** 0.033 -0.181 *** 0.033
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui -0.176 *** 0.025 -1.349 *** 0.028 -0.176 *** 0.025 -1.349 *** 0.029 -0.176 *** 0.025 -1.349 *** 0.029
Intercept -0.711 *** 0.123 5.001 *** 0.145 -0.694 *** 0.123 5.023 *** 0.146 -0.679 *** 0.124 5.042 *** 0.146
Continued on next page 
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Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested [2]musper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    [2]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [3]musper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    [3]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [2]musper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0    [2]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [3]musper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0    [3]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [2]musper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0    [2]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [3]musper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0    [3]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [2]scper43 = 0          [2]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]scper43 = 0          [3]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]scper50 = 0          [2]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]scper50 = 0          [3]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]scper55 = 0          [2]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]scper55 = 0          [3]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [2]stper43 = 0          [2]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]stper43 = 0          [3]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]stper50 = 0          [2]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]stper50 = 0          [3]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]stper55 = 0          [2]stmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]stper55 = 0          [3]stmaleper55 = 0    
                   
Number of Variables Tested 18      6      18      
chi2 61.8      451.0      41.6      
Prob > chi2 0.000           0.000           0.001           




Table 29 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployment/Out of the Labor 
Force Over Time in All, Fundamentalist, and Non-Fundamentalist States 
 
  1983 1987 1993 1999 
All States     
Wage Employment 0.3774 0.3824 0.3887 0.4143 
Self-Employment 0.4429 0.4351 0.4196 0.4052 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor 
Force 0.1797 0.1825 0.1918 0.1805 
     
Fundamentalist States     
Wage Employment 0.3356 0.3615 0.3591 0.3904 
Self-Employment 0.5243 0.4994 0.4766 0.4597 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor 
Force 0.1401 0.1391 0.1643 0.1499 
     
Non-Fundamentalist States     
Wage Employment 0.4035 0.3928 0.4065 0.4260 
Self-Employment 0.3894 0.3933 0.3877 0.3768 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor 




Table 30 Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self Employment, 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force by Gender 
 
  Male  Female Gender Difference Gender Ratio 
All States     
Wage Employment     
1983 0.4764 0.1153 0.3611 0.2420 
1987 0.4920 0.1118 0.3802 0.2272 
1993 0.4934 0.1145 0.3789 0.2321 
1999 0.5144 0.1313 0.3831 0.2552 
Self-Employment     
1983 0.5057 0.1505 0.3552 0.2976 
1987 0.4859 0.1561 0.3298 0.3213 
1993 0.4901 0.1316 0.3585 0.2685 
1999 0.4656 0.1354 0.3302 0.2908 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force     
1983 0.0178 0.7342 -0.7164 41.2472 
1987 0.0221 0.7321 -0.7100 33.1267 
1993 0.0165 0.7540 -0.7375 45.6970 
1999 0.0200 0.7333 -0.7133 36.6650 
Fundamentalist States     
Wage Employment     
1983 0.4147 0.1163 0.2984 0.2804 
1987 0.4548 0.1203 0.3345 0.2645 
1993 0.4519 0.1118 0.3401 0.2474 
1999 0.4759 0.1358 0.3401 0.2854 
Self-Employment     
1983 0.5721 0.2066 0.3655 0.3611 
1987 0.5278 0.2103 0.3175 0.3984 
1993 0.5366 0.1635 0.3731 0.3047 
1999 0.5078 0.1717 0.3361 0.3381 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force     
1983 0.0132 0.6772 -0.6640 51.3030 
1987 0.0173 0.6694 -0.6521 38.6936 
1993 0.0115 0.7247 -0.7132 63.0174 
1999 0.0163 0.6925 -0.6762 42.4847 




Table 30 Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self Employment, 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force by Gender Continued 
 
  Male  Female Gender Difference Gender Ratio 
Non-Fundamentalist States     
Wage Employment     
1983 0.5150 0.1147 0.4003 0.2227 
1987 0.5120 0.1062 0.4058 0.2074 
1993 0.5157 0.1171 0.3986 0.2271 
1999 0.5315 0.1292 0.4023 0.2431 
Self-Employment     
1983 0.4640 0.1187 0.3453 0.2558 
1987 0.4626 0.1253 0.3373 0.2709 
1993 0.4641 0.1164 0.3477 0.2508 
1999 0.4466 0.1176 0.3290 0.2633 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force     
1983 0.0210 0.7666 -0.7456 36.5048 
1987 0.0254 0.7684 -0.7430 30.2520 
1993 0.0201 0.7665 -0.7464 38.1343 




Table 31 Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self Employment, 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force by Religion 







All States     
Wage Employment 0.3342 0.3127 0.0215 0.9357 
Self-Employment 0.4723 0.4091 0.0632 0.8662 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor 
Force 0.1935 0.2782 -0.0847 1.4377 
     
Fundamentalist States     
Wage Employment 0.3004 0.2915 0.0089 0.9704 
Self-Employment 0.5429 0.4813 0.0616 0.8865 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor 
Force 0.1567 0.2272 -0.0705 1.4499 
     
Non-Fundamentalist States     
Wage Employment 0.3569 0.3254 0.0315 0.9117 
Self-Employment 0.4251 0.3692 0.0559 0.8685 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor 




Table 32 Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self Employment, 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force by Religion Over Time 
  Hindu Muslim Difference Ratio 
All States     
Wage Employment     
1983 0.3255 0.3165 0.0090 0.9724 
1987 0.3163 0.2991 0.0172 0.9456 
1993 0.3387 0.2982 0.0405 0.8804 
1999 0.3604 0.3421 0.0183 0.9492 
Self-Employment     
1983 0.4819 0.4029 0.0790 0.8361 
1987 0.4963 0.4424 0.0539 0.8914 
1993 0.4583 0.4019 0.0564 0.8769 
1999 0.4481 0.3829 0.0652 0.8545 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force     
1983 0.1926 0.2806 -0.0880 1.4569 
1987 0.1874 0.2585 -0.0711 1.3794 
1993 0.2030 0.3000 -0.0970 1.4778 
1999 0.1915 0.2750 -0.0835 1.4360 
Fundamentalist States     
Wage Employment     
1983 0.2848 0.3072 -0.0224 1.0787 
1987 0.2867 0.2729 0.0138 0.9519 
1993 0.3057 0.2758 0.0299 0.9022 
1999 0.3293 0.3185 0.0108 0.9672 
Self-Employment     
1983 0.5643 0.4814 0.0829 0.8531 
1987 0.5694 0.5253 0.0441 0.9226 
1993 0.5200 0.4673 0.0527 0.8987 
1999 0.5101 0.4408 0.0693 0.8641 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force     
1983 0.1508 0.2114 -0.0606 1.4019 
1987 0.1440 0.2019 -0.0579 1.4021 
1993 0.1744 0.2570 -0.0826 1.4736 
1999 0.1606 0.2407 -0.0801 1.4988 




Table 32 Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self Employment, 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force by Religion Over Time  Continued 
 
  Hindu Muslim Difference Ratio 
Non-Fundamentalist States     
Wage Employment     
1983 0.3547 0.3212 0.0335 0.9056 
1987 0.3378 0.3148 0.0230 0.9319 
1993 0.3592 0.3106 0.0486 0.8647 
1999 0.3799 0.3567 0.0232 0.9389 
Self-Employment     
1983 0.4224 0.3560 0.0664 0.8428 
1987 0.4419 0.3930 0.0489 0.8893 
1993 0.4226 0.3706 0.0520 0.8770 
1999 0.4114 0.3549 0.0565 0.8627 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force     
1983 0.2229 0.3228 -0.0999 1.4482 
1987 0.2203 0.2922 -0.0719 1.3264 
1993 0.2182 0.3188 -0.1006 1.4610 




Table 33 Religious Differences in Employment Predicted Probabilities 25-55 for 
Individuals Below  the Poverty Line 
 
  Hindu Muslim Religious Diff. Religious Ratio 
All States     
Wage Employment     
1983 0.3715 0.3855 -0.0140 1.0377 
1987 0.3574 0.3541 0.0033 0.9908 
1993 0.4015 0.3545 0.0470 0.8829 
1999 0.4407 0.3841 0.0566 0.8716 
Self-Employment     
1983 0.4511 0.3476 0.1035 0.7706 
1987 0.4728 0.4175 0.0553 0.8830 
1993 0.4144 0.3712 0.0432 0.8958 
1999 0.3917 0.3670 0.0247 0.9369 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force     
1983 0.1775 0.2669 -0.0894 1.5037 
1987 0.1698 0.2284 -0.0586 1.3451 
1993 0.1842 0.2743 -0.0901 1.4891 
1999 0.1676 0.2488 -0.0812 1.4845 
Fundamentalist States     
Wage Employment     
1983 0.3178 0.3576 -0.0398 1.1252 
1987 0.3139 0.3033 0.0106 0.9662 
1993 0.3476 0.3228 0.0248 0.9287 
1999 0.4220 0.3569 0.0651 0.8457 
Self-Employment     
1983 0.5377 0.4300 0.1077 0.7997 
1987 0.5527 0.5090 0.0437 0.9209 
1993 0.4908 0.4483 0.0425 0.9134 
1999 0.4377 0.4106 0.0271 0.9381 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force     
1983 0.1444 0.2124 -0.0680 1.4709 
1987 0.1334 0.1877 -0.0543 1.4070 
1993 0.1615 0.2289 -0.0674 1.4173 
1999 0.1403 0.2325 -0.0922 1.6572 
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Table 33 Religious Differences in Employment Predicted Probabilities 25-55 for 
Individuals Below  the Poverty Line Continued 
 
  Hindu Muslim Religious Diff. Religious Ratio 
Non-Fundamentalist States     
Wage Employment     
1983 0.4107 0.4040 0.0067 0.9837 
1987 0.3912 0.3894 0.0018 0.9954 
1993 0.4411 0.3745 0.0666 0.8490 
1999 0.4469 0.4014 0.0455 0.8982 
Self-Employment     
1983 0.3860 0.2954 0.0906 0.7653 
1987 0.4078 0.3571 0.0507 0.8757 
1993 0.3581 0.3245 0.0336 0.9062 
1999 0.3668 0.3517 0.0151 0.9588 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force     
1983 0.2033 0.3007 -0.0974 1.4791 
1987 0.2010 0.2535 -0.0525 1.2612 
1993 0.2007 0.3010 -0.1003 1.4998 




Table 34 Religious Differences in Employment Predicted Probabilities 25-55 for 
Individuals Above the Poverty Line 
 
  Hindu Muslim Religious Diff. Religious Ratio
All States     
Wage Employment     
1983 0.2910 0.2641 0.0269 0.9076 
1987 0.2885 0.2696 0.0189 0.9345 
1993 0.3134 0.2688 0.0446 0.8577 
1999 0.3353 0.3275 0.0078 0.9767 
Self-Employment     
1983 0.5079 0.4473 0.0606 0.8807 
1987 0.5173 0.4553 0.0620 0.8801 
1993 0.4777 0.4176 0.0601 0.8742 
1999 0.4670 0.3862 0.0808 0.8270 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force     
1983 0.2011 0.2886 -0.0875 1.4351 
1987 0.1943 0.2751 -0.0808 1.4159 
1993 0.2090 0.3136 -0.1046 1.5005 
1999 0.1977 0.2864 -0.0887 1.4487 
Fundamentalist States     
Wage Employment     
1983 0.2532 0.2713 -0.0181 1.0715 
1987 0.2665 0.2584 0.0081 0.9696 
1993 0.2838 0.2542 0.0296 0.8957 
1999 0.2959 0.3044 -0.0085 1.0287 
Self-Employment     
1983 0.5910 0.5179 0.0731 0.8763 
1987 0.5856 0.5325 0.0531 0.9093 
1993 0.5369 0.4677 0.0692 0.8711 
1999 0.5383 0.4533 0.0850 0.8421 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force     
1983 0.1557 0.2107 -0.0550 1.3532 
1987 0.1479 0.2091 -0.0612 1.4138 
1993 0.1793 0.2781 -0.0988 1.5510 
1999 0.1657 0.2423 -0.0766 1.4623 
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Table 34 Religious Differences in Employment Predicted Probabilities 25-55 for 
Individuals Above the Poverty Line Continued 
 
  Hindu Muslim Religious Diff. Religious Ratio
Non-Fundamentalist States     
Wage Employment     
1983 0.3184 0.2606 0.0578 0.8185 
1987 0.3040 0.2748 0.0292 0.9039 
1993 0.3303 0.2772 0.0531 0.8392 
1999 0.3615 0.3411 0.0204 0.9436 
Self-Employment     
1983 0.4486 0.4036 0.0450 0.8997 
1987 0.4680 0.4108 0.0572 0.8778 
1993 0.4473 0.3984 0.0489 0.8907 
1999 0.4245 0.3513 0.0732 0.8276 
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force     
1983 0.2330 0.3359 -0.1029 1.4416 
1987 0.2280 0.3144 -0.0864 1.3789 
1993 0.2224 0.3244 -0.1020 1.4586 




Table 35 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Below 
The Poverty Line 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.072 *** 0.020 -0.012  0.022 0.090 ** 0.029 0.031  0.025 -0.070 *** 0.020 -0.012  0.023
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.193 *** 0.021 -0.036  0.023 -0.188 *** 0.032 -0.012  0.026 -0.164 *** 0.022 -0.022  0.024
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.337 *** 0.025 -0.195 *** 0.026 -0.310 *** 0.035 -0.187 *** 0.028 -0.289 *** 0.026 -0.163 *** 0.027
Male -0.151 *** 0.013 -4.734 *** 0.034 -0.079 *** 0.022 -4.740 *** 0.061 -0.132 *** 0.018 -4.717 *** 0.046
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)       -0.239 *** 0.030 0.175 * 0.072       
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)       -0.009  0.032 -0.204 ** 0.076       
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999)       -0.040  0.037 0.031  0.095       
Muslim             0.062  0.053 0.659 *** 0.039
Scheduled Caste             -1.069 *** 0.031 -0.741 *** 0.024
Scheduled Tribe             -0.091 ** 0.032 -0.790 *** 0.031
Muslim*Male             -0.179 *** 0.056 -0.938 *** 0.089
Scheduled Caste*Male             0.022  0.032 0.286 *** 0.070
Scheduled Tribe*Male             -0.051 + 0.030 0.642 *** 0.098
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)                   
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)                   
Muslim*Period 55  (1999)                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 43                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 50                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 55                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55                   
Muslim*Male*Period 43                                     
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Table 35 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Below 
The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 50                   
Muslim*Male*Period 55                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                   
Age -0.020 ** 0.008 -0.228 *** 0.009 -0.020 ** 0.008 -0.227 *** 0.009 -0.025 ** 0.008 -0.235 *** 0.010
Age Squared 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.169 *** 0.023 1.023 *** 0.022 -0.167 *** 0.023 1.020 *** 0.022 -0.218 *** 0.026 0.867 *** 0.023
Household Size 0.183 *** 0.006 0.222 *** 0.006 0.183 *** 0.006 0.222 *** 0.006 0.174 *** 0.006 0.216 *** 0.006
Primary School 0.420 *** 0.019 0.645 *** 0.027 0.420 *** 0.019 0.645 *** 0.026 0.350 *** 0.019 0.550 *** 0.027
Middle School 0.572 *** 0.024 1.053 *** 0.043 0.569 *** 0.024 1.054 *** 0.043 0.471 *** 0.025 0.973 *** 0.043
College 0.201 ** 0.073 1.385 *** 0.118 0.197 ** 0.073 1.393 *** 0.119 0.063  0.074 1.291 *** 0.121
Never Married 0.030  0.041 0.666 *** 0.079 0.029  0.041 0.668 *** 0.080 -0.016  0.042 0.651 *** 0.080
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.196 *** 0.028 -0.738 *** 0.033 -0.197 *** 0.028 -0.738 *** 0.033 -0.205 *** 0.029 -0.771 *** 0.034
Number of Kids in Household -0.052 *** 0.008 -0.103 *** 0.009 -0.052 *** 0.008 -0.103 *** 0.009 -0.049 *** 0.009 -0.118 *** 0.009
Andra Pradesh -0.945 *** 0.040 -1.985 *** 0.044 -0.947 *** 0.040 -1.981 *** 0.044 -1.085 *** 0.041 -2.013 *** 0.044
Assam -0.691 *** 0.046 0.308 *** 0.053 -0.692 *** 0.046 0.310 *** 0.053 -0.922 *** 0.048 0.167 ** 0.056
Bihar -0.799 *** 0.031 -0.157 *** 0.031 -0.798 *** 0.031 -0.156 *** 0.031 -0.917 *** 0.032 -0.183 *** 0.032
Jammu and Kashmir -0.050  0.080 0.811 *** 0.076 -0.048  0.080 0.802 *** 0.076 -0.163 * 0.081 0.642 *** 0.080
Madhya Pradesh -0.581 *** 0.033 -1.634 *** 0.036 -0.581 *** 0.033 -1.632 *** 0.036 -0.728 *** 0.037 -1.466 *** 0.038
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Table 35 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Below 
The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Maharashtra -1.135 *** 0.036 -2.184 *** 0.038 -1.135 *** 0.036 -2.182 *** 0.037 -1.323 *** 0.038 -2.206 *** 0.038
Orissa -0.714 *** 0.039 -0.698 *** 0.039 -0.714 *** 0.039 -0.698 *** 0.039 -0.853 *** 0.043 -0.525 *** 0.040
Rajasthan 0.086 * 0.043 -0.872 *** 0.049 0.085 * 0.043 -0.869 *** 0.049 0.033  0.045 -0.741 *** 0.050
West Bengal -0.996 *** 0.039 -0.020  0.039 -0.997 *** 0.039 -0.020  0.039 -1.000 *** 0.042 -0.016  0.041
New Delhi -0.717 *** 0.170 -0.916 *** 0.174 -0.718 *** 0.170 -0.918 *** 0.174 -0.534 ** 0.181 -0.680 *** 0.179
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman -1.237 *** 0.037 -1.804 *** 0.038 -1.237 *** 0.037 -1.802 *** 0.038 -1.297 *** 0.039 -1.788 *** 0.039
Kerele/Lakshadweep -1.878 *** 0.056 -1.050 *** 0.058 -1.877 *** 0.056 -1.049 *** 0.058 -2.006 *** 0.057 -1.211 *** 0.059
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli -1.153 *** 0.055 -1.392 *** 0.053 -1.155 *** 0.055 -1.390 *** 0.053 -1.324 *** 0.056 -1.291 *** 0.054
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh -0.810 *** 0.067 -0.216 * 0.091 -0.811 *** 0.067 -0.216 * 0.091 -0.608 *** 0.064 -0.006  0.088
Northeast 0.088  0.054 -0.193 *** 0.058 0.088  0.054 -0.193 *** 0.058 -0.075  0.058 0.081  0.061
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui -1.045 *** 0.043 -1.588 *** 0.045 -1.044 *** 0.043 -1.587 *** 0.045 -1.165 *** 0.045 -1.603 *** 0.047
Intercept -0.329 * 0.147 4.462 *** 0.180 -0.375 * 0.148 4.441 *** 0.181 0.186   0.152 4.928 *** 0.186
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Table 35 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Below 
The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.  SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested       [2]mper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    
       [3]mper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    
       [2]mper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0    
       [3]mper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0    
       [2]mper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0    
       [3]mper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0    
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested       6      6      
chi2       144.1      232.2      
Prob > chi2            0.000           0.000           
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Table 35 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Below 
The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.086 * 0.036 -0.005  0.034 0.086 * 0.036 -0.003  0.034 0.068  0.042 -0.021  0.037
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.163 *** 0.039 -0.041  0.036 -0.161 *** 0.039 -0.038  0.036 -0.207 *** 0.046 -0.088 * 0.039
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.312 *** 0.045 -0.228 *** 0.040 -0.311 *** 0.045 -0.226 *** 0.040 -0.338 *** 0.052 -0.254 *** 0.043
Male -0.063 ** 0.023 -4.783 *** 0.063 -0.046 + 0.026 -4.726 *** 0.064 -0.079 * 0.032 -4.851 *** 0.078
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.251 *** 0.031 0.221 ** 0.075 -0.252 *** 0.031 0.195 ** 0.073 -0.226 *** 0.044 0.294 ** 0.094
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.027  0.033 -0.201 * 0.079 -0.029  0.033 -0.208 ** 0.077 0.039  0.047 0.063  0.100
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999) -0.054  0.038 0.033  0.100 -0.055  0.038 0.015  0.098 -0.015  0.057 0.162  0.148
Muslim -0.298 *** 0.044 0.371 *** 0.048 -0.159 * 0.062 0.593 *** 0.058 -0.240 ** 0.081 0.570 *** 0.062
Scheduled Caste -1.101 *** 0.037 -0.796 *** 0.044 -1.113 *** 0.044 -0.819 *** 0.044 -1.146 *** 0.055 -0.872 *** 0.047
Scheduled Tribe -0.048  0.047 -0.888 *** 0.058 -0.016  0.049 -0.901 *** 0.056 -0.049  0.053 -0.951 *** 0.056
Muslim*Male       -0.185 *** 0.056 -0.935 *** 0.090 -0.081  0.086 -0.971 *** 0.188
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.020  0.032 0.297 *** 0.072 0.071  0.057 0.680 *** 0.137
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.053 + 0.030 0.624 *** 0.099 -0.001  0.060 1.045 *** 0.235
Muslim*Period 43 (1987) 0.183 ** 0.061 -0.065  0.067 0.184 ** 0.061 -0.054  0.075 0.104  0.116 -0.098  0.090
Muslim*Period 50 (1993) 0.312 *** 0.063 0.152 * 0.070 0.317 *** 0.064 0.142 + 0.078 0.321 * 0.126 0.127  0.095
Muslim*Period 55  (1999) 0.370 *** 0.077 0.162 + 0.086 0.374 *** 0.077 0.170 + 0.096 0.740 *** 0.156 0.324 ** 0.117
Scheduled Caste*Period 43 0.076  0.052 0.059  0.059 0.076  0.052 0.052  0.057 0.130 + 0.076 0.089  0.063
Scheduled Caste*Period 50 -0.017  0.056 0.076  0.061 -0.017  0.056 0.076  0.059 0.055  0.086 0.178 ** 0.065
Scheduled Caste*Period 55 0.118 + 0.064 0.177 ** 0.066 0.118 + 0.064 0.173 ** 0.065 0.127  0.091 0.242 *** 0.071
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43 -0.126 * 0.060 0.239 *** 0.074 -0.127 * 0.060 0.218 ** 0.073 -0.071  0.075 0.283 *** 0.075
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50 -0.098  0.065 0.131 + 0.079 -0.097  0.065 0.130 + 0.077 0.022  0.082 0.259 *** 0.081
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55 -0.061  0.073 0.118  0.081 -0.061  0.073 0.109  0.080 -0.079  0.088 0.133  0.082
Muslim*Male*Period 43                         0.102   0.123 0.034   0.249
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Table 35 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Below 
The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 50             -0.015  0.132 0.049  0.241
Muslim*Male*Period 55             -0.458 ** 0.170 0.009  0.279
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43             -0.083  0.078 -0.210  0.172
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50             -0.110  0.086 -0.768 *** 0.191
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55             -0.017  0.093 -0.591 ** 0.227
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43             -0.089  0.082 -0.475 + 0.271
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50             -0.188 * 0.084 -1.065 *** 0.310
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55             0.036  0.090 -0.307  0.309
Age -0.025 ** 0.008 -0.233 *** 0.010 -0.025 ** 0.008 -0.234 *** 0.010 -0.025 ** 0.008 -0.234 *** 0.010
Age Squared 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.215 *** 0.026 0.861 *** 0.023 -0.216 *** 0.026 0.865 *** 0.023 -0.217 *** 0.026 0.866 *** 0.023
Household Size 0.174 *** 0.006 0.215 *** 0.006 0.174 *** 0.006 0.216 *** 0.006 0.174 *** 0.006 0.216 *** 0.006
Primary School 0.352 *** 0.020 0.554 *** 0.027 0.350 *** 0.020 0.550 *** 0.027 0.350 *** 0.020 0.550 *** 0.027
Middle School 0.473 *** 0.025 0.982 *** 0.043 0.470 *** 0.025 0.977 *** 0.043 0.470 *** 0.025 0.979 *** 0.043
College 0.065  0.074 1.298 *** 0.121 0.061  0.074 1.301 *** 0.122 0.061  0.074 1.304 *** 0.122
Never Married -0.014  0.042 0.652 *** 0.081 -0.017  0.042 0.654 *** 0.080 -0.017  0.042 0.653 *** 0.080
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.206 *** 0.029 -0.762 *** 0.033 -0.208 *** 0.029 -0.771 *** 0.034 -0.208 *** 0.029 -0.771 *** 0.034
Number of Kids in Household -0.049 *** 0.009 -0.119 *** 0.009 -0.049 *** 0.009 -0.119 *** 0.009 -0.049 *** 0.009 -0.119 *** 0.009
Andra Pradesh -1.091 *** 0.041 -2.006 *** 0.044 -1.090 *** 0.041 -2.010 *** 0.044 -1.090 *** 0.041 -2.011 *** 0.044
Assam -0.940 *** 0.048 0.159 ** 0.055 -0.936 *** 0.048 0.168 ** 0.057 -0.935 *** 0.048 0.166 ** 0.056
Bihar -0.918 *** 0.032 -0.179 *** 0.031 -0.918 *** 0.032 -0.182 *** 0.031 -0.918 *** 0.032 -0.182 *** 0.031
Jammu and Kashmir -0.116  0.082 0.596 *** 0.076 -0.111  0.082 0.661 *** 0.079 -0.116  0.082 0.662 *** 0.080
Madhya Pradesh -0.729 *** 0.037 -1.468 *** 0.037 -0.729 *** 0.037 -1.462 *** 0.038 -0.729 *** 0.037 -1.463 *** 0.038
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Table 35 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Below 
The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Maharashtra -1.329 *** 0.038 -2.199 *** 0.038 -1.328 *** 0.038 -2.205 *** 0.038 -1.328 *** 0.038 -2.206 *** 0.038
Orissa -0.857 *** 0.043 -0.525 *** 0.040 -0.856 *** 0.043 -0.524 *** 0.040 -0.856 *** 0.043 -0.524 *** 0.040
Rajasthan 0.028  0.046 -0.742 *** 0.050 0.028  0.045 -0.741 *** 0.050 0.029  0.045 -0.741 *** 0.050
West Bengal -1.008 *** 0.042 -0.018  0.041 -1.006 *** 0.042 -0.016  0.041 -1.005 *** 0.042 -0.016  0.041
New Delhi -0.538 ** 0.182 -0.665 *** 0.179 -0.539 ** 0.182 -0.680 *** 0.178 -0.537 ** 0.182 -0.685 *** 0.178
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman -1.304 *** 0.039 -1.791 *** 0.039 -1.302 *** 0.039 -1.788 *** 0.039 -1.301 *** 0.039 -1.788 *** 0.039
Kerele/Lakshadweep -2.003 *** 0.057 -1.197 *** 0.057 -2.002 *** 0.057 -1.208 *** 0.059 -2.002 *** 0.057 -1.207 *** 0.059
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli -1.332 *** 0.055 -1.291 *** 0.053 -1.331 *** 0.055 -1.290 *** 0.054 -1.331 *** 0.055 -1.289 *** 0.054
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh -0.610 *** 0.064 0.009  0.090 -0.612 *** 0.064 -0.007  0.088 -0.612 *** 0.064 -0.006  0.088
Northeast -0.079  0.058 0.081  0.062 -0.077  0.058 0.076  0.061 -0.076  0.058 0.077  0.061
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui -1.169 *** 0.045 -1.599 *** 0.046 -1.168 *** 0.045 -1.601 *** 0.047 -1.168 *** 0.045 -1.602 *** 0.047
Intercept 0.169   0.154 4.936 *** 0.188 0.155   0.154 4.940 *** 0.189 0.179   0.154 4.963 *** 0.189
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Table 35 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Below 
The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested [2]musper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    [2]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [3]musper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    [3]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [2]musper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0    [2]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [3]musper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0    [3]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [2]musper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0    [2]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [3]musper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0    [3]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [2]scper43 = 0          [2]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]scper43 = 0          [3]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]scper50 = 0          [2]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]scper50 = 0          [3]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]scper55 = 0          [2]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]scper55 = 0          [3]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [2]stper43 = 0          [2]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]stper43 = 0          [3]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]stper50 = 0          [2]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]stper50 = 0          [3]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]stper55 = 0          [2]stmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]stper55 = 0          [3]stmaleper55 = 0    
                   
Number of Variables Tested 18      6      18      
chi2 92.1      227.4      54.8      
Prob > chi2 0.000           0.000           0.000           





Table 36 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Below The Poverty Line 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.188 *** 0.029 -0.110 *** 0.034 0.031  0.040 -0.020  0.038 -0.183 *** 0.030 -0.107 ** 0.035
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.299 *** 0.032 -0.020  0.036 -0.242 *** 0.045 0.045  0.039 -0.276 *** 0.032 -0.009  0.037
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.561 *** 0.038 -0.299 *** 0.040 -0.511 *** 0.048 -0.278 *** 0.042 -0.515 *** 0.040 -0.265 *** 0.041
Male -0.184 *** 0.019 -4.661 *** 0.056 -0.059 + 0.031 -4.626 *** 0.109 -0.178 *** 0.027 -4.666 *** 0.080
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)       -0.336 *** 0.041 0.147  0.123       
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)       -0.089 * 0.044 -0.369 ** 0.134       
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999)       -0.075  0.051 0.057  0.163       
Muslim             -0.035  0.076 0.629 *** 0.065
Scheduled Caste             -1.057 *** 0.044 -0.817 *** 0.038
Scheduled Tribe             -0.247 *** 0.045 -0.746 *** 0.045
Muslim*Male             -0.047  0.080 -0.903 *** 0.152
Scheduled Caste*Male             0.019  0.046 0.256 * 0.115
Scheduled Tribe*Male             -0.049  0.043 1.022 *** 0.167
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)                   
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)                   
Muslim*Period 55  (1999)                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 43                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 50                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 55                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55                   
Muslim*Male*Period 43                                     
Continued on next page 
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Table 36 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Below The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 50                   
Muslim*Male*Period 55                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                   
Age -0.036 ** 0.011 -0.237 *** 0.015 -0.036 ** 0.011 -0.237 *** 0.015 -0.040 *** 0.012 -0.245 *** 0.015
Age Squared 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.267 *** 0.035 1.265 *** 0.032 -0.267 *** 0.035 1.263 *** 0.032 -0.316 *** 0.043 1.095 *** 0.035
Household Size 0.195 *** 0.009 0.226 *** 0.009 0.195 *** 0.009 0.225 *** 0.009 0.188 *** 0.010 0.221 *** 0.010
Primary School 0.264 *** 0.030 0.554 *** 0.047 0.264 *** 0.030 0.554 *** 0.046 0.191 *** 0.031 0.462 *** 0.048
Middle School 0.372 *** 0.036 0.897 *** 0.075 0.368 *** 0.036 0.901 *** 0.074 0.268 *** 0.038 0.827 *** 0.076
College -0.122  0.093 0.868 *** 0.170 -0.126  0.093 0.871 *** 0.171 -0.277 ** 0.098 0.796 *** 0.178
Never Married 0.163 * 0.067 0.927 *** 0.139 0.161 * 0.067 0.935 *** 0.138 0.100  0.069 0.900 *** 0.141
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.156 *** 0.041 -0.554 *** 0.052 -0.158 *** 0.041 -0.554 *** 0.052 -0.144 *** 0.042 -0.563 *** 0.054
Number of Kids in Household -0.065 *** 0.013 -0.112 *** 0.014 -0.065 *** 0.013 -0.112 *** 0.013 -0.066 *** 0.013 -0.127 *** 0.014
Madhya Pradesh -0.574 *** 0.033 -1.662 *** 0.037 -0.574 *** 0.034 -1.659 *** 0.037 -0.664 *** 0.040 -1.521 *** 0.040
Maharashtra -1.101 *** 0.037 -2.239 *** 0.040 -1.102 *** 0.037 -2.237 *** 0.040 -1.266 *** 0.041 -2.280 *** 0.042
Rajasthan 0.075 + 0.043 -0.902 *** 0.050 0.074 + 0.043 -0.900 *** 0.050 0.057  0.046 -0.785 *** 0.052
New Delhi -0.614 *** 0.172 -1.122 *** 0.179 -0.614 *** 0.172 -1.125 *** 0.179 -0.431 * 0.182 -0.862 *** 0.184
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli -1.141 *** 0.055 -1.442 *** 0.054 -1.143 *** 0.055 -1.441 *** 0.054 -1.270 *** 0.057 -1.372 *** 0.056
Intercept 0.130   0.213 4.750 *** 0.283 0.053   0.215 4.704 *** 0.283 0.659 ** 0.218 5.269 *** 0.289
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Table 36 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Below The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.  SE Coef.   SE Coef.  SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested       [2]mper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    
       [3]mper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    
       [2]mper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0    
       [3]mper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0    
       [2]mper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0    
       [3]mper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0    
                   
                   
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested       6      6      
chi2       115.2      112.1      
Prob > chi2            0.000          0.000           
Continued on next page 
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Table 36 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Below The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.040  0.052 -0.067  0.051 0.043  0.052 -0.058  0.051 -0.016  0.061 -0.108 + 0.056
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.181 *** 0.056 0.022  0.054 -0.177 ** 0.056 0.028  0.054 -0.300 *** 0.065 -0.072  0.057
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.489 *** 0.065 -0.312 *** 0.060 -0.486 *** 0.065 -0.310 *** 0.059 -0.561 *** 0.073 -0.377 *** 0.064
Male -0.042  0.032 -4.670 *** 0.112 -0.035  0.035 -4.621 *** 0.112 -0.131 ** 0.042 -4.825 *** 0.146
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.356 *** 0.043 0.196  0.128 -0.361 *** 0.043 0.131  0.123 -0.272 *** 0.060 0.311 + 0.168
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.099 * 0.046 -0.326 * 0.140 -0.105 * 0.046 -0.358 ** 0.133 0.077  0.063 0.011  0.180
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999) -0.101 + 0.054 0.051  0.177 -0.106 + 0.055 0.032  0.168 0.007  0.085 0.287  0.252
Muslim -0.341 *** 0.067 0.268 ** 0.085 -0.311 *** 0.091 0.446 *** 0.096 -0.479 *** 0.119 0.348 *** 0.097
Scheduled Caste -1.101 *** 0.052 -0.903 *** 0.059 -1.117 *** 0.060 -0.926 *** 0.060 -1.231 *** 0.073 -1.027 *** 0.064
Scheduled Tribe -0.104  0.070 -0.761 *** 0.093 -0.077  0.071 -0.784 *** 0.087 -0.180 * 0.070 -0.885 *** 0.080
Muslim*Male       -0.048  0.080 -0.909 *** 0.153 0.180  0.121 -0.741 * 0.358
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.024  0.046 0.266 * 0.117 0.200 ** 0.074 0.780 *** 0.204
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.050  0.043 0.986 *** 0.169 0.114  0.091 1.536 *** 0.409
Muslim*Period 43 (1987) 0.293 ** 0.094 0.108  0.110 0.301 *** 0.094 0.129  0.121 0.473 ** 0.171 0.272 + 0.142
Muslim*Period 50 (1993) 0.325 *** 0.100 0.155  0.122 0.329 *** 0.101 0.131  0.132 0.466 * 0.194 0.192  0.158
Muslim*Period 55  (1999) 0.445 *** 0.119 0.404 ** 0.139 0.446 *** 0.119 0.428 ** 0.151 0.805 *** 0.222 0.615 *** 0.191
Scheduled Caste*Period 43 0.129 + 0.075 0.121  0.085 0.128 + 0.075 0.113  0.084 0.257 * 0.106 0.187 * 0.094
Scheduled Caste*Period 50 -0.085  0.082 0.090  0.089 -0.086  0.082 0.088  0.088 0.142  0.120 0.274 ** 0.097
Scheduled Caste*Period 55 0.164 + 0.094 0.211 * 0.096 0.164 + 0.094 0.207 * 0.095 0.264 * 0.125 0.335 *** 0.104
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43 -0.239 ** 0.086 0.160  0.114 -0.240 ** 0.086 0.127  0.112 -0.164  0.100 0.223 * 0.108
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50 -0.231 * 0.094 0.091  0.122 -0.230 * 0.094 0.092  0.118 0.010  0.110 0.299 * 0.116
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55 -0.197 + 0.110 -0.033  0.126 -0.198 + 0.110 -0.041  0.123 -0.088  0.120 0.061  0.121
Muslim*Male*Period 43                         -0.230   0.175 -0.459   0.414
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Table 36 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Below The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 50             -0.198  0.204 -0.048  0.442
Muslim*Male*Period 55             -0.468 * 0.233 -0.200  0.489
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43             -0.199 + 0.107 -0.221  0.262
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50             -0.343 ** 0.118 -0.987 *** 0.306
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55             -0.155  0.133 -0.828 * 0.360
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43             -0.119  0.117 -0.617  0.451
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50             -0.383 ** 0.122 -1.199 * 0.519
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55             -0.173  0.131 -0.486  0.536
Age -0.040 *** 0.012 -0.243 *** 0.015 -0.040 *** 0.012 -0.245 *** 0.015 -0.040 *** 0.012 -0.245 *** 0.015
Age Squared 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.311 *** 0.042 1.079 *** 0.034 -0.315 *** 0.042 1.094 *** 0.035 -0.315 *** 0.042 1.093 *** 0.034
Household Size 0.188 *** 0.010 0.219 *** 0.009 0.188 *** 0.010 0.220 *** 0.009 0.188 *** 0.010 0.220 *** 0.009
Primary School 0.191 *** 0.031 0.467 *** 0.048 0.190 *** 0.031 0.462 *** 0.048 0.191 *** 0.031 0.463 *** 0.048
Middle School 0.265 *** 0.038 0.832 *** 0.076 0.263 *** 0.039 0.831 *** 0.074 0.263 *** 0.039 0.833 *** 0.075
College -0.279 ** 0.097 0.779 *** 0.174 -0.282 ** 0.098 0.794 *** 0.178 -0.282 ** 0.098 0.799 *** 0.178
Never Married 0.103  0.069 0.863 *** 0.141 0.099  0.069 0.907 *** 0.140 0.100  0.069 0.910 *** 0.140
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.147 *** 0.042 -0.559 *** 0.053 -0.147 *** 0.042 -0.566 *** 0.054 -0.147 *** 0.042 -0.566 *** 0.054
Number of Kids in Household -0.067 *** 0.013 -0.126 *** 0.014 -0.067 *** 0.013 -0.127 *** 0.014 -0.067 *** 0.013 -0.127 *** 0.014
Madhya Pradesh -0.667 *** 0.040 -1.515 *** 0.040 -0.666 *** 0.040 -1.518 *** 0.040 -0.666 *** 0.040 -1.518 *** 0.040
Maharashtra -1.273 *** 0.040 -2.267 *** 0.041 -1.272 *** 0.040 -2.281 *** 0.042 -1.272 *** 0.040 -2.281 *** 0.041
Rajasthan 0.052  0.046 -0.781 *** 0.052 0.053  0.046 -0.786 *** 0.052 0.054  0.046 -0.785 *** 0.052
New Delhi -0.430 * 0.184 -0.835 *** 0.183 -0.429 * 0.184 -0.859 *** 0.183 -0.428 * 0.184 -0.865 *** 0.182
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli -1.282 *** 0.057 -1.363 *** 0.055 -1.280 *** 0.056 -1.373 *** 0.055 -1.280 *** 0.056 -1.372 *** 0.056
Intercept 0.590 ** 0.220 5.242 *** 0.288 0.578 ** 0.220 5.259 *** 0.289 0.642 ** 0.220 5.314 *** 0.288
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Table 36 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Below The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.  SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested [2]musper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    [2]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [3]musper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    [3]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [2]musper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0     [2]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [3]musper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0     [3]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [2]musper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0     [2]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [3]musper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0     [3]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [2]scper43 = 0          [2]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]scper43 = 0          [3]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]scper50 = 0          [2]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]scper50 = 0          [3]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]scper55 = 0          [2]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]scper55 = 0          [3]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [2]stper43 = 0          [2]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]stper43 = 0          [3]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]stper50 = 0          [2]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]stper50 = 0          [3]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]stper55 = 0          [2]stmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]stper55 = 0          [3]stmaleper55 = 0    
                   
Number of Variables Tested 18      6      18      
chi2 65.3      108.6      39.9      
Prob > chi2 0.000          0.000           0.002           
+p<.1 *p< .05  **p<.01  ***<.001 
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Table 37 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.014  0.027 0.058 * 0.029 0.135 *** 0.042 0.070 * 0.034 0.011  0.027 0.056 + 0.030
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.100 *** 0.029 -0.054 + 0.031 -0.124 ** 0.046 -0.048  0.035 -0.070 * 0.029 -0.036  0.031
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.129 *** 0.032 -0.136 *** 0.034 -0.096 + 0.052 -0.122 *** 0.038 -0.081 * 0.033 -0.102 ** 0.035
Male -0.098 *** 0.019 -4.793 *** 0.042 -0.051  0.032 -4.814 *** 0.071 -0.072 ** 0.025 -4.773 *** 0.051
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)       -0.168 *** 0.043 0.204 * 0.088       
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)       0.031  0.046 -0.109  0.091       
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999)      -0.046  0.052 -0.034  0.099       
Muslim             0.186 * 0.074 0.657 *** 0.049
Scheduled Caste             -1.112 *** 0.045 -0.705 *** 0.032
Scheduled Tribe             0.065  0.047 -0.810 *** 0.043
Muslim*Male             -0.311 *** 0.080 -0.993 *** 0.106
Scheduled Caste*Male             0.066  0.045 0.312 *** 0.086
Scheduled Tribe*Male             -0.058  0.043 0.439 *** 0.106
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)                   
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)                   
Muslim*Period 55  (1999)                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 43                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 50                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 55                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55                   
Muslim*Male*Period 43                                     
Continued on next page 
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Table 37 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman -0.469 *** 0.036 -1.575 *** 0.039 -0.469 *** 0.036 -1.573 *** 0.039 -0.385 *** 0.037 -1.548 *** 0.039
Kerele/Lakshadweep -1.126 *** 0.055 -0.879 *** 0.059 -1.126 *** 0.055 -0.879 *** 0.059 -1.121 *** 0.055 -1.011 *** 0.060
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh -0.037  0.066 -0.028  0.092 -0.038  0.066 -0.029  0.092 0.305 *** 0.063 0.185 * 0.089
Northeast 0.880 *** 0.054 -0.055  0.058 0.881 *** 0.054 -0.055  0.058 0.769 *** 0.057 0.268 *** 0.061
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui -0.268 *** 0.042 -1.369 *** 0.045 -0.269 *** 0.042 -1.368 *** 0.045 -0.257 *** 0.042 -1.367 *** 0.046
Intercept -1.453 *** 0.203 4.144 *** 0.224 -1.484 *** 0.203 4.133 *** 0.226 -1.087 *** 0.210 4.560 *** 0.235
Continued on next page 
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Table 37 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.  SE Coef.   SE Coef.  SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested       [2]mper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    
       [3]mper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    
       [2]mper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0    
       [3]mper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0    
       [2]mper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0    
       [3]mper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0    
                   
                   
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested       6      6      
chi2       50.7      152.7      
Prob > chi2             0.000          0.000          
Continued on next page 
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Table 37 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.104 * 0.050 0.038  0.045 0.101 * 0.050 0.036  0.045 0.118 * 0.058 0.036  0.049
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.146 ** 0.055 -0.084 + 0.048 -0.148 ** 0.055 -0.085 + 0.048 -0.136 * 0.066 -0.107 * 0.051
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.135 * 0.063 -0.172 *** 0.054 -0.139 * 0.062 -0.171 *** 0.053 -0.140 + 0.075 -0.178 ** 0.058
Male -0.039  0.032 -4.863 *** 0.074 -0.019  0.037 -4.805 *** 0.075 -0.010  0.046 -4.881 *** 0.089
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.174 *** 0.045 0.244 ** 0.091 -0.170 *** 0.045 0.237 ** 0.089 -0.193 ** 0.062 0.296 ** 0.112
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.011  0.047 -0.131  0.095 0.013  0.047 -0.118  0.093 0.000  0.068 0.091  0.118
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999) -0.050  0.053 -0.020  0.103 -0.046  0.053 -0.035  0.100 -0.043  0.075 0.022  0.133
Muslim -0.251 *** 0.059 0.408 *** 0.057 -0.008  0.086 0.667 *** 0.071 -0.044  0.113 0.681 *** 0.081
Scheduled Caste -1.115 *** 0.054 -0.740 *** 0.060 -1.156 *** 0.063 -0.772 *** 0.060 -1.107 *** 0.082 -0.797 *** 0.064
Scheduled Tribe -0.070  0.060 -1.017 *** 0.070 -0.028  0.067 -1.020 *** 0.071 -0.009  0.081 -1.038 *** 0.076
Muslim*Male       -0.315 *** 0.080 -0.986 *** 0.107 -0.272 * 0.120 -1.158 *** 0.179
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.060  0.045 0.326 *** 0.086 -0.004  0.086 0.625 *** 0.178
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.064  0.043 0.426 *** 0.106 -0.090  0.077 0.724 *** 0.213
Muslim*Period 43 (1987) 0.123  0.081 -0.172 * 0.084 0.117  0.081 -0.165 + 0.094 -0.102  0.161 -0.294 * 0.114
Muslim*Period 50 (1993) 0.316 *** 0.083 0.161 + 0.085 0.322 *** 0.083 0.161 + 0.095 0.225  0.168 0.104  0.120
Muslim*Period 55  (1999) 0.316 ** 0.100 -0.019  0.109 0.321 *** 0.099 -0.022  0.122 0.726 *** 0.215 0.124  0.147
Scheduled Caste*Period 43 0.038  0.073 0.035  0.078 0.039  0.073 0.028  0.076 -0.001  0.112 0.043  0.084
Scheduled Caste*Period 50 0.069  0.077 0.071  0.081 0.069  0.077 0.075  0.079 0.007  0.124 0.131  0.085
Scheduled Caste*Period 55 0.097  0.084 0.163 + 0.088 0.096  0.084 0.161 + 0.086 0.003  0.133 0.190 * 0.094
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43 0.097  0.082 0.352 *** 0.095 0.097  0.082 0.337 *** 0.093 0.153  0.117 0.399 *** 0.106
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50 0.107  0.088 0.187 + 0.100 0.108  0.088 0.187 + 0.099 0.122  0.124 0.258 * 0.110
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55 0.186 * 0.092 0.323 ** 0.104 0.188 * 0.092 0.316 ** 0.102 0.075  0.129 0.278 * 0.113
Muslim*Male*Period 43                         0.283   0.172 0.322   0.288
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Table 37 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 50             0.117  0.176 0.109  0.258
Muslim*Male*Period 55             -0.495 * 0.236 0.181  0.293
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43             0.053  0.117 -0.228  0.224
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50             0.078  0.125 -0.635 ** 0.241
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55             0.125  0.131 -0.398  0.261
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43             -0.088  0.114 -0.422  0.288
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50             -0.029  0.115 -0.872 ** 0.335
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55             0.173  0.121 -0.070  0.291
Age -0.016  0.011 -0.228 *** 0.012 -0.016  0.011 -0.229 *** 0.012 -0.016  0.011 -0.229 *** 0.012
Age Squared 0.000 ** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.088 *** 0.028 0.643 *** 0.029 -0.089 *** 0.028 0.641 *** 0.030 -0.090 *** 0.028 0.642 *** 0.030
Household Size 0.162 *** 0.008 0.212 *** 0.008 0.161 *** 0.008 0.213 *** 0.008 0.161 *** 0.008 0.213 *** 0.008
Primary School 0.481 *** 0.025 0.612 *** 0.032 0.478 *** 0.025 0.608 *** 0.032 0.478 *** 0.025 0.607 *** 0.032
Middle School 0.660 *** 0.032 1.093 *** 0.049 0.656 *** 0.032 1.087 *** 0.049 0.655 *** 0.032 1.087 *** 0.049
College 0.485 *** 0.105 1.764 *** 0.162 0.480 *** 0.105 1.757 *** 0.162 0.479 *** 0.105 1.760 *** 0.163
Never Married -0.104 * 0.052 0.584 *** 0.094 -0.106 * 0.052 0.580 *** 0.093 -0.108 * 0.052 0.578 *** 0.093
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.212 *** 0.039 -0.878 *** 0.042 -0.216 *** 0.039 -0.889 *** 0.043 -0.215 *** 0.039 -0.888 *** 0.043
Number of Kids in Household -0.030 ** 0.011 -0.111 *** 0.011 -0.030 ** 0.011 -0.110 *** 0.011 -0.030 ** 0.011 -0.111 *** 0.011
Andra Pradesh -0.173 *** 0.039 -1.752 *** 0.044 -0.172 *** 0.039 -1.751 *** 0.044 -0.171 *** 0.039 -1.751 *** 0.044
Assam -0.070  0.046 0.352 *** 0.055 -0.064  0.046 0.370 *** 0.057 -0.063  0.046 0.368 *** 0.057
Jammu and Kashmir 0.828 *** 0.084 0.800 *** 0.076 0.837 *** 0.084 0.872 *** 0.080 0.831 *** 0.084 0.868 *** 0.081
Orissa 0.024  0.040 -0.338 *** 0.039 0.025  0.039 -0.331 *** 0.039 0.025  0.039 -0.331 *** 0.039
West Bengal -0.112 ** 0.040 0.190 *** 0.040 -0.109 ** 0.040 0.194 *** 0.041 -0.109 ** 0.040 0.195 *** 0.041
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Table 37 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman -0.393 *** 0.037 -1.559 *** 0.039 -0.390 *** 0.037 -1.550 *** 0.039 -0.388 *** 0.037 -1.550 *** 0.039
Kerele/Lakshadweep -1.120 *** 0.055 -1.001 *** 0.059 -1.120 *** 0.055 -1.011 *** 0.060 -1.120 *** 0.055 -1.010 *** 0.060
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh 0.302 *** 0.063 0.196 * 0.091 0.299 *** 0.063 0.183 * 0.088 0.300 *** 0.063 0.184 * 0.088
Northeast 0.767 *** 0.057 0.258 *** 0.061 0.768 *** 0.057 0.263 *** 0.060 0.768 *** 0.057 0.264 *** 0.061
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui -0.262 *** 0.042 -1.369 *** 0.046 -0.261 *** 0.042 -1.366 *** 0.046 -0.259 *** 0.042 -1.367 *** 0.046
Intercept -1.068 *** 0.212 4.586 *** 0.238 -1.082 *** 0.211 4.581 *** 0.239 -1.085 *** 0.213 4.588 *** 0.240
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Table 37 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested [2]musper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    [2]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [3]musper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    [3]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [2]musper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0    [2]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [3]musper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0    [3]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [2]musper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0    [2]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [3]musper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0    [3]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [2]scper43 = 0          [2]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]scper43 = 0          [3]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]scper50 = 0          [2]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]scper50 = 0          [3]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]scper55 = 0          [2]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]scper55 = 0          [3]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [2]stper43 = 0          [2]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]stper43 = 0          [3]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]stper50 = 0          [2]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]stper50 = 0          [3]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]stper55 = 0          [2]stmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]stper55 = 0          [3]stmaleper55 = 0    
                   
Number of Variables Tested 18      6      18      
chi2 53.2      150.6      36.8      
Prob > chi2 0.000           0.000           0.006           




Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above 
the Poverty Line 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.030 + 0.016 -0.029  0.019 0.024  0.027 -0.026  0.025 -0.018  0.016 -0.021  0.019
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.071 *** 0.016 0.023  0.019 -0.183 *** 0.028 -0.031  0.025 -0.035 * 0.016 0.056 ** 0.019
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.170 *** 0.018 -0.106 *** 0.021 -0.313 *** 0.029 -0.219 *** 0.027 -0.108 *** 0.018 -0.052 * 0.021
Male -0.223 *** 0.011 -5.267 *** 0.026 -0.315 *** 0.021 -5.439 *** 0.049 -0.239 *** 0.015 -5.284 *** 0.029
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)       -0.075 ** 0.027 0.198 *** 0.055       
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)       0.155 *** 0.028 -0.007  0.057       
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999)       0.198 *** 0.030 0.369 *** 0.059       
Muslim             -0.256 *** 0.045 0.509 *** 0.038
Scheduled Caste             -1.270 *** 0.028 -0.950 *** 0.023
Scheduled Tribe             -0.403 *** 0.036 -0.988 *** 0.037
Muslim*Male             0.231 *** 0.047 -0.657 *** 0.066
Scheduled Caste*Male             0.163 *** 0.028 0.413 *** 0.057
Scheduled Tribe*Male             -0.117 *** 0.032 0.702 *** 0.081
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)                   
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)                   
Muslim*Period 55  (1999)                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 43                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 50                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 55                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55                   
Muslim*Male*Period 43                                     
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Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above 
the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 50                   
Muslim*Male*Period 55                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                   
Age -0.017 ** 0.006 -0.235 *** 0.007 -0.018 ** 0.006 -0.235 *** 0.007 -0.027 *** 0.006 -0.243 *** 0.008
Age Squared 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.766 *** 0.015 0.589 *** 0.021 -0.764 *** 0.015 0.592 *** 0.021 -0.834 *** 0.016 0.490 *** 0.021
Household Size 0.207 *** 0.004 0.257 *** 0.005 0.207 *** 0.004 0.257 *** 0.005 0.198 *** 0.004 0.250 *** 0.005
Primary School 0.475 *** 0.015 0.897 *** 0.020 0.477 *** 0.015 0.898 *** 0.020 0.367 *** 0.016 0.783 *** 0.021
Middle School 0.200 *** 0.016 0.903 *** 0.023 0.198 *** 0.016 0.904 *** 0.023 0.019  0.017 0.758 *** 0.023
College -0.637 *** 0.029 -0.109 * 0.045 -0.640 *** 0.029 -0.107 * 0.045 -0.870 *** 0.030 -0.293 *** 0.047
Never Married 0.159 *** 0.025 0.854 *** 0.052 0.157 *** 0.025 0.854 *** 0.052 0.127 *** 0.025 0.837 *** 0.052
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.212 *** 0.022 -0.727 *** 0.026 -0.214 *** 0.022 -0.729 *** 0.026 -0.220 *** 0.022 -0.747 *** 0.026
Number of Kids in Household -0.065 *** 0.007 -0.112 *** 0.008 -0.065 *** 0.007 -0.112 *** 0.008 -0.062 *** 0.007 -0.121 *** 0.008
Andra Pradesh -0.855 *** 0.027 -2.018 *** 0.034 -0.855 *** 0.027 -2.020 *** 0.034 -0.936 *** 0.027 -2.045 *** 0.034
Assam -0.639 *** 0.033 0.105 * 0.043 -0.640 *** 0.033 0.101 * 0.043 -0.684 *** 0.035 0.106 * 0.045
Bihar -0.454 *** 0.029 -0.051  0.035 -0.454 *** 0.029 -0.053  0.035 -0.504 *** 0.029 -0.061 + 0.036
Jammu and Kashmir -0.396 *** 0.040 0.357 *** 0.046 -0.396 *** 0.040 0.345 *** 0.046 -0.503 *** 0.042 0.104 * 0.050
Madhya Pradesh -0.441 *** 0.030 -1.440 *** 0.037 -0.442 *** 0.030 -1.442 *** 0.037 -0.432 *** 0.031 -1.284 *** 0.037
Continued on next page 
 
 240
Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above 
the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Maharashtra -0.935 *** 0.028 -2.069 *** 0.034 -0.936 *** 0.028 -2.070 *** 0.034 -1.019 *** 0.028 -2.074 *** 0.035
Orissa -0.842 *** 0.036 -0.610 *** 0.042 -0.843 *** 0.036 -0.611 *** 0.042 -0.829 *** 0.037 -0.478 *** 0.042
Rajasthan 0.086 ** 0.030 -0.893 *** 0.036 0.085 ** 0.030 -0.895 *** 0.036 0.104 *** 0.031 -0.792 *** 0.037
West Bengal -0.858 *** 0.028 -0.195 *** 0.034 -0.858 *** 0.028 -0.191 *** 0.034 -0.767 *** 0.029 -0.124 *** 0.034
New Delhi -0.901 *** 0.084 -0.755 *** 0.090 -0.899 *** 0.084 -0.750 *** 0.091 -0.916 *** 0.086 -0.725 *** 0.085
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman -1.126 *** 0.029 -1.934 *** 0.035 -1.126 *** 0.029 -1.935 *** 0.035 -1.168 *** 0.030 -1.941 *** 0.036
Kerele/Lakshadweep -1.755 *** 0.036 -1.443 *** 0.043 -1.755 *** 0.036 -1.443 *** 0.043 -1.824 *** 0.036 -1.558 *** 0.043
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli -0.883 *** 0.032 -1.485 *** 0.038 -0.883 *** 0.032 -1.487 *** 0.038 -0.935 *** 0.033 -1.421 *** 0.039
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh -0.707 *** 0.032 -0.459 *** 0.038 -0.707 *** 0.032 -0.460 *** 0.038 -0.558 *** 0.033 -0.296 *** 0.038
Northeast -0.247 *** 0.029 -0.991 *** 0.037 -0.248 *** 0.029 -0.993 *** 0.037 -0.164 *** 0.033 -0.605 *** 0.040
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui -0.833 *** 0.031 -1.648 *** 0.037 -0.833 *** 0.031 -1.649 *** 0.037 -0.908 *** 0.031 -1.673 *** 0.038
Intercept 0.256 * 0.118 5.363 *** 0.143 0.329 ** 0.119 5.420 *** 0.144 0.833 *** 0.121 5.841 *** 0.144
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Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above 
the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested       [2]mper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    
       [3]mper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    
       [2]mper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0     
       [3]mper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0     
       [2]mper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0     
       [3]mper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0     
                   
                   
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested       6      6      
chi2       202.1      455.0      
Prob > chi2             0.000           0.000           
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Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above 
the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed  Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.027  0.030 -0.026  0.028 0.029 0.030  -0.024 0.029  -0.012  0.034 -0.064 * 0.031
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.135 *** 0.030 -0.035  0.028 -0.136 0.030 *** -0.034 0.029  -0.144 *** 0.035 -0.051  0.031
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.226 *** 0.033 -0.159 *** 0.033 -0.226 0.033 *** -0.157 0.033 *** -0.273 *** 0.038 -0.196 *** 0.037
Male -0.300 *** 0.021 -5.457 *** 0.050 -0.331 0.022 *** -5.436 0.051 *** -0.367 *** 0.026 -5.526 *** 0.059
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.072 ** 0.028 0.198 *** 0.056 -0.076 0.028 ** 0.196 0.055 *** -0.021  0.034 0.326 *** 0.067
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.157 *** 0.028 -0.005  0.059 0.158 0.028 *** -0.023 0.058  0.168 *** 0.035 0.073  0.070
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999) 0.207 *** 0.031 0.356 *** 0.061 0.206 0.031 *** 0.337 0.059 *** 0.270 *** 0.040 0.444 *** 0.074
Muslim -0.030  0.039 0.458 *** 0.046 -0.218 0.056 *** 0.492 0.056 *** -0.386 *** 0.083 0.352 *** 0.067
Scheduled Caste -1.156 *** 0.036 -0.949 *** 0.045 -1.265 0.041 *** -1.022 0.045 *** -1.301 *** 0.056 -1.075 *** 0.051
Scheduled Tribe -0.352 *** 0.044 -0.936 *** 0.056 -0.273 0.050 *** -0.928 0.058 *** -0.363 *** 0.063 -0.994 *** 0.065
Muslim*Male       0.234 0.047 *** -0.668 0.066 *** 0.442 *** 0.084 -0.293 * 0.124
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.158 0.028 *** 0.396 0.057 *** 0.207 *** 0.057 0.737 *** 0.131
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.129 0.032 *** 0.684 0.081 *** 0.004  0.061 0.838 *** 0.169
Muslim*Period 43 (1987) -0.030  0.053 -0.043  0.060 -0.029 0.053  -0.019 0.066  0.166  0.115 0.184 * 0.093
Muslim*Period 50 (1993) 0.049  0.055 0.101  0.064 0.044 0.055  0.121 0.069 + 0.186  0.122 0.259 ** 0.096
Muslim*Period 55  (1999) -0.136 * 0.058 -0.064  0.066 -0.140 0.059 * -0.027 0.072  0.130  0.123 0.152  0.100
Scheduled Caste*Period 43 0.107 * 0.047 0.052  0.058 0.106 0.047 * 0.043 0.056  0.244 *** 0.075 0.142 * 0.066
Scheduled Caste*Period 50 -0.012  0.047 0.154 ** 0.057 -0.016 0.047  0.153 0.055 ** -0.081  0.077 0.175 ** 0.064
Scheduled Caste*Period 55 -0.060  0.050 0.077  0.059 -0.060 0.050  0.073 0.057  -0.001  0.079 0.150 * 0.067
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43 -0.091  0.060 0.012  0.074 -0.090 0.060  -0.005 0.073  -0.059  0.087 0.043  0.087
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50 -0.209 *** 0.061 0.060  0.078 -0.208 0.061 *** 0.051 0.077  -0.132  0.087 0.114  0.090
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55 -0.125 + 0.068 -0.168 * 0.084 -0.129 0.068 + -0.180 0.082 * 0.041  0.095 -0.078  0.099
Muslim*Male*Period 43                         -0.241 * 0.118 -0.649 *** 0.167
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Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above 
the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed  Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 50             -0.173  0.125 -0.434 * 0.178
Muslim*Male*Period 55             -0.332 ** 0.128 -0.348 + 0.181
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43             -0.197 * 0.077 -0.371 * 0.163
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50             0.091  0.079 -0.360 * 0.170
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55             -0.081  0.081 -0.453 ** 0.168
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43             -0.041  0.086 -0.266  0.225
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50             -0.115  0.084 -0.208  0.239
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55             -0.258 ** 0.087 -0.102  0.224
Age -0.027 *** 0.006 -0.243 *** 0.008 -0.027 0.006 *** -0.243 0.008 *** -0.027 *** 0.006 -0.243 *** 0.008
Age Squared 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.003 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.831 *** 0.016 0.489 *** 0.021 -0.832 0.016 *** 0.493 0.021 *** -0.833 *** 0.016 0.493 *** 0.021
Household Size 0.199 *** 0.004 0.250 *** 0.005 0.198 0.004 *** 0.250 0.005 *** 0.198 *** 0.004 0.250 *** 0.005
Primary School 0.372 *** 0.016 0.789 *** 0.021 0.371 0.016 *** 0.785 0.021 *** 0.371 *** 0.016 0.785 *** 0.021
Middle School 0.016  0.017 0.763 *** 0.023 0.017 0.017  0.759 0.024 *** 0.017  0.017 0.760 *** 0.024
College -0.879 *** 0.030 -0.283 *** 0.047 -0.875 0.030 *** -0.288 0.048 *** -0.874 *** 0.030 -0.288 *** 0.048
Never Married 0.126 *** 0.025 0.836 *** 0.052 0.126 0.025 *** 0.837 0.052 *** 0.126 *** 0.025 0.838 *** 0.052
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.222 *** 0.022 -0.746 *** 0.026 -0.222 0.022 *** -0.749 0.026 *** -0.222 *** 0.022 -0.749 *** 0.026
Number of Kids in Household -0.062 *** 0.007 -0.120 *** 0.008 -0.062 0.007 *** -0.121 0.008 *** -0.062 *** 0.007 -0.121 *** 0.008
Andra Pradesh -0.936 *** 0.027 -2.049 *** 0.034 -0.933 0.027 *** -2.046 0.035 *** -0.933 *** 0.027 -2.046 *** 0.035
Assam -0.685 *** 0.035 0.098 * 0.045 -0.684 0.035 *** 0.104 0.045 * -0.684 *** 0.035 0.104 * 0.045
Bihar -0.505 *** 0.029 -0.066 + 0.036 -0.503 0.029 *** -0.063 0.036 + -0.503 *** 0.029 -0.063 + 0.036
Jammu and Kashmir -0.479 *** 0.042 0.051  0.048 -0.485 0.042 *** 0.108 0.050 * -0.485 *** 0.042 0.105 * 0.050
Madhya Pradesh -0.434 *** 0.031 -1.297 *** 0.037 -0.432 0.031 *** -1.288 0.037 *** -0.432 *** 0.031 -1.288 *** 0.037
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Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above 
the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed  Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Maharashtra -1.019 *** 0.029 -2.076 *** 0.035 -1.018 0.028 *** -2.074 0.035 *** -1.018 *** 0.028 -2.074 *** 0.035
Orissa -0.831 *** 0.037 -0.480 *** 0.042 -0.827 0.037 *** -0.480 0.042 *** -0.827 *** 0.037 -0.480 *** 0.042
Rajasthan 0.102 *** 0.031 -0.797 *** 0.037 0.105 0.031 *** -0.792 0.037 *** 0.105 *** 0.031 -0.792 *** 0.037
West Bengal -0.762 *** 0.029 -0.122 *** 0.034 -0.765 0.029 *** -0.122 0.034 *** -0.765 *** 0.029 -0.121 *** 0.034
New Delhi -0.915 *** 0.086 -0.718 *** 0.086 -0.913 0.086 *** -0.719 0.086 *** -0.913 *** 0.086 -0.719 *** 0.086
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman -1.169 *** 0.030 -1.948 *** 0.036 -1.166 0.030 *** -1.942 0.036 *** -1.166 *** 0.030 -1.942 *** 0.036
Kerele/Lakshadweep -1.826 *** 0.036 -1.555 *** 0.043 -1.822 0.036 *** -1.556 0.043 *** -1.822 *** 0.036 -1.557 *** 0.043
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli -0.936 *** 0.033 -1.429 *** 0.039 -0.933 0.033 *** -1.423 0.039 *** -0.933 *** 0.033 -1.423 *** 0.039
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh -0.556 *** 0.033 -0.289 *** 0.039 -0.557 0.033 *** -0.295 0.038 *** -0.557 *** 0.033 -0.295 *** 0.038
Northeast -0.170 *** 0.034 -0.608 *** 0.041 -0.163 0.033 *** -0.603 0.041 *** -0.163 *** 0.033 -0.603 *** 0.041
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui -0.908 *** 0.031 -1.676 *** 0.038 -0.905 0.031 *** -1.673 0.038 *** -0.905 *** 0.031 -1.674 *** 0.038
Intercept 0.882 *** 0.122 5.879 *** 0.145 0.892 0.122 *** 5.899 0.145 *** 0.920 *** 0.122 5.927 *** 0.145
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Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above 
the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed  Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested [2]musper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0     [2]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [3]musper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0     [3]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [2]musper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0     [2]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [3]musper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0     [3]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [2]musper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0     [2]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [3]musper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0     [3]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [2]scper43 = 0          [2]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]scper43 = 0          [3]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]scper50 = 0          [2]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]scper50 = 0          [3]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]scper55 = 0          [2]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]scper55 = 0          [3]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [2]stper43 = 0          [2]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]stper43 = 0          [3]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]stper50 = 0          [2]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]stper50 = 0          [3]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]stper55 = 0          [2]stmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]stper55 = 0          [3]stmaleper55 = 0    
                   
Number of Variables Tested 18      6      18      
chi2 70.1      457.7      53.4      
Prob > chi2 0.000           0.000           0.000           
+p<.1 *p< .05  **p<.01  ***<.001 
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Table 39 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Above the Poverty Line  
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.089 0.024 *** -0.093 0.028 *** -0.091 * 0.040 -0.129 *** 0.037 -0.073 ** 0.024 -0.083 ** 0.028
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.103 0.024 *** 0.125 0.029 *** -0.246 *** 0.041 0.055  0.037 -0.080 *** 0.025 0.147 *** 0.029
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.180 0.028 *** -0.028 0.034  -0.350 *** 0.046 -0.170 *** 0.045 -0.118 *** 0.028 0.030  0.035
Male -0.297 0.019 *** -5.437 0.041 *** -0.426 *** 0.030 -5.648 *** 0.069 -0.294 *** 0.025 -5.455 *** 0.047
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)       -0.001  0.040 0.376 *** 0.084       
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)       0.198 *** 0.041 -0.140  0.089       
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999)       0.235 *** 0.049 0.465 *** 0.092       
Muslim             -0.268 *** 0.072 0.400 *** 0.065
Scheduled Caste             -1.235 *** 0.044 -0.993 *** 0.041
Scheduled Tribe             -0.630 *** 0.051 -1.071 *** 0.055
Muslim*Male             0.186 * 0.077 -0.509 *** 0.118
Scheduled Caste*Male             0.125 ** 0.044 0.398 *** 0.094
Scheduled Tribe*Male             -0.093 * 0.045 0.907 *** 0.143
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)                   
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)                   
Muslim*Period 55  (1999)                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 43                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 50                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 55                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55                   
Muslim*Male*Period 43                                     
Continued on next page 
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Table 39 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Above the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 50                   
Muslim*Male*Period 55                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50                   
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50                   
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55                   
Age -0.038 0.010 *** -0.242 0.012 *** -0.038 *** 0.010 -0.242 *** 0.012 -0.049 *** 0.010 -0.252 *** 0.012
Age Squared 0.001 0.000 *** 0.003 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.834 0.026 *** 0.800 0.040 *** -0.833 *** 0.026 0.804 *** 0.040 -0.896 *** 0.027 0.697 *** 0.042
Household Size 0.222 0.007 *** 0.260 0.008 *** 0.222 *** 0.007 0.260 *** 0.008 0.210 *** 0.007 0.249 *** 0.008
Primary School 0.291 0.026 *** 0.741 0.035 *** 0.293 *** 0.026 0.743 *** 0.035 0.168 *** 0.027 0.614 *** 0.036
Middle School -0.031 0.026  0.713 0.039 *** -0.033  0.026 0.712 *** 0.039 -0.230 *** 0.028 0.539 *** 0.042
College -0.792 0.046 *** -0.367 0.074 *** -0.797 *** 0.046 -0.364 *** 0.074 -1.048 *** 0.047 -0.579 *** 0.079
Never Married 0.151 0.045 *** 0.985 0.099 *** 0.149 *** 0.045 0.983 *** 0.099 0.097 * 0.045 0.944 *** 0.099
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.189 0.033 *** -0.644 0.042 *** -0.190 *** 0.033 -0.645 *** 0.042 -0.199 *** 0.033 -0.670 *** 0.043
Number of Kids in Household -0.075 0.011 *** -0.112 0.013 *** -0.076 *** 0.011 -0.111 *** 0.013 -0.071 *** 0.011 -0.116 *** 0.013
Madhya Pradesh -0.460 0.030 *** -1.490 0.039 *** -0.461 *** 0.030 -1.493 *** 0.039 -0.407 *** 0.031 -1.321 *** 0.039
Maharashtra -0.915 0.028 *** -2.126 0.038 *** -0.916 *** 0.029 -2.128 *** 0.038 -0.980 *** 0.030 -2.123 *** 0.040
Rajasthan 0.060 0.031 * -0.940 0.039 *** 0.059 + 0.031 -0.943 *** 0.039 0.101 ** 0.032 -0.835 *** 0.040
New Delhi -0.802 0.088 *** -0.821 0.098 *** -0.800 *** 0.088 -0.811 *** 0.100 -0.817 *** 0.091 -0.785 *** 0.094
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli -0.876 0.033 *** -1.532 0.041 *** -0.876 *** 0.033 -1.534 *** 0.041 -0.897 *** 0.034 -1.459 *** 0.043
Intercept 0.790 0.191 *** 5.612 0.233 *** 0.888 *** 0.193 5.690 *** 0.235 1.429 *** 0.195 6.170 *** 0.234
Continued on next page 
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Table 39 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Above the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested       [2]mper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    
       [3]mper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    
       [2]mper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0    
       [3]mper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0    
       [2]mper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0     
       [3]mper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0     
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested       6      6      
chi2       131.2      132.2      
Prob > chi2             0.000           0.000           
Continued on next page 
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Table 39 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Above the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.060  0.044 -0.103 * 0.043 -0.057  0.045 -0.101 * 0.043 -0.122 * 0.052 -0.154 *** 0.048
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.210 *** 0.045 0.027  0.043 -0.213 *** 0.045 0.024  0.043 -0.232 *** 0.052 0.004  0.048
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.249 *** 0.052 -0.093 + 0.056 -0.251 *** 0.052 -0.093 + 0.056 -0.311 *** 0.063 -0.140 * 0.064
Male -0.396 *** 0.030 -5.633 *** 0.070 -0.415 *** 0.032 -5.642 *** 0.072 -0.467 *** 0.038 -5.721 *** 0.081
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.015  0.041 0.358 *** 0.086 -0.019  0.041 0.355 *** 0.085 0.067  0.052 0.467 *** 0.101
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.193 *** 0.042 -0.156 + 0.091 0.197 *** 0.042 -0.145  0.089 0.221 *** 0.053 -0.068  0.106
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999) 0.230 *** 0.050 0.430 *** 0.095 0.231 *** 0.051 0.417 *** 0.094 0.311 *** 0.070 0.514 *** 0.116
Muslim -0.201 ** 0.068 0.234 ** 0.078 -0.347 *** 0.093 0.221 * 0.093 -0.499 *** 0.129 0.099  0.109
Scheduled Caste -1.149 *** 0.051 -1.039 *** 0.060 -1.238 *** 0.061 -1.106 *** 0.062 -1.293 *** 0.078 -1.159 *** 0.070
Scheduled Tribe -0.478 *** 0.061 -0.853 *** 0.075 -0.414 *** 0.069 -0.844 *** 0.078 -0.559 *** 0.083 -0.947 *** 0.087
Muslim*Male       0.188 * 0.078 -0.501 *** 0.119 0.378 ** 0.134 -0.226  0.214
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.128 ** 0.044 0.380 *** 0.095 0.202 * 0.078 0.640 *** 0.190
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.110 * 0.046 0.885 *** 0.144 0.109  0.081 1.078 *** 0.263
Muslim*Period 43 (1987) 0.137  0.093 0.144  0.104 0.139  0.093 0.167  0.109 0.403 * 0.184 0.413 ** 0.159
Muslim*Period 50 (1993) 0.174 + 0.094 0.316 ** 0.108 0.167 + 0.094 0.345 ** 0.114 0.105  0.193 0.339 * 0.160
Muslim*Period 55  (1999) 0.001  0.105 0.118  0.112 -0.001  0.105 0.158  0.118 0.322  0.198 0.365 * 0.172
Scheduled Caste*Period 43 0.028  0.070 -0.031  0.082 0.029  0.070 -0.034  0.080 0.188 + 0.108 0.066  0.096
Scheduled Caste*Period 50 0.051  0.072 0.307 *** 0.085 0.047  0.072 0.306 *** 0.083 0.105  0.115 0.354 *** 0.098
Scheduled Caste*Period 55 -0.059  0.076 0.135  0.087 -0.060  0.076 0.130  0.086 -0.053  0.118 0.183 + 0.104
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43 -0.170 * 0.085 -0.112  0.104 -0.172 * 0.085 -0.135  0.103 -0.024  0.118 -0.019  0.120
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50 -0.302 *** 0.085 -0.124  0.103 -0.302 *** 0.085 -0.126  0.102 -0.236 * 0.116 -0.058  0.115
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55 -0.239 * 0.097 -0.400 *** 0.124 -0.243 * 0.097 -0.414 *** 0.122 0.012  0.136 -0.255 + 0.147
Muslim*Male*Period 43                         -0.326 + 0.192 -0.665 * 0.302
Continued on next page 
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Table 39 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Above the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 50             0.065  0.200 -0.181  0.303
Muslim*Male*Period 55             -0.402 + 0.213 -0.255  0.321
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43             -0.227 * 0.109 -0.160  0.248
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50             -0.080  0.117 -0.239  0.267
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55             -0.006  0.122 -0.424  0.261
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43             -0.217 + 0.116 -0.287  0.359
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50             -0.097  0.112 -0.382  0.414
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55             -0.398 *** 0.124 -0.127  0.372
Age -0.050 *** 0.010 -0.252 *** 0.012 -0.049 *** 0.010 -0.252 *** 0.012 -0.050 *** 0.010 -0.252 *** 0.012
Age Squared 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.891 *** 0.027 0.688 *** 0.042 -0.895 *** 0.027 0.700 *** 0.042 -0.895 *** 0.027 0.700 *** 0.042
Household Size 0.210 *** 0.007 0.248 *** 0.008 0.210 *** 0.007 0.248 *** 0.008 0.210 *** 0.007 0.248 *** 0.008
Primary School 0.172 *** 0.027 0.620 *** 0.036 0.171 *** 0.027 0.616 *** 0.036 0.171 *** 0.027 0.617 *** 0.036
Middle School -0.234 *** 0.028 0.545 *** 0.042 -0.234 *** 0.028 0.541 *** 0.042 -0.234 *** 0.028 0.541 *** 0.042
College -1.057 *** 0.048 -0.561 *** 0.080 -1.054 *** 0.047 -0.571 *** 0.080 -1.054 *** 0.047 -0.572 *** 0.080
Never Married 0.096 * 0.045 0.926 *** 0.099 0.095 * 0.045 0.941 *** 0.099 0.096 * 0.045 0.941 *** 0.099
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.200 *** 0.033 -0.670 *** 0.043 -0.200 *** 0.033 -0.673 *** 0.043 -0.200 *** 0.033 -0.673 *** 0.043
Number of Kids in Household -0.071 *** 0.011 -0.115 *** 0.012 -0.071 *** 0.011 -0.116 *** 0.012 -0.071 *** 0.011 -0.116 *** 0.012
Madhya Pradesh -0.414 *** 0.032 -1.335 *** 0.040 -0.411 *** 0.032 -1.331 *** 0.040 -0.411 *** 0.032 -1.331 *** 0.040
Maharashtra -0.982 *** 0.030 -2.124 *** 0.039 -0.980 *** 0.030 -2.125 *** 0.040 -0.979 *** 0.030 -2.125 *** 0.040
Rajasthan 0.098 ** 0.032 -0.835 *** 0.040 0.102 *** 0.032 -0.835 *** 0.040 0.102 *** 0.032 -0.834 *** 0.040
New Delhi -0.816 *** 0.091 -0.773 *** 0.094 -0.814 *** 0.091 -0.776 *** 0.094 -0.814 *** 0.091 -0.777 *** 0.094
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli -0.899 *** 0.035 -1.461 *** 0.043 -0.895 *** 0.034 -1.459 *** 0.043 -0.895 *** 0.035 -1.459 *** 0.043
Intercept 1.505 *** 0.195 6.228 *** 0.235 1.509 *** 0.195 6.243 *** 0.235 1.551 *** 0.196 6.280 *** 0.235
Continued on next page 
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Table 39 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist 
States Above the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.  SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested [2]musper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    [2]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [3]musper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    [3]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [2]musper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0     [2]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [3]musper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0     [3]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [2]musper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0     [2]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [3]musper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0     [3]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [2]scper43 = 0          [2]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]scper43 = 0          [3]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]scper50 = 0          [2]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]scper50 = 0          [3]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]scper55 = 0          [2]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]scper55 = 0          [3]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [2]stper43 = 0          [2]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]stper43 = 0          [3]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]stper50 = 0          [2]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]stper50 = 0          [3]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]stper55 = 0          [2]stmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]stper55 = 0          [3]stmaleper55 = 0    
                   
Number of Variables Tested 18      6      18      
chi2 62.3      132.7      33.8      
Prob > chi2 0.000           0.000           0.013          
+p<.1 *p< .05  **p<.01  ***<.001 
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Table 40 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line 
  Model 1         Model 2           Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.014  0.021 0.016  0.025 0.109 ** 0.038 0.043  0.033 0.022  0.021 0.023  0.025
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.032  0.021 -0.058 * 0.025 -0.097 * 0.038 -0.098 ** 0.033 0.012  0.021 -0.018  0.025
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.145 *** 0.023 -0.166 *** 0.027 -0.264 *** 0.040 -0.260 *** 0.034 -0.081 *** 0.023 -0.115 *** 0.027
Male -0.150 *** 0.015 -5.161 *** 0.033 -0.205 *** 0.029 -5.318 *** 0.065 -0.184 *** 0.018 -5.173 *** 0.038
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)       -0.125 *** 0.038 0.090  0.071       
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)       0.088 * 0.038 0.084  0.074       
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999)       0.165 *** 0.039 0.331 *** 0.075       
Muslim             -0.238 *** 0.059 0.579 *** 0.046
Scheduled Caste             -1.299 *** 0.038 -0.915 *** 0.029
Scheduled Tribe             -0.173 *** 0.049 -0.929 *** 0.050
Muslim*Male             0.259 *** 0.060 -0.786 *** 0.080
Scheduled Caste*Male             0.200 *** 0.038 0.388 *** 0.070
Scheduled Tribe*Male             -0.114 * 0.045 0.641 *** 0.098
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)                   
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)                   
Muslim*Period 55  (1999)                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 43                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 50                   
Scheduled Caste*Period 55                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50                   
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55                   
Muslim*Male*Period 43                                     
Continued on next page 
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Table 40 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2           Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman -0.695 *** 0.031 -1.833 *** 0.037 -0.695 *** 0.031 -1.833 *** 0.037 -0.668 *** 0.032 -1.830 *** 0.037
Kerele/Lakshadweep -1.353 *** 0.037 -1.407 *** 0.045 -1.353 *** 0.037 -1.407 *** 0.045 -1.367 *** 0.038 -1.522 *** 0.046
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh -0.269 *** 0.034 -0.398 *** 0.039 -0.269 *** 0.034 -0.398 *** 0.039 -0.050  0.035 -0.225 *** 0.039
Northeast 0.170 *** 0.031 -0.934 *** 0.038 0.170 *** 0.031 -0.935 *** 0.038 0.207 *** 0.035 -0.558 *** 0.042
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui -0.374 *** 0.032 -1.556 *** 0.039 -0.374 *** 0.032 -1.556 *** 0.039 -0.394 *** 0.033 -1.575 *** 0.039
Intercept -0.579 *** 0.148 5.233 *** 0.182 -0.533 *** 0.150 5.275 *** 0.183 -0.120   0.151 5.647 *** 0.184
Continued on next page 
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Table 40 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 1         Model 2           Model 3         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested       [2]mper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    
       [3]mper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    
       [2]mper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0     
       [3]mper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0     
       [2]mper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0     
       [3]mper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0     
                   
                   
                   
                   
Number of Variables Tested       6      6      
chi2       86.2      352.3      
Prob > chi2             0.000           0.000           
Continued on next page 
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Table 40 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
                   
Historical Period 43 (1987) 0.089 * 0.041 0.025  0.038 0.091 * 0.041 0.026  0.038 0.063  0.046 -0.010  0.041
Historical Period 50 (1993) -0.040  0.041 -0.083 * 0.038 -0.039  0.041 -0.078 * 0.038 -0.051  0.047 -0.102 * 0.042
Historical Period 55 (1999) -0.182 *** 0.044 -0.212 *** 0.040 -0.180 *** 0.044 -0.210 *** 0.041 -0.228 *** 0.050 -0.248 *** 0.044
Male -0.199 *** 0.029 -5.356 *** 0.067 -0.241 *** 0.031 -5.312 *** 0.068 -0.275 *** 0.035 -5.416 *** 0.080
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987) -0.111 ** 0.038 0.103  0.073 -0.114 ** 0.038 0.100  0.072 -0.076 + 0.046 0.246 ** 0.088
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993) 0.092 * 0.038 0.090  0.076 0.092 * 0.038 0.056  0.075 0.108 * 0.046 0.176 + 0.091
Male*Historical Period 55  (1999) 0.179 *** 0.040 0.328 *** 0.077 0.174 *** 0.040 0.309 *** 0.076 0.239 *** 0.050 0.427 *** 0.094
Muslim 0.095 * 0.047 0.566 *** 0.057 -0.126 + 0.071 0.651 *** 0.072 -0.318 ** 0.109 0.492 *** 0.085
Scheduled Caste -1.169 *** 0.049 -0.889 *** 0.064 -1.299 *** 0.057 -0.962 *** 0.063 -1.340 *** 0.080 -1.029 *** 0.070
Scheduled Tribe -0.236 *** 0.063 -1.066 *** 0.080 -0.159 * 0.072 -1.071 *** 0.082 -0.208 * 0.097 -1.121 *** 0.094
Muslim*Male       0.264 *** 0.060 -0.797 *** 0.080 0.499 *** 0.110 -0.371 * 0.152
Scheduled Caste*Male       0.187 *** 0.038 0.368 *** 0.071 0.245 ** 0.083 0.763 *** 0.169
Scheduled Tribe*Male       -0.120 ** 0.045 0.628 *** 0.098 -0.050  0.091 0.832 *** 0.218
Muslim*Period 43 (1987) -0.124 + 0.063 -0.144 + 0.074 -0.123 + 0.063 -0.122  0.083 0.034  0.151 0.062  0.116
Muslim*Period 50 (1993) -0.036  0.068 -0.014  0.078 -0.036  0.068 -0.010  0.088 0.254  0.158 0.216 + 0.121
Muslim*Period 55  (1999) -0.226 *** 0.070 -0.146 + 0.081 -0.230 *** 0.070 -0.118  0.091 0.026  0.161 0.060  0.123
Scheduled Caste*Period 43 0.173 ** 0.063 0.111  0.079 0.171 ** 0.063 0.098  0.077 0.291 ** 0.105 0.201 * 0.089
Scheduled Caste*Period 50 -0.033  0.063 0.070  0.077 -0.034  0.063 0.067  0.075 -0.149  0.106 0.105  0.084
Scheduled Caste*Period 55 -0.045  0.067 0.047  0.079 -0.044  0.067 0.043  0.076 0.082  0.108 0.143 + 0.087
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43 0.025  0.084 0.194 + 0.104 0.028  0.084 0.183 + 0.101 -0.023  0.131 0.199  0.125
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50 -0.093  0.088 0.262 * 0.117 -0.091  0.088 0.251 * 0.114 0.028  0.134 0.338 * 0.138
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55 0.035  0.087 0.115  0.105 0.032  0.087 0.106  0.102 0.108  0.129 0.164  0.123
Muslim*Male*Period 43                         -0.197   0.154 -0.623 ** 0.202
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Table 40 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Muslim*Male*Period 50             -0.351 * 0.161 -0.588 ** 0.221
Muslim*Male*Period 55             -0.315 + 0.164 -0.405 + 0.218
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43             -0.169  0.110 -0.482 * 0.208
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50             0.153  0.109 -0.457 * 0.214
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55             -0.179  0.111 -0.476 * 0.213
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43             0.076  0.127 -0.335  0.289
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50             -0.177  0.129 -0.242  0.302
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55             -0.108  0.124 -0.166  0.272
Age -0.012  0.008 -0.242 *** 0.010 -0.011  0.008 -0.242 *** 0.010 -0.011  0.008 -0.243 *** 0.010
Age Squared 0.000 ** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000
Urban -0.762 *** 0.019 0.336 *** 0.022 -0.761 *** 0.019 0.334 *** 0.022 -0.761 *** 0.019 0.334 *** 0.022
Household Size 0.188 *** 0.005 0.253 *** 0.006 0.188 *** 0.005 0.253 *** 0.006 0.188 *** 0.005 0.253 *** 0.006
Primary School 0.528 *** 0.019 0.895 *** 0.025 0.525 *** 0.019 0.891 *** 0.025 0.525 *** 0.019 0.891 *** 0.025
Middle School 0.209 *** 0.021 0.903 *** 0.028 0.211 *** 0.020 0.901 *** 0.028 0.211 *** 0.020 0.901 *** 0.028
College -0.713 *** 0.035 -0.093 + 0.056 -0.708 *** 0.035 -0.094 + 0.057 -0.708 *** 0.035 -0.094 + 0.057
Never Married 0.115 *** 0.030 0.778 *** 0.061 0.116 *** 0.030 0.773 *** 0.060 0.116 *** 0.030 0.773 *** 0.060
Widow/Divorced/Separated -0.215 *** 0.030 -0.787 *** 0.033 -0.216 *** 0.030 -0.791 *** 0.033 -0.216 *** 0.030 -0.792 *** 0.033
Number of Kids in Household -0.055 *** 0.008 -0.126 *** 0.010 -0.055 *** 0.008 -0.127 *** 0.010 -0.055 *** 0.008 -0.127 *** 0.010
Andra Pradesh -0.390 *** 0.029 -1.930 *** 0.035 -0.391 *** 0.029 -1.928 *** 0.036 -0.391 *** 0.029 -1.928 *** 0.036
Assam -0.239 *** 0.036 0.136 ** 0.046 -0.239 *** 0.036 0.143 ** 0.046 -0.239 *** 0.036 0.144 ** 0.046
Jammu and Kashmir 0.017  0.045 0.106 * 0.050 0.009  0.045 0.156 ** 0.053 0.007  0.045 0.151 ** 0.053
Orissa -0.354 *** 0.038 -0.416 *** 0.042 -0.352 *** 0.038 -0.415 *** 0.042 -0.352 *** 0.038 -0.415 *** 0.042
West Bengal -0.295 *** 0.031 -0.062 + 0.036 -0.300 *** 0.031 -0.065 + 0.036 -0.299 *** 0.031 -0.064 + 0.036
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Table 40 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman -0.668 *** 0.032 -1.834 *** 0.037 -0.667 *** 0.032 -1.830 *** 0.037 -0.667 *** 0.032 -1.830 *** 0.037
Kerele/Lakshadweep -1.371 *** 0.038 -1.514 *** 0.045 -1.368 *** 0.038 -1.522 *** 0.046 -1.368 *** 0.038 -1.523 *** 0.046
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh -0.049  0.035 -0.218 *** 0.040 -0.052  0.035 -0.226 *** 0.039 -0.052  0.035 -0.226 *** 0.039
Northeast 0.202 *** 0.035 -0.571 *** 0.042 0.203 *** 0.035 -0.559 *** 0.042 0.203 *** 0.035 -0.558 *** 0.042
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui -0.392 *** 0.033 -1.575 *** 0.039 -0.393 *** 0.033 -1.575 *** 0.039 -0.393 *** 0.033 -1.575 *** 0.039
Intercept -0.101   0.153 5.668 *** 0.185 -0.084   0.153 5.697 *** 0.185 -0.057   0.154 5.725 *** 0.186
Continued on next page 
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Table 40 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-
Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued 
  Model 4         Model 5         Model 6         
 Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF Self Employed Unemp./Out LF 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
Wald Test                   
Variables Tested [2]musper43 = 0    [2]musmale = 0    [2]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [3]musper43 = 0    [3]musmale = 0    [3]musmaleper43 = 0   
 [2]musper50 = 0    [2]scmale = 0     [2]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [3]musper50 = 0    [3]scmale = 0     [3]musmaleper50 = 0   
 [2]musper55 = 0    [2]stmale = 0     [2]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [3]musper55 = 0    [3]stmale = 0     [3]musmaleper55 = 0   
 [2]scper43 = 0          [2]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]scper43 = 0    chi2(  6) = 350     [3]scmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]scper50 = 0    Prob > chi2 = 0     [2]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]scper50 = 0          [3]scmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]scper55 = 0          [2]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]scper55 = 0          [3]scmaleper55 = 0    
 [2]stper43 = 0          [2]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [3]stper43 = 0          [3]stmaleper43 = 0    
 [2]stper50 = 0          [2]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [3]stper50 = 0          [3]stmaleper50 = 0    
 [2]stper55 = 0          [2]stmaleper55 = 0    
 [3]stper55 = 0          [3]stmaleper55 = 0    
                   
Number of Variables Tested 18      6      18      
chi2 47.8      350.4      41.2      
Prob > chi2 0.000           0.000           0.001           
+p<.1 *p< .05  **p<.01  ***<.001 
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Ratio Hindu Male Hindu Female Hindu Difference Hindu Ratio
All States         
Wage Employment         
1983 0.4476 0.0663 0.3813 0.1481 0.4219 0.0907 0.3312 0.2150 
1987 0.4455 0.0641 0.3814 0.1439 0.4363 0.0926 0.3437 0.2122 
1993 0.4224 0.0583 0.3641 0.1380 0.4274 0.0934 0.3340 0.2185 
1999 0.4714 0.0637 0.4077 0.1351 0.4389 0.1048 0.3341 0.2388 
Self-Employment         
1983 0.5354 0.0822 0.4532 0.1535 0.5602 0.1561 0.4041 0.2787 
1987 0.5377 0.0932 0.4445 0.1733 0.5398 0.1625 0.3773 0.3010 
1993 0.5612 0.0792 0.4820 0.1411 0.5548 0.1433 0.4115 0.2583 
1999 0.5080 0.0889 0.4191 0.1750 0.5397 0.1441 0.3956 0.2670 
Unemp./Out LF         
1983 0.0170 0.8515 -0.8345 50.0882 0.0179 0.7532 -0.7353 42.0782 
1987 0.0169 0.8427 -0.8258 49.8639 0.0239 0.7449 -0.7210 31.1674 
1993 0.0164 0.8625 -0.8461 52.5915 0.0178 0.7633 -0.7455 42.8820 
1999 0.0206 0.8474 -0.8268 41.1359 0.0214 0.7511 -0.7297 35.0981 
Fundamentalist States         
Wage Employment         
1983 0.3965 0.0832 0.3133 0.2098 0.3610 0.0876 0.2734 0.2427 
1987 0.3968 0.0652 0.3316 0.1643 0.3905 0.0968 0.2937 0.2479 
1993 0.3684 0.0667 0.3017 0.1811 0.3810 0.0908 0.2902 0.2383 
1999 0.4224 0.0659 0.3565 0.1560 0.3918 0.1043 0.2875 0.2662 
Self-Employment         
1983 0.5911 0.1225 0.4686 0.2072 0.6261 0.2139 0.4122 0.3416 
1987 0.5906 0.1399 0.4507 0.2369 0.5915 0.2175 0.3740 0.3677 
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Ratio Hindu Male Hindu Female Hindu Difference Hindu Ratio
Fundamentalist States Continued         
Self-Employment         
1993 0.6194 0.1011 0.5183 0.1632 0.6069 0.1769 0.4300 0.2915 
1999 0.5581 0.1128 0.4453 0.2021 0.5909 0.1820 0.4089 0.3080 
Unemp./Out LF         
1983 0.0124 0.7943 -0.7819 64.0565 0.0129 0.6985 -0.6856 54.1473 
1987 0.0126 0.7949 -0.7823 63.0873 0.0180 0.6858 -0.6678 38.1000 
1993 0.0122 0.8322 -0.8200 68.2131 0.0121 0.7323 -0.7202 60.5207 
1999 0.0195 0.8213 -0.8018 42.1179 0.0173 0.7137 -0.6964 41.2543 
Non-Fundamentalist States         
Wage Employment         
1983 0.4768 0.0582 0.4186 0.1221 0.4641 0.0922 0.3719 0.1987 
1987 0.4733 0.0628 0.4105 0.1327 0.4673 0.0898 0.3775 0.1922 
1993 0.4547 0.0543 0.4004 0.1194 0.4575 0.0960 0.3615 0.2098 
1999 0.4980 0.0631 0.4349 0.1267 0.4664 0.1062 0.3602 0.2277 
Self-Employment         
1983 0.5038 0.0629 0.4409 0.1249 0.5143 0.1221 0.3922 0.2374 
1987 0.5075 0.0711 0.4364 0.1401 0.5046 0.1297 0.3749 0.2570 
1993 0.5270 0.0698 0.4572 0.1324 0.5202 0.1256 0.3946 0.2414 
1999 0.4817 0.0791 0.4026 0.1642 0.5098 0.1239 0.3859 0.2430 
Unemp./Out LF         
1983 0.0193 0.8789 -0.8596 45.5389 0.0216 0.7858 -0.7642 36.3796 
1987 0.0192 0.8662 -0.8470 45.1146 0.0281 0.7806 -0.7525 27.7794 
1993 0.0183 0.8759 -0.8576 47.8634 0.0223 0.7784 -0.7561 34.9058 




Table 42 Religious and Gender Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployment/Out of the 
Labor Force, Below the Poverty Line 











All States         
Wage Employment         
1983 0.5226 0.0894 0.4332 0.1711 0.4421 0.1335 0.3086 0.3020 
1987 0.5091 0.0966 0.4125 0.1897 0.477 0.1337 0.3433 0.2803 
1993 0.4883 0.0857 0.4026 0.1755 0.4827 0.1468 0.3359 0.3041 
1999 0.5376 0.081 0.4566 0.1507 0.5277 0.168 0.3597 0.3184 
Self-Employment         
1983 0.4632 0.093 0.3702 0.2008 0.54 0.1764 0.3636 0.3267 
1987 0.4739 0.1194 0.3545 0.2520 0.4977 0.1892 0.3085 0.3801 
1993 0.4964 0.0999 0.3965 0.2012 0.4982 0.1577 0.3405 0.3165 
1999 0.4439 0.1258 0.3181 0.2834 0.4528 0.1583 0.2945 0.3496 
Unemp./Out LF         
1983 0.0141 0.8176 -0.8035 57.9858 0.0179 0.6902 -0.6723 38.5587 
1987 0.017 0.784 -0.7670 46.1176 0.0253 0.6771 -0.6518 26.7628 
1993 0.0154 0.8144 -0.7990 52.8831 0.019 0.6954 -0.6764 36.6000 
1999 0.0185 0.7933 -0.7748 42.8811 0.0195 0.6737 -0.6542 34.5487 
Fundamentalist States         
Wage Employment         
1983 0.4335 0.108 0.3255 0.2491 0.3615 0.1259 0.2356 0.3483 
1987 0.4443 0.0891 0.3552 0.2005 0.4268 0.1351 0.2917 0.3165 
1993 0.4222 0.0964 0.3258 0.2283 0.4133 0.1412 0.2721 0.3416 
1999 0.4836 0.087 0.3966 0.1799 0.4929 0.1807 0.3122 0.3666 
Self-Employment         
1983 0.5548 0.1316 0.4232 0.2372 0.6241 0.2479 0.3762 0.3972 
1987 0.5435 0.1714 0.3721 0.3154 0.5523 0.2617 0.2906 0.4738 
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Table 42 Religious and Gender Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployment/Out of the 
Labor Force, Below the Poverty Line 











Fundamentalist States Continued         
Self-Employment         
1993 0.5654 0.1387 0.4267 0.2453 0.5712 0.2059 0.3653 0.3605 
1999 0.4983 0.1354 0.3629 0.2717 0.4891 0.203 0.2861 0.4150 
Unemp./Out LF         
1983 0.0117 0.7604 -0.7487 64.9915 0.0144 0.6262 -0.6118 43.4861 
1987 0.0122 0.7395 -0.7273 60.6148 0.0209 0.6032 -0.5823 28.8612 
1993 0.0124 0.7649 -0.7525 61.6855 0.0155 0.6529 -0.6374 42.1226 
1999 0.018 0.7776 -0.7596 43.2000 0.018 0.6164 -0.5984 34.2444 
Non-Fundamentalist States         
Wage Employment         
1983 0.5809 0.0796 0.5013 0.1370 0.5012 0.136 0.3652 0.2713 
1987 0.5523 0.0985 0.4538 0.1783 0.5149 0.1304 0.3845 0.2533 
1993 0.5302 0.0792 0.4510 0.1494 0.5339 0.1496 0.3843 0.2802 
1999 0.5683 0.0785 0.4898 0.1381 0.5466 0.1576 0.3890 0.2883 
Self-Employment         
1983 0.4044 0.0734 0.3310 0.1815 0.4783 0.1311 0.3472 0.2741 
1987 0.4276 0.0923 0.3353 0.2159 0.4558 0.1414 0.3144 0.3102 
1993 0.4534 0.0798 0.3736 0.1760 0.4446 0.1258 0.3188 0.2830 
1999 0.415 0.1301 0.2849 0.3135 0.4343 0.1321 0.3022 0.3042 
Unemp./Out LF         
1983 0.0147 0.847 -0.8323 57.6190 0.0205 0.7328 -0.7123 35.7463 
1987 0.0201 0.8092 -0.7891 40.2587 0.0293 0.7281 -0.6988 24.8498 
1993 0.0164 0.8409 -0.8245 51.2744 0.0215 0.7245 -0.7030 33.6977 




Table 43 Religious and Gender Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployment/Out of the 


















All States         
Wage Employment         
1983 0.391 0.0554 0.3356 0.1417 0.4043 0.071 0.3333 0.1756 
1987 0.4175 0.0493 0.3682 0.1181 0.4097 0.0748 0.3349 0.1826 
1993 0.3836 0.046 0.3376 0.1199 0.3987 0.0755 0.3232 0.1894 
1999 0.4388 0.0582 0.3806 0.1326 0.403 0.086 0.3170 0.2134 
Self-Employment         
1983 0.5908 0.0776 0.5132 0.1313 0.5779 0.1465 0.4314 0.2535 
1987 0.5666 0.0806 0.4860 0.1423 0.5669 0.1524 0.4145 0.2688 
1993 0.6011 0.0673 0.5338 0.1120 0.5835 0.1348 0.4487 0.2310 
1999 0.5397 0.0706 0.4691 0.1308 0.5743 0.135 0.4393 0.2351 
Unemp./Out LF         
1983 0.0182 0.867 -0.8488 47.6374 0.0177 0.7824 -0.7647 44.2034 
1987 0.0159 0.8701 -0.8542 54.7233 0.0234 0.7728 -0.7494 33.0256 
1993 0.0153 0.8867 -0.8714 57.9542 0.0179 0.7898 -0.7719 44.1229 
1999 0.0215 0.8712 -0.8497 40.5209 0.0227 0.779 -0.7563 34.3172 
Fundamentalist States         
Wage Employment         
1983 0.3818 0.069 0.3128 0.1807 0.3537 0.069 0.2847 0.1951 
1987 0.3765 0.054 0.3225 0.1434 0.3644 0.079 0.2854 0.2168 
1993 0.3454 0.0524 0.2930 0.1517 0.3564 0.0717 0.2847 0.2012 
1999 0.3972 0.0573 0.3399 0.1443 0.3516 0.081 0.2706 0.2304 
Self-Employment         
1983 0.6065 0.1199 0.4866 0.1977 0.634 0.1973 0.4367 0.3112 
1987 0.6112 0.1242 0.4870 0.2032 0.6182 0.2001 0.4181 0.3237 
Continued on next page 
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Table 43 Religious and Gender Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployment/Out of the 


















Fundamentalist States Continued         
Self-Employment         
1993 0.643 0.0802 0.5628 0.1247 0.632 0.1627 0.4693 0.2574 
1999 0.583 0.1007 0.4823 0.1727 0.6306 0.1699 0.4607 0.2694 
Unemp./Out LF         
1983 0.0117 0.811 -0.7993 69.3162 0.0123 0.7337 -0.7214 59.6504 
1987 0.0123 0.8218 -0.8095 66.8130 0.0174 0.7209 -0.7035 41.4310 
1993 0.0116 0.8674 -0.8558 74.7759 0.0116 0.7656 -0.7540 66.0000 
1999 0.0198 0.8421 -0.8223 42.5303 0.0178 0.7491 -0.7313 42.0843 
Non-Fundamentalist States         
Wage Employment         
1983 0.3949 0.0489 0.3460 0.1238 0.4384 0.0725 0.3659 0.1654 
1987 0.4388 0.0465 0.3923 0.1060 0.439 0.0726 0.3664 0.1654 
1993 0.4066 0.0436 0.3630 0.1072 0.4245 0.0792 0.3453 0.1866 
1999 0.4617 0.0585 0.4032 0.1267 0.4339 0.0909 0.3430 0.2095 
Self-Employment         
1983 0.583 0.0577 0.5253 0.0990 0.5398 0.1176 0.4222 0.2179 
1987 0.5434 0.0604 0.4830 0.1112 0.5334 0.1253 0.4081 0.2349 
1993 0.5765 0.063 0.5135 0.1093 0.5528 0.122 0.4308 0.2207 
1999 0.5165 0.0564 0.4601 0.1092 0.5404 0.1174 0.4230 0.2172 
Unemp./Out LF         
1983 0.0221 0.8934 -0.8713 40.4253 0.0218 0.8099 -0.7881 37.1514 
1987 0.0177 0.8932 -0.8755 50.4633 0.0276 0.8021 -0.7745 29.0616 
1993 0.0169 0.8934 -0.8765 52.8639 0.0227 0.7987 -0.7760 35.1850 
1999 0.0219 0.8851 -0.8632 40.4155 0.0257 0.7917 -0.7660 30.8054 
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-Supply of Schools 
-Economic Benefits of Education 
-Ideologies about Non-Economic Benefits of 
Education  
Discrimination and Disadvantage 
Girls - 







Hindu Fundamentalism and Muslim 
Identity Politics - 
-Girls as symbols of community 
-Conservative gender ideologies (i.e. about gender 
roles) 
-Girls vessels of religion 
-Safety issues 
Parental Value and Demand for 
Education 
-Economic Resources 

















Discrimination and Disadvantage 
Women 
-Work place discrimination 
-Cultural practices (i.e. Purdah) 
Muslims 
-Work place discrimination 
-Hindu fundamentalism 
Hindu Fundamentalism and 
Muslim Identity Politics 
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